Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 3, 1946, 10:15 a.m.

Nanking, June 3, 1946, 10:15 a.m.

Also present:	Colonel Caughey
	Mr. Chang
	Captain Soong

General Chou opened the meeting by asking General Marshall if he had heard when the Generalissimo was coming back.

General Marshall said the Generalissimo would be back today.

General Chou stated that he would like first to inform General Marshall of a few items. General Chou had learned that the Generalissimo would call a conference of many generals, some of whom have arrived, including General Chang Fa Kwei⁶⁶ and others. The date had not yet been fixed. It was to be held as soon as the Generalissimo returned. This conference would deal with military questions. Apart from that, there would be a food conference to discuss the problem of collecting food for war purposes. At the military conference, the generals would feel that the National troops had crushed the Communist troops in Manchuria and hence would want to carry on the war instead of stopping it. They intended to seize such places as Tsitsihar, Harbin and Antung, etc., so as to control all railway lines and large cities.

With regard to China proper, at first it had been felt that Americans would stop the fighting. Whenever hostilities took place, Americans would intervene. Since April and May, fighting, especially in Manchuria, has become vigorous. When the Kuomintang occupy a place, they leave no trace behind that the Communists had been there. After occupying it, they stop further attack and then try to prove that the place was never occupied by Communists. This tactics had become rather effective for Americans, upon finding such a situation, would leave without further investigation. Under such circumstances, Communist forces feel that they can not stop resisting in Manchuria. The Kuomintang are continuing their attacks after the capture of Changchun. Recently at Anshan, the Communists routed one National division of the 60th Army. The Communists then occupied Anshan down to Yingkow including Haishun and Daishu-chan on the railway line.

Coming to China proper, if the original plan of the Government troops was pursued then the Communists cannot give up resistance.

General Marshall asked what was meant by the original plan.

General Chou said their method of procedure. The Generalissimo was deliberately delaying his return by staying in Manchuria and then Peiping. This delay makes the situation only more complicated. The Generalissimo seems to be awaiting the fall of Harbin. If the Generalissimo cannot wait that long, then he should return anyway. The Generalissimo’s action showed that he was not working toward the cessation of hostilities.

General Chou asked General Marshall if he could take some of his time to have a rather lengthy discussion.

General Marshall replied that he could take all day.

General Chou said that because he had consulted with General Marshall for five months, he had full confidence in him. Therefore, he wanted to tell General Marshall frankly of his thoughts and of the points which he does not fully understand. He wanted to talk to General Marshall not only as a negotiator, but also as a friend. His purpose was to have General Marshall understand what he was thinking and what efforts he was making. He hoped that the records would not be published unless agreed by both sides.

The first point was about American policy. After two months, he had come to the following comprehension. The American Government is carrying on a double-policy toward China. General Marshall was responsible for the good side. This bright side included the policy left behind by President Roosevelt which looked toward cooperation in the whole world, as well as China; President Truman’s statement⁶⁷ before General Marshall’s departure; and the Moscow communiqué of last December.⁶⁸ These documents served as a basis for General Marshall’s mission to China. After arrival in China, General Marshall had actually carried out this documented policy and had reaped large success.

General Chou said he would next speak about the gloomy side. In the Pacific, the U. S. has now made military dispositions. In China, they actively helped the Kuomintang before the Chinese Government was democratized. After victory over Japan, the U. S. still assisted the Kuomintang by providing supplies which were not for the purpose of fighting the Japanese any more. Troops were sent to North China and recently to Manchuria. If only 5 armies had been sent to Manchuria to take over sovereignty, they could still agree to its acceptability. However, even though Soviet troops had evacuated in the middle of April, two additional armies were sent up there—the 60th Army and 93rd Army. He had received further reports saying that the 53rd and 5th Armies are also to be sent to Manchuria but are waiting for shipment.

General Marshall asked if that was the 5th Army.

General Chou repeated that it was the 5th Army, now located near Shanghai. Right now, war supplies in Manchuria were ample enough to last for another three months of war. These supplies were of course sent up by the U. S. Navy. In Manchuria, airplanes had been used extensively. Even the Kuomintang claimed that the bombings had been successful. These planes undoubtedly were handed over to the Kuomintang through lend lease—also fuel. Civil war in China had not yet been stopped. The U. S. Navy has sent two fleets to China, one stationed at Chinwangtao and the other at Tsingtao, and has furnished the Chinese Navy with vessels, though the Ministry of Defense is completely controlled by the Kuomintang.

There were incidents in which the U. S. Marines at Chinwangtao and the Peiping–Tientsin sectors had been provocative. Last November, Marines bombarded a Communist village in East Hopeh. General Wedemeyer⁶⁹ expressed his regret over that matter, but General Rockey⁷⁰ denied that fact. Recently, on May 17th, U. S. Marines again dashed to the outskirts of Tientsin to start provocations by hurting several people in the Communist area there.

General Chennault,⁷¹ on his way back to the United States, declared at Pearl Harbor that the Chinese Communist problem should be resolved by force. The U. S. Navy was still cooperating with General Tai Li’s office⁷² and was continuing to supply the Tai Li units. All these circumstances if viewed objectively tend to encourage the Kuomintang to wage civil war. If the Kuomintang received such assistance and felt that it was backed up, it would fear nothing.

General Chou at that juncture expressed his gratification that the loan and relief supplies are under control of General Marshall. Therefore some pressure could be exerted upon the Kuomintang. Even so, relief supplies for the Communist liberated areas are six-tenths of one per cent of the total supplies, despite the fact that the population of the Communist area has suffered most during the years of the Japanese occupation and have suffered damage amounting to over 50% of the total damage in China. Right now in CNRRA, the Chinese office of UNRRA, there is almost no Communist representative at all.

