Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall
I. With the Manchurian situation taking a turn and the China proper situation undergoing further deterioration, the overall picture of China has entered a most critical stage. These circumstances are basically brought about by the non-observance of the Cease-Fire-Agreement on part of the Government, which is mainly expressed in the following three aspects:
A. Illegal movement of troops amounting to 106 army divisions:
According to incomplete data published by Yenan Headquarters, which covers the period between January 13 and May 14, movement of Nationalist troops, each time of a scope larger than one division, involves altogether 37 armies (106 divisions), comprising a total of 1,200,000 men. (For details please refer to MM 005.64) Such intense movement was chiefly accomplished through full exploitation of the transportation facilities. Had such action been duly investigated and corrected by Executive Headquarters and the field teams, they would never have gone so far. And if investigations were made without taking effective measures for correction, then events like what happened in Jehol would inevitably arise, where the Nationalists have moved three divisions (the 5th Division of the 94th Army, the 89th Division of the 13th Army, the 195th Division of the 52nd Army) to Manchuria, despite explicit order of Executive Headquarters prohibiting and stopping such actions. Based upon such large-scale movement the Nationalists were massing troops to strategical keypoints around the Communist areas and entered into positions most favorable for launching an all-out attack against them (e.g. around the Communist area in North-Kiangsu the Nationalists massed 11 army units [Page 947] to the northern bank of the Yangtze River and the southern section of the Tsinpu railway, and another 6 army units at Hsuchow (117°30’–34°20’). Around the Communist area in Hupeh they massed 11 army units. Along the northern bank of the Yellow River and the railway section between Hsinhsiang (113° 55’–35° 20’) and Anyang (114° 19’–36°06’) they also massed 4 army units.) The purpose of this troop massing is that they may under the pretext of opening up communications strike out for the Communist-controlled railway sections, and lay a firm hold upon the supply veins all over the country.
B. Illegal assault and encroachment on Communist territories by means of which they seized 19 cities and 2099 townlets and villages up to the end of April:
Data covering the period between January 13 and April 30 evidenced that the Nationalist troops have altogether laid 3,511 assaults on Communist territories, seized 2,099 townlets and villages, and 19 cities (during the month May they seized another five towns in China proper alone), and inflicted 33,000 casualties upon the Communist military and civil personnel. Inasmuch as those cities and townlets largely lie off the railway line, their seizure did not arouse so much alarm among the public and the neutrals. For this reason disputes over such issues were much dragged out, making the investigation the more difficult. (Example: The armed conflicts in Tingyuan area (117°30’–32°30’) and in East Honan.) If investigation were made, it happens mostly that either the conflicts by then are over, or the conditions have been much changed. (Example: The armed conflicts in Nantung area (120°51’–32°00’) and at Hsiaohsien (117°10’–34°10’) and Hsiayi (116°20’–34°20’).) Even if any conclusion were drawn after investigation, those conclusions would generally fall under two classifications: If the Nationalist troops had captured a place through attack, they were generally ordered to cease advance, maintain their position, and avoid further conflict (such as in Shansi, Hupeh, and Peiping–Tientsin area); on the other hand, if the Communist troops had recovered or in their counter-offensive taken a place, they however were generally ordered to evacuate that place (such as at Chien-ping city in Jehol (119°18’–41°50’), at Nantung (120°51’–32°00’) and along the northern section of the Tientsin–Pukow railway), and that place is marked as a neutral zone. Such unfair readjustment helps, rather than checks, the incessant attack of the Nationalist troops.
C. Illegal erection of new blockhouses:
Under varied excuses the Nationalist troops are not only blocking the reopening of communications by refusing to tear down the blockhouses and fortifications, but went even a step further by vigorously erecting new blockhouses. Thus there are over 6,000 blockhouses all-told [Page 948] around the Communist area in Hupeh. The American member of team 23 at Yucheng recently also witnessed the erection of new fortifications at Yenchow, Shantung (116°50’–35°35’). Evidently such actions are aimed to mutilate and lay a heavy blockade upon the Communist areas, so as to provide every facility for the Nationalist troops to launch individual attack against the Communists.
II. In reply to your OSE 86 and the enclosed memorandum of General Hsu Yung-chang,65 it is necessary first to reach clarification on the relation between cause and effect of the foregoing subject, as well as on the sequence of events taking place in the various places, before a procedure of settlement can be found out.
- 1.
- Jehol situation. For the reason that orders of Executive Headquarters failed to stop the movement of three Nationalist divisions from Jehol, the Communist troops thereupon chose to wreck the railways themselves in order to succeed in stopping their movement. Right now the Nationalists are massing heavy forces at Shanhaikwan, Suichung (120°21’–40°20’), and Fuhsin (121°36’–42°09’), with a view to launch vehement attack on Communist troops at Chengteh (117°50’–40°56’).
- 2.
- Teams 11, 26 and 2. By now team 11 at Chengteh has resumed work, and Communist representatives to team 26 at Chaoyang, and team 2 at Chihfeng have arrived to join the work of the respective teams.
- 3.
