Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Meeting at Taiyuan, March 3, 1946
Col. Holly: “Committee, Commissioners, and others. I am going to divide my talk into four parts. First, I shall discuss the committee and its problems. Next, say a few words about Shansi Province; violations of cease-fire order; state of communications, and the Japanese prisoner situation and civilians.
“I arrived with the Nationalist member of the committee on 3 February in Taiyuan. We were alone at that time without a Communist member, so we merely tried to gather data and decide on a common viewpoint in trying to solve this problem. On the seventh of the month, the two of us sent a letter to General Liu Po Chen. In this letter we informed him that the Communist member was not present, but would like to make arrangements for a meeting with him at such time and at such place as would be convenient for him. The letter was taken by General Tsu, Army commander in the Taiyuan area to Lin Fen and then carried to a Communist member to give it to General Liu Po Chen. He came back, and the letter was returned about a week later because no one would take the letter through to General Liu Po Chen. On the 15th, the Communist member and his team arrived.
“We spent many hours trying to get a working agreement on the solution of this problem. The Communist member seemed very sensitive, and every time we mentioned guilt or blame on the part of the Communist side, he seemed to take offense at that. In fact, night before last, I was accused of unfairness in trying to settle this problem. We talked about this matter yesterday morning, and it developed that if we issue an order to our Communist commanders that we have not even talked with and could not reach, that we must also issue the same order to a Nationalist commander. There was a tendency to stick to the letter of each paragraph rather than trying to get a broad interpretation to get a solution. He made the definite statement in the committee meeting that a statement by General Ho Lung was proof that it had taken place. We have no proof as yet that any of the Communist commanders have received any of the orders issued by Executive Headquarters. We do have over Governor Yen Hsi Shan’s signature that he issued an order to all his people that they follow Directive Number 2,67 or be court-martialed. I have made the practice [Page 488] of giving copies of all our radios for information to each of the Committee. We do not get any from the Communist Branch and he says he is not authorized to do so unless it says so specifically in the radiogram. As a result, we have no idea of the reactions or viewpoints of the Communist commanders.
“The Communist member does not know the name nor the location of any subordinate commanders in this area. He has no direct contact with either General Liu Po Chen or General Shih. All communications with them go direct to General Ho Lung. As yet, we have no overlay of a map showing the positions and the organizations and their locations of the Communist positions as of 2400 January 13. We have no information of Japanese situations in the Communist territory, either. And, of course, we know nothing of the present locations of the troops or commanders of the Communists. All these have been asked for from the Communist member.
“The committee recently took a trip to the Lin Shin areas. We had received word that General Liu Po Chen knew that we were coming and that he directed his Chief of Staff to meet us in that area. We went to Liayuan which we thought was the closest station to one of the Communist commanders. At this time, we had with us a liaison group from General Liu Po Chen, which came here at my request and they were supposed to talk about the railroad running down to the southeast. We also had the Army commander in that area, General Chao Chen-Shou, with us. We sent one of the liaison officers from this group along with the Nationalist officers to the Headquarters in that locality to take word to the General if he would come down to see us and bring a liaison group and a radio, that General Chao would desire liaison. I was asked to contact the General and ask him to meet us there with his liaison team to meet us the next day for a swap, and they were also trying to contact General Li Ta, Chief of Staff of General Liu Po Chen.
“Our orders were that if the trip took more than four days, another team would be sent down there and that was the reason for that request. The next morning the liaison officers returned with the information that neither of the two Generals were in that area. They said they had been called to the south for a conference with General Li Ta. They did not know where the place was that the conference was being held. At the same time, they were given another story that his car had broken down and had been late for the meeting. On the way to this Headquarters, the guide and the Nationalist officer saw a group of people, some 200 estimated, with tools on their shoulders. That night, the track was torn up north of us, and the bridge was attacked. Inasmuch as it seemed hopeless to get in touch with any of the commanders, [Page 489] the committee decided to return to Taiyuan. This we were able to do the following afternoon when the tracks were repaired.
“Inasmuch as Governor Yen Hsi Shan would not discuss the railroad situation, the committee decided to return. On the morning of the 21st, before we went down to Chin Hsien area, we requested an interview with the Governor and he was represented by his Chief of Staff. He said that they had received some orders from the Nationalist Branch, Executive Headquarters, but he did not enumerate which ones. About a week before this time, although it had not come from them officially, I took our copy of 4–A68 and had it translated. That directed that commanders contact their opposite numbers and establish liaison. At this time, these radios were in their hands, although they did not come to them through their official channels.