Therefore during the last two months, he gradually became puzzled due to the fact that while General Marshall was working for both sides, other elements believe in arguments of the Kuomintang. Thus the Kuomintang is able to take advantage of American assistance to enlarge the civil war. Under such circumstances, American policy had become a double policy which made it difficult to stop civil war. Some elements in China are even attempting to make this civil war overture for another world war.

General Marshall said the first portion of his comment would be devoted to the period since his arrival in China last mid-December. In the first place, he would like General Chou to know most confidentially that the U. S. Government had issued no instructions to him of any kind whatsoever since his arrival out here. At the same time he had only communicated with the Government on a very few occasions. The situation has been so complicated and so intricate that he had avoided confusing them by frequent reports and they had not asked General Marshall any questions. Actually he had made no recommendation to the Government since he came to China.

His reports outlined the facts as he saw them and what he had done in the light of those facts. The President had not always even acknowledged General Marshall’s messages. Since General Marshall’s return to Chungking in April he had sent the President only two or three messages;⁷³ he thought two, and the last was the night before the Generalissimo departed for Mukden. The President had not acknowledged that message and General Marshall had asked no questions. The message merely stated the facts as he saw them in order that the President not be completely ignorant of what was going on. This should make it plain to General Chou that whatever errors there had been in the procedure since his arrival in China, were his errors and not the Government’s, though the Government had to be held responsible.

General Marshall discussed American equipping, training and arming of the Central Government troops next. The decision to arm, equip and train 39 divisions was made early in 1944 while General Marshall was Chief of Staff. The decision was made to facilitate military operations against the Japanese. The capture of Canton was to permit the entry of supplies by ship into China.

The United States had been exhausting itself transporting a small amount of material over the Hump into Kunming. To lift a few tons of supplies, the United States was using a tremendous number of planes which were sorely needed to help terminate the war in Europe. It was a difficult decision for the United States. The equipping and training of Chinese divisions took a great amount of shipping and many officers which could ill be spared. However, the United States was willing to ship the materiel to China if they had a reasonable guarantee that the material would be used efficiently. It would probably have not been used that way unless Americans supervised the training.

That decision of the American Government was concurred in by the British Chiefs of Staff, who were deeply interested in equipment, and was transmitted to the Soviet authorities in Moscow. The Soviet Government was also demanding great masses of materiel from the United States and were therefore interested in what we gave China. Similarly, the British wanted large amounts of American material and hence were interested parties to the transaction. That explained the basis for the reorganization, the armament, the supply and the training of the 39 Central Government divisions which were called Alpha divisions to distinguish them from the poorer Government divisions.

Now, to meet the present Communist attacks on him and those of Dr. Lo, (head of the Democratic League now making public attacks) would have meant that in 1944, the U. S. should have stipulated to the Chinese Government who were committing themselves to their army being equipped with American equipment, that in the event of a civil war, that Government should disarm its troops and render itself helpless; that it should disband the troops that happened to have been trained by American assistance. Frankly, that to him was nonsense, but it was very good propaganda, he recognized that.

General Marshall said there was one point that he had not covered and that was the lend lease item that General Chou spoke about. It was agreed during the war that the U. S. Government would provide this equipment for 39 divisions under terms of the Lend Lease Act.⁷⁴ Deliveries had not been completed at the time of the cessation of war with Japan. The Lend Lease Act terminates legally on June 30. If delivery of that equipment had not been completed before June 30th, it could not have been delivered except by direct purchase at a very heavy cost to the Chinese. So the effort was made to complete deliveries before the legal expiration of the Lend Lease Act and those deliveries were largely completed more than a month ago.

The procedure had nothing whatever to do with the civil war. As a matter of fact, the last deliveries were very difficult because of lack of shipping and lack of American soldiers to load supplies. Arrangements were made at the time an agreement had been reached for the reorganization and integration of the armies of China. What had occurred since then was another matter. One doesn’t start and stop operations of such magnitude like water coming out of the faucet. It was on a schedule that required months to prepare.

General Marshall repeated again that that was accomplished at the time of the Reorganization Agreement.⁷⁵ He just happened to think of the fact that one great difficulty would be to obtain additional equipment needed for the 10 Communist divisions not in the original 39. General Marshall had made a very special effort to get, without delay, equipment needed for the Kalgan school. This school did not come into our plans in 1944, but did enter decidedly into his consideration of the financial basis which would result from a delay beyond June 30. In those matters, he had gone ahead on a broad basis of the future establishment of the armies in China, but that the Communists did not consult him when they attacked Changchun. General Tu Li Ming⁷⁶ did not consult him when he conducted his operations north, and certainly the propaganda agencies did not discuss with him the various factors concerned.

General Marshall next discussed the naval question that General Chou had mentioned—primarily the supply of the armies in Manchuria and the transportation of troops to Manchuria. He said that the President in his public statement of American policy towards China referred, as he recalled, directly to the fact that the U.S. Government would undertake to assist the Central Government by transporting troops to Manchuria. That was a public statement. There was no question at that time of a war in Manchuria. It was an agreement to assist the Central Government to establish its troops in Manchuria. The United States was an ally of the Government under existing agreements and the agreements were entered into as an ally.

In his first month in China, December and January last, he became involved in the question of the Chinese Navy and Chinese naval and coastal shipping. Those questions had to be settled very promptly. Otherwise the shipping would have been disposed of elsewhere or decommissioned in the United States. His first effort was directed toward the Central Government’s desire to acquire a rather large naval force considering the circumstances, including, he thought, 6 cruisers. General Marshall thought of their inability to maintain them and of their terrific cost to China. He then persuaded them not to have any cruisers. He also dissuaded them from having destroyers and persuaded them to take destroyer escorts, a smaller vessel suitable to coastwise work and protection against pirates. General Marshall said he also persuaded them to concentrate on small vessels that could serve their purpose better in the large rivers of China. If not arranged at an early date, then vessels would have been sold or decommissioned in the United States. It would be difficult and expensive to recommission them and bring them back to China.

