Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Conference Between Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade and General Chou En-lai at General Chou’s House, May 12, 1946, 10 a.m.
| Also present: | Mr. Chang |
| Captain Soong |
General Byroade opened the meeting by expressing his concern over the field teams to make progress and to operate effectively. The major difficulty is the inability of the team to decide as to where they [Page 835] should go and what area should have the priority. The inevitable result is that they don’t go anywhere. It took the field teams to debate three days on the subject as to where they should go; then they fail to reach agreement, they refer it to the Executive Headquarters where it rest[s] for another two or three days and due to the lack of facts, which ordinarily were available to the field teams, this may have to be referred to the Committee of Three. Frequently, this subject could not be decided by the Committee of Three. Consequently, much time was wasted. In early March a long discussion was held and the only solution after a long consideration is to let the American members in the teams decide which area to go and which area should have the priority. General Byroade expressed that he himself was very much against this solution because it put the Americans in a very difficult position and subjected them to serious criticism. However, he was willing to risk that criticism because the field team then probably could investigate on both sides much more effectively. At that time no agreement could [be] reached on this solution and it was referred to the Three Men Committee on March 16 and no reply had been received. Later, the situation became more serious and the Commissioners in the Executive Headquarters and General Byroade were completely unable to make the field teams to move. About two weeks ago, the problem was again brought up among the Commissioners and Gen. Yeh stated that he had to report to Gen. Chou and Yenan for decision. Gen. Byroade then stated that Gen. Hsu has already agreed to the solution. He then presented the document54 to Gen. Chou for his consideration.
After reading the paper, Gen. Chou stated that he had received a report from Gen. Yeh and this problem would have to be discussed in Three Men Committee Conference but to date, no such conference had been held. Gen. Chou then said that to solve this problem some other procedure must be adopted other than the one presented in the paper. He then elaborated that in the past investigations were held wherever was necessary and that the field teams should investigate the areas where violation existed. Kuomintang always accused the Communists of violating the truce agreement but actually there was no truth to all these accusations. Then he cited numerous examples, one of which was that the Communists were accused of violating the truce agreement in Paoting and Kweisui areas. Consequently two teams were sent there to investigate and the result was negative and the two teams had to be withdrawn. He further cited examples of alleged troop movements accused by the Kuomintang in Chifeng, Kalgan, Koumi, Toulon [Tolun] areas but they were all found to be [Page 836] untrue. Gen. Chou then complained about the unfairness in dispatching field teams and that teams were not sent to the areas where the Communists accused the nationalists of violating the truce agreement. He cited the 5th division of the Nationalist army moving to Manchuria thru Jehol; the movement of the 72nd division in northern Hupei. Gen. Chou further said that Gen. Lo reported from Peiping recently that a field team was sent to Chefoo in Shantung because the Government accused the Communists of moving troops to Manchuria through that port. If that was the case, a team should also [be] sent to Shanhaikuan to investigate the movement of elements of the 94, 92 and 16 armies. But no team was sent there. Gen. Chou then reiterated on the frequency of false accusations made by the Kuomintang, and that investigations were conducted with negative results. Meantime, Communist accusations were not met with any degree of fair consideration. He then said originally, the Communists members had the complete confidence in the field team but now such confidence had turned into doubts and suspicions particularly among the lower levels. Now the Kuomintang is accusing that incidents are taking place in the middle of Communist dominated areas, and even for this, the Executive Headquarters wanted to send field teams to conduct investigation. Gen. Chou then stated that frequently after an investigation was conducted on a reported Kuomintang truce violation, it was found that such troop movement had already become an established fact. He cited the elements of Gen. Tong En Poa’s 100th Army moving cross the Yangtze toward Nantung area. The field team advised these elements not to fight but it was ignored. Now the Kuomintang is accusing the Communists of attacking their positions. General Ho Ying Chin also admitted that the National troop movements in Hopei was in anticipation of a Communist outbreak. Gen. Chou then mentioned numerous other unfounded Kuomintang accusations, and that the field teams’ energy was greatly wasted in conducting investigations as a result of these false accusations. He further stated that this is Kuomintang’s strategy in dealing with the Executive Headquarters and the fact that the National Commissioner Gen. Cheng Kai Ming is the leader of Chinese secret police offers a great deal of doubts on Kuomintang’s sincerity in dealing in this matter. Gen. Chou then said that the present paper would not solve the problem, and it would only create more difficulties for the American members on the field teams. Since the paper has already [been] signed by other members, Gen. Chou felt very much embarrassed.