“General Kuo said the Governor acknowledged general responsibility for carrying out the cease-fire order. He refuses to contact any of the Generals direct. He repeated the orders received by him to his field commanders, but gave them no policy as to how he wished them to be carried out. Questioning General Chao on this trip, he said the only order he received had been an exact copy of General Directive 2. He had received no other orders in respect to this matter. General Kuo said that the Governor believed in letting all his field commanders solve their problems and only those they could not solve were they to take up with him. He believed no liaison necessary other than that already directed. He refused to discuss the matter of Chin Hsien area railroad with this detail that had been sent up, that he was not in contact with General Liu Po Chen and that no effort had been made to get in contact with him. He believed it was the committee’s job to make all decisions and make all orders in this matter. We pointed out to him that the responsibility rested with the field commanders to settle all these problems. He still remained of the same opinion despite that. He said that Wang Chen Kuo was directed to establish liaison. We asked if he had contact through this liaison with General Liu Po Chen and he said, ‘Yes.’ I then wrote out a radio and asked him to transmit it and let us know when he got a reply. We were then informed that he did not have any contact.
“We have been told since then by the Governor’s representative that they are now willing to negotiate with qualified Communist generals in this area. I now have that in writing. Two days ago, we received a report that a certain officer was in Ta’Tung as a liaison. The field team called on the Governor and turned this message over to him. This afternoon I received a translation of a letter sent by General [Page 490] Kuo to the effect that they are willing now to establish this liaison and that both sides will contact each other by using the field team radio communications; the names, number, and missions of the liaison team members should be given. In addition, the members must be responsible and authorized to make decisions for their commander. After [being] agreed upon by the other side, they will begin to establish the liaison group. I am sorry to give you this before I have been able to straighten this out. Then the next is really a matter of getting the team into where liaison is to be established.
“I might say that the field team here has sent back many reports with a request that they tell us what the status of the liaison is in those cases. This was done to try to emphasize this liaison business and to get some one who was a witness that we could see when we go to investigate these things. I believe that this is in reply to that request, rather than to Special Directives 1 and 2 and 5,69 which this field team gave them day before yesterday. This committee has spent many hours trying to explain liaison and how it would help solve our problem. I believe it is a very difficult thing to explain, probably in the Chinese language. We have also tried to explain it to the Governor on occasions. This letter would indicate that they still think it is the field team’s problem to establish liaison and to make decisions. Except for the case of this representative of Ho Lung, this committee is not aware of either side making an effort to establish liaison.
“The Shansi Province is high, cool, and bad for farming. The industries are farming, raising grains, fruit, and iron ore and coal in quantities. Food in the big cities is the most pressing problem. The Chamber of Commerce reports a reserve of about 3 days in the warehouses. Family reserves are unknown but they are thought to be for about a month when the family is well-to-do. The shortages are rice, wheat, beans, meal, oil, pork, mutton, beef, cloth, and fire wood. The reasons given are poor communications and also the fact that food is not permitted to come into the big cities. This charge was made against the Communists where they surround the big cities. When I was in Ta’Tung, I can personally verify that, because I investigated it. Prices have risen very greatly recently, reflecting this shortage.
“There are 36 regiments of the Peace Preservation Corps which are disarmed and there are 12,000 district police. We have the following violations of cease-fire orders reported by the National Government side that they have made a record of and we will give you some general statistics on it. In some cases they report the duration of attacks. We will first take the National Government reports: 14 attacks which have lasted one hour; 18 attacks lasting from one to 6 hours; 2 attacks lasting from 6 to 12 hours; 2 attacks lasting from 12 to 24 hours; [Page 491] and more than 24 hours, there are 4. The type of attacks: against troops—34; against villages—14; against buildings—1; against civilians for purpose of looting—16; against railroads—17; against ambulance train—1; against bridges—7; aided by Japs—2; telephone lines—9; disarmed Japs—1. The figures for casualties are negligible. Now for the size of these attacks: fewer than 100—14; 100 to 500—38; 500 to 1000—10 attacks; 1000 to 3000—4 attacks; 4000 to 5000—1 attack.