General Marshall stated that the Chinese could not receive the vessels until they had training in their operation. Ships were complicated affairs; mechanically, electrically, etc. He persuaded the Navy to establish a school at Tsingtao to train sufficient men to take over ships from the American crews. Those decisions came during January and early February. If things were to be done for further rehabilitation of China, they had to be done then or not at all because demobilization of American forces would not permit delays.

General Marshall told these details so General Chou could see that this American program for rehabilitation of China was a matter of doing something or not doing it. This choice came at a time when apparently and general cooperation. General Marshall made a tremendous effort, almost more effort than for anything else, to deliver Chinese coastal and river shipping, because without that, they could not reopen the country. He also tried to get for China material for the reconstruction of the railroads and factories to get shipments of food that would relieve the hardships on the population and restore something like a normal life, etc.

General Marshall said two questions were involved. The first was the terms on which shipping might be acquired, terms which had to be related to the distressing financial situation in China. The second was the availability of river shipping because river shipping was in great demand elsewhere in the world. Therefore, if China was to receive a reasonable quantity of river shipping, they had to act rapidly. He succeeded in “freezing” our surplus coastal shipping all over the world until China had a chance to see if they could reach a basis of agreement. Incidentally, he then became involved in a change of a U. S. law which still has them in difficulty. Because of its tremendous importance to the rehabilitation of China, he had gone ahead for China, and the Kuomintang and the Communist Party each seemingly had gone ahead for civil war—that was about the way the situation rides.

General Marshall said at the present time, as nearly as his information stated which he would check immediately with Admiral Cooke,⁷⁷ he did not think there was any Naval shipping being used for the supply of the armies in Manchuria. Supplies were being hauled largely by Liberty ships which had been turned over to the Chinese Government and which were manned by Chinese crews. Most of those ships were engaged in hauling coal from Chinwangtao to Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow. He did not know how many LST’s the Chinese had but it was some small number which he thought was 8 and which was determined entirely by the lack of trained crews. Most of Admiral Cooke’s LST’s had been sent back to the U. S. or turned over to UNRRA. LST’s Admiral Cooke now controlled are employed either in surveys or in hauling supplies up the Yangtze. One Navy LSM is being sent to Chungking. Navy ships are hauling UNRRA supplies to help out UNRRA which had not been able to get trained crews.

General Marshall recognized in General Chou’s statement on three months supplies in Manchuria, something he had talked to Dr. Lo about day before yesterday. What he talked about was a purely normal military measure. Any force which was sea-based and didn’t accumulate supplies was not deserving the name of military force; it would be suicide not to. Dr. Lo thought that if one stopped what he thought was the American Navy transporting supplies to Manchuria, that would stop the war in Manchuria. General Marshall tried to explain to Dr. Lo that they had a reserve in Manchuria for several months, maybe as much as three months—he didn’t know; that it was a normal procedure; and that if a military leader was so ignorant of the requirements of logistics of war that he did not accumulate supplies for a reasonable reserve, he was not a qualified commander.

General Marshall said that apropos of what he had just said, this morning he received a message which repeated a Soviet press statement charging much the same thing Dr. Lo was. He therefore had directed Colonel Hutchin to contact Admiral Cooke and confirm his impression of what the U. S. naval shipping situation was at present. He had just this moment received a reply. “No naval ships are carrying Government troops or supplies to Manchuria. No naval ships are transporting Nationalists along the coasts. Admiral Cooke now has only 10 LST’s. Two are being held to pick up Communists at Mirs Bay near Kowloon and eight are on the Yangtze hauling UNRRA supplies.”

General Marshall said General Chou made reference to the U. S. position in the Pacific. The implication of that statement was not clear. However, he would state that the United States had demobilized to a degree no other nation had even approached; to the point of a declared weakness that had greatly handicapped the American Secretary of State in his various negotiations. American people were now turning the other way and saying that their insistence on rapid demobilization of the Army had been unwise. In the Philippines, most U. S. troops were moved out and with the Declaration of Independence next July 4, the United States would have few troops left there.

General Marshall said the U. S. had greatly reduced their forces in Japan. One reason the Chinese Government was encouraged to send a division there was to relieve the U. S. of the burden of having to keep so many American troops there. The U. S. had acted similarly regarding Britain and Australia. These countries now had troops in Japan which had relieved some American troops who were then sent home. The U. S. Fleet had been three-fourths demobilized. For the U. S. to spend billions and to suffer some 3 or 400,000 casualties in order to wrest control of the Western Pacific from the Japanese, then to expect the U. S. to completely vacate that region was even more silly than the American people usually were in such international matters. The U. S. had no secrets; foreigners could travel anywhere and see anything. As General Chou well knew, that was far from the case elsewhere.

General Marshall next discussed the Marines. For awhile, he had been trying to move the Marines out of China, but to his mind it was not logical to remove them and leave almost a vacuum at a time when aggressive action by Communist forces was plainly imminent. It was a reasonable proposition for the Central Government to ask to replace Marine units at critical points. In the present state of affairs, Communist forces could not be depended upon to carry out any mission or order from the Central Government. General Chou had made his own answer to that, General Marshall said. General Marshall had caused the orders to be issued and the schedule for ship sailings prepared for the evacuation of Marines. But at present, if Marines do not guard the railway to the coal mines, the coal supply of Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow would almost certainly cease in a very short time. General Marshall knew something of these conditions for he had guarded that line and those mines himself for three years⁷⁸ against continuous attacks, largely by bandits. The purpose of protection at that time was to see that the Embassies in Peiping had a safe access to the sea in case of trouble.