- Situation in Peiping–Tientsin sector. After the Nationalist troops have seized Antze (116°40’–30°25’) and Hsiangho (117°00’–39°50’), hostilities are yet spreading eastward. Though team 25 has been despatched, the Nationalist representative is still blocking team’s movement to Antze and Hsiangho for investigation. So far the actual fact has not been established as yet.
- 4.
- Potou (116°32’–38°15’) and Fengchiakou (116°5’–38°10’). The puppet troops in this area commenced to break the agreement by attacking the Communist Peace Preservation Corps at Chiaoho; they further murdered the captives and insulted the truce team members. On seeing that protests produced no positive result, the Communist forces were forced to take to self-defense. The puppet troops then abandoned Potou and Fengchiakou, and fled to Tsangchow (116°50’–38°20’).
- 5.
- Shihchiachuang (114°25’–38°05’). On April 15 and 18, Communist members of team 12 were twice detained by the Nationalist troops. When the protest met no response, the Communist representative withdrew to Peiping awaiting a settlement.
- 6.
- East Honan. The Nationalists at first refused to recognize the existence of Communist troops in the East Honan sector; subsequently [Page 949] they launched vehement attacks against them. Team 10, which went there for investigation, returned to its base without any result. The Communist troops being forced to take up self-defense thereupon cut off the supply line of the attacking Nationalists and heavily beseiged Tungming (115°05’–35°20’) and Yungnien (114°43’–36°40’) cities, as a result of which the puppet troops within the Tungming city eventually surrendered.
- 7.
- Hsiaohsien and Hsiayi area. The Nationalist troops stationed at Hsuchow (117°34’–34°20’) and Tangshan (116°30’–34°30’) on the Lunghai line occupied Communist-held Hsiaohsien (117°20’–34°15’) and Hsiayi (116°25’–34°25’), inflicting heavy losses upon the Communist troops. The Nationalist representative to team 4 however resisted any investigation up to this date.
- 8.
- Tsaochuang affairs. The puppet troops at Tsaochuang inflicted heavy wounds upon the Communist representative and interpreter. So far no satisfactory reply has been received to the demands raised by the Communists.
- 9.
- Liaocheng (115°58’–36°28’) affairs. When team 7 of Tsinan was delivering relief supplies to Liaocheng, a smuggled secret order issued by Nationalist Shantung Governor Ho Ssu-yuan to the puppet troops garrisoning Liaocheng, along with a large sum of money, was detained by the Communist troops. Arrangement for releasing the seized supplies is underway.
- 10.
- The conflicts at Hsiaohaichen and Kwanyinshan near Nantung (121°00’–32°00’). The two places were initially wrested away by the Nationalist troops from the Communists, then the Communist troops on being forced to launch counter-attack repelled the former. Now the Communist troops voluntarily withdrew from those two places. If the Nationalist troops would promise not to set foot upon those places again, the Communist side would be glad to contemplate, whether those places should be marked as neutral zone, ungarrisoned by troops of either side or not.
- 11.
- The conflicts at Tingyuan (119°35’–32°28’). Nothing was accomplished to meet the request that a team be despatched to conduct investigation on the spot, and that the status as of January 13 be restored. At this moment the conflagration is still spreading, and the situation is becoming very grave. Team is not yet despatched.
- 12.
- The situation in Hupeh area. The movement of Nationalist troops and their incessant clashes with the Communist troops in early May caused the Committee of Three to reach a new agreement with respect to that area. Right now the Communist area in Hupeh to the west of the Pinghan railway track is again being attacked.
- 13.
- Attach in Kwangtung. The Communist troops in Kwangtung are spread over scattered areas, and the communication with them [Page 950] is extremely difficult. The Nationalist troops by taking advantage of the delayed arrival of the sub-teams are launching raids all over the places upon the Communist troops, forcing the latter further to decentralize themselves. Then they went over to charge the latter as being disturbing the populace and breaking the agreement. This action serves no other purpose than to prevent the Communist troops from assembling according to schedule, and obstruct their northward movement.
- 14.
- Suppression of New China News Agency. Shortly after Executive Headquarters is established, the three sides agreed that press reports pertinent to Executive Headquarters and field team activities shall be issued in the form of joint communiqué through the channels of Central News Agency, New China News Agency and USIS. Now the military and police authorities in Peiping unexpectedly closed down the Peiping branch of the New China News Agency at short notice under the pretext that the agency is illegal. This is only another instance of agreement violation.
Judging from the foregoing facts, one comes easily to the conclusion, that the Communist Party cannot be held responsible for the aforementioned incidents. Under such circumstances it is evident that unless the fighting in Manchuria be stopped without delay, and an early overall settlement be reached, the armed conflicts all over China proper are liable to spread up, rather than be diminished, precipitating eventually a nation-wide conflagration. Therefore I still maintain the position, that only an unconditional truce in Manchuria plus the immediate despatch of an advanced detachment of Executive Headquarters to Changchun and the prompt execution of March 27 Directive may help to bring about the termination of hostilities in China proper. Will you kindly let me know your comments on the foregoing?
Yours faithfully,