“The Communists reported similarly. They have only given 6 instances of duration of attack, but as for type of attacks against troops—9; against villages—50: against buildings—3; against civilians for looting—23; against railroads—3; against bridges aided by Japanese—15. The size of these attacking units: less than 100—24; 100 to 500—35; 500 to 1000—4; 3000 to 5000—1. Now the comparison between types of attacks in the number of reports made by the Nationalists and Communist Party. The attacks against troops the Nationalists report 35; the Communist[s] report 9; against villages, Nationalists report 14 and the Communist[s] 50; against buildings, the Nationalists report 1 and the Communists 3; looting, Nationalists report 16 and the Communists 23; attacks against railroads, Nationalists 17; Communists 3; Japanese aided attacks, Nationalists have 2 and the Communists 15. Very few attacks were reported by both sides at the same place on the same day. At the town of Chung Yang which is west of here, [it] is reported under siege. When we were in Liayuan, the committee tried to send a radio to General Ho Lung to direct him to lift the siege at once if they were true. It is quite certain that that city is under siege and has been for a long time. The Communist member refuses to sign it and we could not send the order. We sent it to Executive Headquarters for the decision. The field team was to go there after this party leaves. We have made a request from the Communist commander to see if he will contact the Communist commander there. This request has been made in writing, and as yet, we have received no reply.
“We haven’t many maps. We have had nothing from the Communist side, so all these maps have been presented by the Nationalist side. We are here now in Taiyuan. Chung Yang is the city under siege; and of course, Ta’Tung is up there. Now the Nationalists have given us a map showing the area occupied by them as of 2400 January 13. Not having a similar map from the Communists, we cannot decide where the line should be as of that date. This is also a map provided by the 2d War Area showing where they thought the Communist troops were as of 2400 January 13. This one shows troops movements between January 13 and 31. I might say that the three Communist prisoners we interviewed that said that their route was this here. [Page 492] They moved north and fought a battle up here and at that time were captured. That was not more than 20 days ago. There were three regiments involved in a similar movement. They gave us the name of their regimental commander. We asked if they knew about cease-fire and they said they did. We asked if they were told why they were fighting after the cease-fire order. They were told that it was their orders given by their regimental commander transmitted from a staff officer, and that they would continue to destroy communications and fight the Nationalists wherever they met them. These are the troop movements as reported by the Nationalists of the Communists from February 1 to 25. This is also their estimate of the Communist situation as of 1 March.
“As for the status of communications, the railroads run north from here to Ta’Tung. It runs very poorly and it takes about 2 days and nights to make that trip. To the east on the Chengtai railroad which goes to Peiping, that runs very poorly also. I would estimate that the average speed is about 3 miles per hour or less. From Taiyuan south the line is interrupted down in the Wen-Shi area.
“We have not the complete information on the railroads, but from here east on the way toward Peiping there is one passenger train a day of 8 to 10 cars. There is a mixed train of 4 passengers and 10 freight cars that goes about 150 miles east each day. There are 2 freight trains that leave each day with a capacity of about 800 tons. The telephone system is very, very poor. This map shows the telephones—mostly along the railroads. The solid line indicates perfect lines and the lines with crosses over it indicates that the lines are not very good and most of them are that way.
“The roads that are motorable are very few and this map will show that.
“This map will simplify and show quickly where communications have been damaged. Those numbers refer to a comment in here and the comment is in both English and Chinese.
“Here are three maps that will show where the Nationalists report that attacks have been made.
“Next is the Japanese Prisoner of War situation. They are kept in six main areas and in 24 sub-camps, mostly along railroads. Officers of all grades are with the men, even up to the grade of General. They are fed by the Chinese. The six places in which they are located are there. The organizations are military organizations and they total 42,417; of whom 922 are sick. This figure has been verified from several sources and I think the average is about right. About 5 January, some 61,660 Japanese were disarmed. By 15 January some 8200 had been repatriated. That leaves a balance of 10,540 to be accounted for and they are accounted for as sick, wounded, died, or missing. [Page 493] There are some 2,000 now in the process of repatriation. About 11,000 are being worked on these railroad lines, keeping them in repair. There are some 5,000 on the southern section of this Tungpu line directly south. 3,000 are in the northern section to Ta’Tung, and 3,000 on the Chengtai railroad which runs east from here. All are reported to be disarmed. That report is as of the 15th of January. On the 31st of January the Japanese civilians totaled 11,981. Of this number, 6,793 are men and 5,188 are women and children. They are located in four places. No further concentration is being planned that we can learn of. The reasons given being the difficulty of transportation and food problems. The Governor said that even though these people are working, if an order comes out, they will be repatriated.
“We have a map here showing the main camps and the sub-camps.
“I think that is about all I have, Sir.”
Gen. Chou En-Lai: “Were all this data being submitted given by the Government or was it collected by the field team?”
Col. Holly: “The material for this talk was worked up by this committee. The maps and overlays were submitted by the 2d War Area.”
Gen. Marshall: “The meeting will adjourn so that General Chou and General Chang can meet with their own people. The Three Commissioners and the Committee of Three will meet in my sitting room at 6:45—about 15 minutes before dinner.