With reference to the U. S. Navy, it had been in China waters for nearly 50 years or more, ever since the U. S. had an Asiatic Fleet. It had been based as a rule in Manila but usually spent four months off Chefoo and Shanghai in summer seasons. That had gone on for many years. At the present time it had the task of moving some 10 to 15,000 Japanese a day from China to Japan. Control of that was in the hands of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who is General MacArthur, and it was carried out under the terms of the Allied agreement.

With relation to other American activities in China which reflected the policy of the U. S. Government—he referred to the Military Advisory Group⁷⁹ which is established in Nanking of which General McClure⁸⁰ was the head—that was established at the request of the Chinese Government made almost a year ago. It had not yet been formally approved by the U. S. Government, that is authorization for that group had not yet cleared Congress.

The group was established prior to completion of Congressional action, to assist in avoiding confusion in reorganization of the Chinese forces. One of their first efforts is reflected in the announcement of the reorganization of the Ministry of National Defense which was in line with U. S. policy regarding the position of the army in a democracy as the servant of the people and not the oppressor. It represented the idea of the control of the civil over the military. The Advisory Group had also been working on preparations for various schools including the details of the school for Communist units that General Chou had discussed. General Marshall said it was not possible for him and two staff officers alone to do all those things. Therefore he passed those burdens to the M. A. G. to work on. He set the organization up before authorization was received, to meet a practical requirement in accordance with the agreed plan for the reorganization of the armies of China.

With reference to General Chou’s comment about the five armies in Manchuria, General Gillem⁸¹ had made a lengthy statement about that with which he concurred. The five armies referred to the ultimate arrangement 18 months from the time of reorganization. Actually the present Manchurian armies did not equal the strength authorized for the five armies in the plan to be in place 18 months later.

General Marshall said that as to UNRRA, he was not aware that such a small percentage was being received by the Communists. He would inquire about the amount of six-tenths of one per cent and see if that was correct and then see if anything could be done about it. (Actual figure was 9 per cent.)

General Marshall said he had a message that had reached him that morning from the head of all UNRRA, Mr. LaGuardia,⁸² who was the former mayor of the city of New York, a very aggressive and plain spoken person. He explained to General Chou before he read the communication that he, General Marshall, did not agree with the procedure proposed and he would reply accordingly.

“I am informed that on May 25th there was an attack by between 50 and 100 armed men under officers on a rock quarry 50 miles west of the break in the Yellow River dike. Two air compressors were completely destroyed as well as considerable lengths of their pneumatic hose. Trucks were also damaged and 15 men and 7 officers of the Yellow River Commission were abducted. UNRRA is spending millions of dollars (incidentally, American dollars) in repairing the damage for flood prevention and relief. If it meets with your (General Marshall’s) approval, I wish to tell the responsible parties where they come off if this kind of tactics is repeated. I am ready to say that I will withdraw entirely from the project unless I have assurance that sabotage, quibbling and quarreling will stop at once on this project.”

General Marshall said that when it came to statements of an individual such as General Chennault, he merely replied that General Chennault is a retired officer trying to organize an air transport fleet by a contract with UNRRA. General Chennault indulged in one of the most important freedoms asserted in a democracy—freedom of speech. Whether it was agreed to was something quite different, but every American could say what he pleased—though it might please only him. In this case, the individual was not an official of the Government. On the contrary, the President in his policy regarding China made a very clear statement of the desire and what amounted to a recommendation that would bring about what General Marshall understood the Communist Party was fighting for. That was said in the face of very violent attacks on the Communists in the U. S. by both Democrats and Republicans.

General Marshall emphasized by repeating again that [for] the American side the Government had given him no instructions beyond those when he left for China last December and he had made no recommendations to the American Government and very few reports. He had endeavored to bring about termination of hostilities, and so far as he could through his influence, the adoption of a procedure in China that was in general accordance with the statement of the President. Further, he would like to say that he recognized that recriminations and accusations were inevitable in the situation such as his and regarding the position the U.S. Government had taken.

His trouble here in China had largely consisted of his inability to get one side to believe in the sincerity of the other. In the present international situation, particularly regarding China, it was virtually impossible for other nations (he said he was using that term in a general manner) to believe in the sincerity of U. S. intentions in China. History of the United States’ international efforts would rather prove their sincerity in a very plain and definite manner. The United States never took over concessions in China; returned indemnities, and now the U. S. was giving the Philippine people their freedom. The United States promised the Philippines their freedom thirty years ago and on July 4th they were going to get it, though possibly a considerable party of Filipinos would like very much to have this action somewhat delayed. From his own experience, the United States had often been foolishly idealistic internationally to their own great and ultimate disadvantage. Maybe in the long course of years, that policy would return dividends to the American people—he did not know. However, it cost them dearly at the same time Americans had to suffer every conceivable accusation regarding almost every generous action made internationally.

General Marshall, in bringing the conversation back to the present, said he had been greatly distressed and disturbed by Communist action in their attack on Changchun. He had been equally distressed and disturbed by actions of the Central Government in continuing its action beyond Changchun. His effort had been to compose the two, which was extraordinarily difficult, particularly if the integrity of his action in a middle position was questioned. He had to exercise a great deal of restraint in order to avoid terminating the possibility [of] his assistance in bringing hostilities to a close.

The Generalissimo was returning today. General Marshall’s purpose was to do all in his power to bring the present situation to a conclusion. He could not manage it by radio. Frankly and confidentially, the present situation was just the reverse of two months ago when he felt that General Chou was in the position to negotiate less and less. General Marshall assumed the reason for that was largely because of the domination of Communist generals and their associates in Manchuria. He was inclined now to the belief that the same thing had just happened in Mukden—that the Generalissimo had acted to the pressure of his generals in Manchuria. General Marshall wished to assure General Chou that his best efforts would go toward terminating the fighting quickly. He could not discuss the situation until he saw the Generalissimo. He had debated going to Peiping and earlier than that going to Mukden, but other considerations made it seem advisable that he not do that as it might impair his future usefulness.