Then Gen. Chou offered a six points counter proposal:55 (1) He [Page 837] agreed to the first point in the paper that the local authority, civil or military will not interfere with the field teams’ movement; (2) The field team members’ individual freedom and movement will be protected; (3) about reported troop movement and other violations, as long as it is important and above a minimum number of troops, a team should immediately [be] sent there. A system of punishment should be established if the report is found untrue. The punishment should be for the first untrue report, the following report would be ignored by team. If a second report were found untrue, then the next two reports would be ignored; and if a third report were found untrue, then the next four reports would be ignored; and so forth. (4) The places to be investigated must be those places where physical troop contacts exist. If no physical contacts exist, and a violation is reported, then it must be discussed by the upper level as to whether an investigation should be conducted. Should such an investigation be conducted and were [it] found to be untrue, same punishment set forth in point (3) applies. (5) The priority in conducting investigation, regardless whether it is a reported conflict or reported troop movement, should be based on the reports made by both sides. In other words, this time the investigation is conducted on the base [basis] of the Nationalist report; then the next time, it should be conducted on the base of the Communist report. This excludes the time when one side has no report to make. (6) The above five points must be agreed by all and General Chou assures that if this procedure is adopted, it will be much more effective, and will be very helpful to the teams. He further assures that the Communists will give as much assistance as possible in [to] carry out this procedure. He further stated that if these six points can be made into a directive, it will become regulation and the teams must carry it out.
General Byroade then stated that he appreciated Gen. Chou’s overall presentation of the situation. General Byroade then emphasized on the importance of getting an agreement and that Gen. Chou may not have been informed on some of the events [which] happened in the field. Many incidents mentioned by General Chou on the failure to reach agreement in dispatching field teams to investigate on alleged Kuomintang violations did not correspond to the reports available to the Executive Headquarters. Gen. Byroade expressed that he did not want to take up these incidents because it was the principle that was involved. According to records, there was a great deal of refusal on the part of the Communists in dispatching field teams. Gen. Byroade agreed that punishment must be dealt against false reports. He further stated that in the past month the refusal by the Communist members to investigate reports against their own side has increased and in many cases, the Communist team members absent [Page 838] themselves without permission for days when an urgent investigation should be conducted. General Byroade said he is very much concerned for two reasons: (1) our field teams are not operating [with] any where near the efficiency they should be; (2) if this continues, try as he may, he can’t keep among the American members in the Executive Headquarters the inference that the present refusal of the Communists plus the refusal to sign the agreement for the team to go any where they want to go indicate that the Communists don’t want to be seen by the teams of certain areas. Gen. Byroade then said that he was hesitant in making this statement because he knew General Chou’s sincerity in this matter. He further emphasized his absolute conviction of Gen. Chou’s sincerity but just wanted Gen. Chou to know the facts. He explained that the principle in the paper was worked up by the Americans without suggestion from either side. It was worked out on account of desirability and necessity. He did not think that he had over-emphasized the importance for field teams to move without hesitation or delay.
General Chou then stated that there was a difference of opinion. (1) The procedure set out by General Marshall for all three parties to agree must be adhered [to] and he had complete confidence in that, and he could not divert from it. He expressed the desire for General Byroade and Mr. Robertson to understand. (2) Some distinction must be made as to the places [which] may be investigated by the field teams. If a hostility is reported at a place where physical troop contact exists, then the investigation should be conducted. But if an alleged violation is reported at points where such condition does not exist, then it will just be a waste of effort in conducting an investigation. Gen. Chou then cited numerous instances of accused hostilities in Northern Chahar and Jehol where Communists were in full domination and none of the national troops ever existed. He further stated that he probably could also make many accusations in areas south of the Yangtze River. (3) Gen. Chou said that he could believe that many requests by the Kuomintang to dispatch field teams had been refused by the Communist[s] because there were too many false reports. (4) General Chou admitted that the Communist team members did not cooperate to the fullest extent because they are greatly dissatisfied with the Kuomintang team members. However, General Chou is willing to wire the commissioner in Peiping to instruct the Communist field team members to cooperate more fully and disregard the attitude of the Kuomintang team members. Gen. Chou then said that based on these, he would like to have Gen. Byroade’s consideration of his six points presentation. He further stated that he could not accept Gen. Byroade’s paper because: (1) he wanted to follow Gen. [Page 839] Marshall’s principle that all agreements must be agreed upon by all; (2) he regreted that the paper was signed before he was consulted. He reiterated that he wanted to solve this problem and that if his six points could be made into a directive then no one dares to violate. Gen. Chou then explained that the Communists are not anti-American although they lack the understanding of the American people due to lack of contact. Much of the anti-American [reports?] by the Communists are propaganda of the Central Government in an effort to weaken the relation between the Communists and the American people.
General Byroade closed the meeting by saying that he would be the last one to recommend the abandonment of unanimous agreement. Also he is very much concerned in getting a workable, practicable, and reasonable solution. His first reaction was that Gen. Chou’s suggestion was not workable; however, he has to make a study before making any recommendation to General Marshall.