General Chou said that he appreciated General Marshall’s telling him so many facts which would reduce on his part many misapprehensions on many points. Still, he would like to be made clear on certain points.

General Chou said that he did not imply anything was wrong with U. S. assisting China to fight the Japanese; nor during General Marshall’s first two or three months, in assisting China to arrange shipping and the turn-over of airplanes and equipment to Chinese armies. What puzzled the Communist Party was that whenever the Kuomintang did not subscribe to American policy, the conflict immediately arose within the American policy itself.

For example, in the past, President Roosevelt decided to assist all anti-Japanese forces in China. Teaching China the ways of a democracy was a prerequisite. When that was brought before the Communist Party by General Hurley, it was fully concurred in. But when the Kuomintang objected to the establishment of a coalition government, then the U. S. immediately seemed powerless. The U. S. continued its assistance towards the Kuomintang and immediately ceased assistance to other parties which were working toward unity of China. This appeared to the Communists as a self-contradiction of American policy.

General Chou said that from the American point of view, that policy might seem well justified because the Kuomintang is the Government recognized by the U. S. and therefore entitled to receive American assistance. Thus, before the Communist Party entered into the coalition government, the Kuomintang had the right to stop any assistance toward it. The explanation was that as long as the Kuomintang was fighting against the Japanese, assistance may be extended to it. As soon as it was not fighting against the Japanese, but entirely devoted itself to civil war, the American Government could hardly say that supplies were given for the purpose of fighting the Japanese and not for fighting a civil war. When discussing American equipment, he did not imply that it should be taken back. As General Marshall said, that was like water coming out of a faucet and there was no way to stop it. However, the U. S. held a morale power which the Kuomintang could not completely disregard.

General Chou said that coming back to the five months since General Marshall had arrived in China, during the first 3 months General Marshall had not demanded the withdrawal of anything the U. S. Government had given to China. All he demanded was the cessation of hostilities, reorganization of the army and political consultation. By virtue of that spirit, the Kuomintang felt the international demand on China as well as the morale pressure. As a result of that, General Marshall had accomplished a big success and had won the support of the Chinese people as well as the Communist Party.

When General Marshall came to China the second time, the Manchurian situation had gotten out of control and General Marshall was placed in a very difficult position. Right at that time, arrangements planned before this civil war took place were still continuing. That situation made the Communist Party feel that the working method seemed to be different from the past. For example, LST’s which were handed over to the Kuomintang were previously in the hands of the U. S. Navy. If the delivery could be effected by imposing certain terms, the Kuomintang would not have so much of a free hand as it had now.

Regarding the Kalgan school, because of objection by the Kuomintang to delivering weapons to the Communists in time of civil war, it could not be opened. The American Government immediately committed itself to meet that demand. Similar things happened with relief supplies. The Government would not allow relief supplies to enter Communist areas. That means that once the hostilities are enlarged, the Communists were 100% restricted but the Kuomintang may still receive assistance. What had been already delivered to the Kuomintang, the Communist Party did not want to cause trouble about that. What had not yet been delivered, the U. S. had the right to stop it. General Chou wished to point out that it is better not to give any help for civil war in China than to help one side. Of course when peace was restored to China everything could still be done according to the original schedule.

General Marshall said it was his recollection that General Chou said he couldn’t get the Kalgan school going before 1 July. At first General McClure intended to go there. Then General Chou met General McClure and said the school would probably start around July 15th. General Chou arranged for him to meet General Chang⁸³ to discuss the matter on the Communist side. Arrangements were to be made for buildings, etc., as well as for the collection of officers and the meeting of other difficulties that would arise in connection with other aspects of the school.

General Chou said that there may have been some misunderstanding. He received a message from Kalgan saying that transportation of students would be one of the biggest problems. Only a few students could come from Yenan and other places where airplanes were available. A large number would have to travel by foot. They had wondered whether some money could be borrowed from the Government, but in view of the present situation in Manchuria, he thought it might not be advisable to talk to the Government about the loan, particularly since he had so much complication regarding the loan in the Hopeh [Hupeh?] area.

General Marshall said he merely wanted to point out that interpreters for the school had been furnished transportation, even using General Gillem’s personal plane. General Marshall wished General Chou would be a little more specific about the UNRRA point he raised. He didn’t want the information for discussion, but for action on his part.

General Chou thought the main difficulty in connection with UNRRA in the past was the lack of contact between the Communist Party and UNRRA. For example, regarding the Yellow River business, the first he knew about it was when he talked to Mr. Todd.⁸⁴ General Chou forwarded the project to Communist authorities in the neighborhood of that area but the delay was most unfortunate. He received a letter from Mr. Todd on this matter, but since it was a letter rather than a telegram, it was a little late. He wired the people there to take action on the matter.

Mr. Todd’s attitude was quite cooperative. He explained that as soon as the matter was straightened out, he would go ahead with the project. That showed the lack of contact. General Chou entertained the hope that some of his men could be stationed with UNRRA and that they would have a representative in CNRRA. They could then include Communist requests in their over-all plans. People would become familiar with the over-all plan.

In the past supplies had been detained by both parties. Dr. Tsiang⁸⁵ had also told General Chou that the Kuomintang had also detained supplies going into the Communist areas. To have a Communist representative in UNRRA would probably necessitate obtaining the permission of the Government. In the Far Eastern Conference on Food to be participated in by representatives of various-countries, General Chou hoped that the Communist Party would have one representative in the Chinese delegation under the direction of Dr. Tsiang. He was just thinking about it and had not yet taken any action.

General Marshall expressed his thanks to General Chou for his presentation.

General Chou admitted that the situation had become complicated largely due to the Manchurian issue. He presumed that General Marshall would agree that during the first four months, they had done all they could to make concessions in order to reach a settlement of the Manchurian problem. Changchun was taken under circumstances that left the Communist Party no alternate course—they were forced to follow the course they took. Before April 15th, the Communists consistently promised to the Government that Changchun could be preserved until April 15th if they would only stop the fighting. The Government was unwilling to do so.

The main cause of other issues was the hostilities in Manchuria. The occupation of Changchun by the Communist troops presented a difficult problem for General Marshall. However, from the time General Marshall arrived in China the second time until the time the Communists evacuated Changchun, General Chou had consistently taken into consideration all the issues General Marshall had brought up. He had worked hard to try to secure a situation where not only would the Communist troops evacuate Changchun, but an overall agreement would be reached. For a period of one month, the Government was not willing to stop fighting before further discussion. It was not the Communists who were not willing to do so. The large problem pertaining to Manchuria since General Marshall’s return until that time was still the question of cessation of hostilities. At the present time, of course, it seemed that the Government considered itself in an advantageous position. It would be difficult to convince them to stop fighting. But victory and defeat is a common phenomenon. If the fighting should be continued, the whole situation would become confused. On the Communists’ part, they still maintained that fighting should be stopped. Therefore, it should not be viewed that the Communists maintain the same attitude as the Government towards continuation of civil war.

General Chou said he did not know whether apart from the point that the Government was not willing to stop the hostilities, whether General Marshall had some consideration regarding the Communist attitude toward the matter. The present attitude of the Kuomintang is that regardless of how the war comes out, they would consider that they could occupy all the large cities and the communication lines under the pretext of taking over sovereignty. General Chou said that was stated in the message sent by General Hsiung⁸⁶ and General Tu Li Ming to Executive Headquarters and also to the Committee of Three. He asked if General Marshall had received that message.

General Marshall said he had not seen it.

General Chou said he just received a copy of that message from General Hsu in Chinese and that maybe the English copy had not yet been received.

General Marshall said he would investigate to see why he had not received the message.

General Chou said the message from General Hsiung and General Tu Li Ming was dispatched when the Generalissimo was there. The Generalissimo arrived there on the 23rd and the message was dispatched on May 26th.

General Marshall said General Chou spoke of two messages.

General Chou said the first was published in the paper and the second one was the message dated the 26th which said that after the capture of Changchun they should occupy Harbin, Tsitsihar, Antung and all the railway lines in Manchuria. In the past, they had stated that once the Changchun problem was straightened out, they would immediately cease fire. It now appeared to him that the Government was intending to drag out the war and to provoke a large split so as to make General Marshall’s mission a failure. Once the Kuomintang is involved in war, the U. S. would help the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang was trying to get the U. S. involved in the war.

General Chou stated that the Communist attitude was entirely different from that. Communists had no intention of instigating war or of making General Marshall’s mission a failure. They hoped that General Marshall would succeed in his mission to stop fighting and to help China toward reconstruction.

The Government had another aim. They are trying to push Communists out of all railway lines. They want a firm hand on all large cities and railroads. The Kuomintang was planning to set up a provincial government which would include all parties except the Communist Party in order to obtain assistance from the United States. General Chou thought that scheme would inevitably fail because if war should be continued and they should try to control all railway lines, then the Communists would be forced to wreck those railway lines so that they would not be able to operate them. Any Government in China without the participation of the Chinese Communist Party could not be called a democratic government. It has never occurred to the Communist Party to set up a government in China without the Kuomintang.

General Chou said he would like to say a few words on the power of final decision. He had told General Marshall before that he was making every effort towards securing the power of final decision for teams conducting investigations. General Marshall had handed him a proposal⁸⁷ without asking for comments right at that moment. As General Chou had heard that the Generalissimo was coming back the next day, he decided to wait before he reported to Yenan. He was afraid that by sending that proposal to Yenan at that time, it might cause more misunderstanding. Later on, he learned from Dr. Lo⁸⁸ of the Democratic League that he was handed a similar copy of that proposal. Dr. Lo was told to also exert his efforts toward the adoption of that proposal so General Chou felt that he had to make a report to Yenan.

In that regard, General Chou’s point of view was somewhat different from General Marshall’s. The crucial point of General Marshall’s thought seemed to be that without an American representative empowered with final decision, the basic agreements in which the U. S. has also entered into, like the cease-fire agreement, the restoration of communications agreement, and the army reorganization plan, will meet with no success. If there was no such final decision, then those agreements might possibly break down in failure. Even the Democratic League, whom some people allege to be pro-Communist, are also trying to convince General Chou the [this?] way.

However, General Chou’s thought was somewhat different. It appeared to him that it may give an appearance that the United States is taking advantage of this opportunity to secure leadership or control over China. It could be said that since the final decision has to be approved by the Committee of Three, actually that agency is empowered with the final decision. However, he had to take into consideration that past agreements have a great deal of generalities, the stipulations of which had been under much dispute. Some stipulations could be implemented one way or another. Therefore, the final decision may be of quite considerable effect. That would place Americans in a very difficult position, both in the matter of formality or in the actual implementation.

General Chou said it would make it difficult to go one way or the other, particularly as General Marshall had indicated that reactionary public opinions in America are charging General Marshall to be pro Communist. In case some decision by the American representative was disadvantageous to the Government, they would use that as propaganda against that particular decision. In case decision was disadvantageous to the Communists, then elements sympathizing with Communists may also interpret it in the opposite way.

General Marshall said that the original proposal for the teams was General Byroade’s and Mr. Robertson’s. He concurred with the proposal when they submitted it to him. The next proposal was in the form of a stipulation on May 24th by the Generalissimo to the following effect: “In carrying out all three agreements, the American officers of the Executive Headquarters or teams have the determining voice and authority both in the execution and interpretation of the views held in divergence by the Government and Communist representatives.”⁸⁹ General Marshall’s reply to the Generalissimo on May 26th followed: “Is it your intention to give the American Commissioner at Peiping complete authority to make decisions on all matters over which opposite commissioners are in disagreement. This would facilitate matters but I feel that it is too all inclusive in effect, to place an American and consequently the American Government in the position of deciding a number of the major matters that would shortly become involved. How about restricting this final decision by Americans to specific matters such as where, when and how teams should proceed; what they should see and decisions covering local situations. Also restrict final decision by the American at Changchun regarding only all immediate arrangements and matters in Manchuria which pertain to the termination of hostilities; also at Executive Headquarters regarding matters referred to commissioners by teams and to matters pertaining to restoration of communications. In all of this, decisions regarding political matters should be excluded unless specifically stipulated by later agreement.”

Then on May 28th, the Generalissimo said the following: “Regarding the scope of the American representatives’ authority of decision, I am able to appreciate the difficult position in which you find yourself and therefore I agree with your suggestion that such authority should be confined to specific matters. However, all executive matters relating to the restoration of railroad and other communications must be included in the scope of such authority.”

General Marshall said that the draft he gave General Chou was merely a reduction to writing of the various things which were proposed as a stipulation by the Generalissimo and to which General Marshall took partial exception. The Generalissimo had never seen that paper and he did not give it to General Hsu until some days later. He had merely confined it to a discussion between General Chou and himself. General Marshall stated that he probably made a mistake in giving Dr. Lo a copy, knowing little of Dr. Lo’s methods. Now he was pressing General Marshall as to what he thought might be done to facilitate the termination of hostilities. General Marshall said he frankly told him of two stipulations the Generalissimo had made; one as to communications and one as to the American officers.

General Marshall expressed his own embarrassment regarding the latter and also the embarrassment of the American Government. If he were committed to such an arrangement, which he would do only to facilitate the termination of hostilities and the execution of agreements, it would be a very heavy burden rather than a desire. He told Dr. Lo of the feeling that General Chou had described, a feeling which certainly existed in the ranks of Communist forces and which added to the complications. General Marshall suggested some arrangement whereby a few over-all teams might be formed with an American and no military officials, but with two civilians; one a member of the Democratic League and one a representative of the Young China Party. General Marshall had thought of that at the moment and so stated.

He explained then, that if he became involved in the stipulation of the Generalissimo’s, he would of course follow the practice that he had adopted throughout the war: namely, to have an over-all inspection service to reassure him personally that everything was uniform as to the operations of the teams and that ineffective officers were removed. Otherwise, he couldn’t accept such a responsibility. Hence, the suggestion of the moment in the discussion with Dr. Lo,⁹⁰ was one of merely adding responsibility to the Americans. There would be two representatives who could see for themselves that it was a fair deal throughout. Dr. Lo asked General Marshall if he could have a copy of that proposal and General Marshall had given it to him. That may have been an error but throughout all his efforts in China he had utilized every source he could find that might help. Some had helped and others had hurt, but that was the fortune of war.

General Chou replied that there was no trouble about General Marshall’s discussing that point with Dr. Lo. In the past, the Democratic League had helped General Marshall to try to conceive some means to solve the Manchurian problem. General Chou thought they were trustworthy fellows.

General Chou said he wanted to clear up two things. The first was that before this draft was shown to Dr. Lo, he had not transmitted it to Yenan because he planned to discuss various points again with General Marshall. [Day before?] Yesterday, it was shown to Dr. Lo. General Chou had to consider the possibility that it might be known to more people and therefore some public discussion might take place. General Chou told Dr. Lo that he hoped the draft would not be circulated among too large a group of people.

The second point was that General Chou thought such a stipulation might put Americans in a difficult position. It was a very sharp maneuver on the part of the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo had repeatedly stated in the past that he did not believe in all that General Marshall was doing and even predicted that the mission might prove a failure. The Generalissimo would rather use other means, even force.

A question to be brought up again was the cessation of hostilities. In event American actions proved suitable to the Kuomintang, it would inevitably cause opposition from the Communist Party. The Generalissimo could then place you [General Marshall] and the Communist Party in opposition to each other. In event American actions favor the Communists, then it would raise opposition from the Kuomintang. Inevitably, General Marshall would reach a point where work could not be continued. Actually, of course, it seemed rather evident that the second possibility was unlikely to occur for action would be advantageous to the Communists. Communists officers are not well acquainted with dubious methods of procedure while the Kuomintang is. The Kuomintang would be able to conceive all kinds of ways to deceive the Americans and lead them into a trap.

Eventually, the Generalissimo may succeed in placing the Americans in opposition to the Communists. They had already issued a false document saying that the Central Committee of the Communist Party had issued on March 12, a four-point instruction saying that no more negotiations and compromises would be made with the Kuomintang by the Communists. That document had been published by the Central News and was printed in both Chinese and American papers.

General Chou cited two instances to prove the falsehood of the document. On March 15, he made a big concession with regard to the draft constitution. Even Dr. Lin Fo⁹¹ called that one of the major concessions of the Communist Party. The same evening, General Chou expressed agreement with General Chang Chih Chung⁹² that National troops could take over the section between Mukden and Changchun. The draft he prepared was still in the hands of General Chang. If instructions had been issued on March 12, as publicized by the Central News, then how could General Chou have made those concessions.

General Chou said it had been stated that Communists were trying to rupture the relationship between the Kuomintang and the United States. All they had said was that no assistance should be given to the Kuomintang whenever it was for civil war purposes. On the other hand, the Kuomintang was trying to push the Communists into such a position that if they objected to that proposal, then it would imply that they were against the Americans. He knew that the proposal was actually from the Generalissimo. Therefore he had no intention to do so at all.

He believed that the U. S. was in an advantageous position in China. The United States had won the overwhelming sympathy of the Chinese people who believe that the U. S. is working for peace and democracy. This political advantage might facilitate reconstruction of China and General Marshall’s efforts toward peace. Under such circumstances, the Chinese Communist Party is able to cooperate with the United States.

He hoped General Marshall would use his political advantages wisely. It was not advisable to throw the issue of final decision into open discussion and thereby push the Communists into the position of being the opponent of that proposition. That might prove a hindrance to the cessation of hostilities. Under such conditions, cease fire could be transformed into an issue of final decision. That would divert attention from the main goal which was the point that the Generalissimo was striving after. Since the principle of unanimous agreement was first brought up by General Marshall, he hoped that principle could be adhered to as had been specified in the cease-fire agreement. The question was brought up because past disputes between the Kuomintang and Communists had blocked progress of cease fire, restoration of communications and army reorganization agreements. If hostilities could be stopped, then the main root of the trouble was taken away.

General Chou stated that the Communists have never imposed any conditions precedent to an agreement, whether it was advantageous or disadvantageous to them. The Kuomintang side imposed certain terms or they tried to drag out the settlement unless conditions were imposed.

General Chou said that once he saw proposals raised by General Marshall were compatible with the actual situation, he readily accepted all of them. However, he said, it could not be expected that the lower ranks could grasp the meaning to the same extent because they lacked that kind of experience. Therefore, he said, he felt sure that if the dealing of the Americans were indeed impartial, proposals would meet the approval of the Communist side. After final decision, if American friends show true cooperative spirit, they would succeed in settling problems and making investigations. There were many things vested in the hands of the Americans that would help reach solutions. General Chou thought disagreements in the past were purely caused by the Manchurian situation. This is the effect rather than the cause. If disagreement was caused by lack of final decision, then everything would be referred to the Committee of Three. Thus there would still be endless trouble.

If the Generalissimo would agree to stop fighting and to straighten out all matters, then the number of the field teams could be increased and teams could be sent to all the trouble spots. As to what General Marshall had mentioned about setting up over-all teams including members of other parties, General Chou said he thought that was a very good idea. They should be a separate supervisory organization and not a military setup as the present field teams.

If fighting stopped, there should be close cooperation on press reports. There would be no more closing down of papers and news agencies as was the case in Peiping. Regarding the restoration of communications, General Chou stated he would take that up with General Yu Ta Wei. When fighting had stopped, the problem of demobilization would also be taken up. Though demobilization had already been undertaken, it should be publicized. The work of truce teams in China proper should be intensified. The problem entirely lies in whether they should go ahead in good faith to stop fighting or not. That was the prerequisite to everything else.

General Chou pointed out another condition that showed the Communists’ sincerity. From the very beginning, Communists had welcomed the presence of the Americans in Manchuria. They had no secrets to hide. Of course, when fighting was still going on, there might be some places they would not welcome Americans while the Government had the advantage of being able to obtain assistance from the United States.

Coming to the restoration of communications, General Chou said they fully welcomed the restoration of communications. Incidentally, they had dispatched three trucks from Yenan carrying family dependents since they lacked transportation to bring them down the river. Though they had permits from the National Military Council, they were stopped. He said that showed who was obstructing the restoration of communications.

General Chou told General Marshall he intended to go to Yenan for discussion but because the Generalissimo was not yet back, General Chou decided he would wait until he had a clear idea of the Generalissimo’s objections.

General Marshall thanked General Chou for his frank views. He would naturally consider the points General Chou raised. General Marshall assumed that the Generalissimo would ask to see him tonight. However, maybe he would want to talk to his own people first. After seeing the Generalissimo, General Marshall said he would like to see General Chou.

General Chou, in closing, said he wanted to bring up a minor question about money for the Kwangtung Communists. Since the Communist troops were embarking on June 10th, General Chou asked if money could be flown down and asked General Marshall if he could help arrange air transportation.

General Marshall said he would look into it and instructed Colonel Caughey to make the arrangements.

66. From Kwangtung.
67. December 15, 1945; United States Relations With China, p. 607.
68. Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, p. 1027.
69. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, then Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater.
70. Maj. Gen. Keller E. Rockey, Commanding General, U. S. Marines in China.
71. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, wartime Commanding General, 14th Air Force (China).
72. Secret police organization of the Chinese Government.
73. Telegrams Nos. 651, May 6, p. 815; 740, May 22, p. 881; and 776, May 26, p. 902.
74. Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.
75. February 25, p. 295.
76. Gen. Tu Yu-ming, Chinese commander in Manchuria.
77. Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., Commander, U. S. 7th Fleet.
78. 1924–27.
79. For correspondence on this subject, see vol. x, pp. 810 ff.
80. Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure, Deputy Commanding General, Nanking Headquarters Command, and temporarily head of the Army Advisory Group.
81. Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Commanding General, China Service Command.
82. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, Director General of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation.
83. Possibly Gen. Chang Yun-yi, Vice Commander of the Communist New 4th Army.
84. Oliver J. Todd, American engineer, UNRRA adviser to the Yellow River Commission.
85. T. F. Tsiang, Director General of Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation (CNRRA).
86. Gen. Hsiung Shih-hui, director of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Headquarters in Manchuria.
87. See draft of May 30, p. 914.
88. Lo Lung-chi.
89. See Madame Chiang’s letter No. 1, May 24, p. 891.
90. See minutes of conference of June 1, p. 927.
91. Sun Fo, President of the Chinese Legislative Yuan.
92. Then representative of the Chinese Government on the Committee of Three.