Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Meeting at Hsinhsiang, March 3, 1946
Col. Ferguson: “In the name of Team Number 10 I wish to greet our distinguished guests and, though I am a newcomer here, I will give you the notes of Colonel Cummings, the previous member, and the information I have received since I have been here, a brief of the situation.
“The general situation here can be reported as quiet at present. Communist troops occupy the area west of Tsui Wu except for a small place just north of the Yellow River. This group north of the Yellow River is the group which is causing the present stalemate in this area—occupied by Communists except for a small group of Nationalists in Tung-Ming. All of the railroad cities south of the Yellow River are reported to be occupied by the National Government.
“There are four areas that can be described as critical points. The number one which I mentioned is Meng-Hsien. Number two is the An-Yang to Lui Ho Kou area—this running into the coal mines. The other two and of equal value and importance are Yung-Ning and Tung-Ming, both Nationalist forces surrounded by Communist forces.
[Page 481]“A brief history of this team as taken from the notes of Colonel Cummings. Team Ten arrived at this city on the 29th of January; moved out promptly and held a conference at Chiao-Tso on 1 February. The following points were discussed at this conference: The first was the Meng Hsien situation. No ground for agreement has yet been found and the matter is still under consideration.
“The second point was road repair between Tsui Wu and Chiao Tso—about 20 miles. It was agreed that the road would be repaired and opened to civilian traffic and not to aggressive action. The road is now barely passable to jeeps.
“Another point discussed was the release of so-called innocent captives. Colonel Cummings’ written notes state that both sides agreed to release these people; however, when this was brought to the attention of the Communist and Nationalist members, there was much discussion about it. I have no written and signed agreement.
“Item four which was agreed by both sides was the cessation of hostilities throughout this area. Since that date, February 1, there have been a number of reports of small conflicts, but nothing of any importance.
“The fifth and last item taken from Colonel Cummings’ handwritten notes was that the Communists had agreed to stop executions, but that they will continue to try people, but will take it to the Government Court before the sentence is carried out.
“At our conference last night, the National Government [representative] stated that his record read the same as Colonel Cummings’. However, the Communist representative stated that the agreement was not according to his records; that he had stated at the time that the people had demanded the trial and execution of the traitors. It was the duty of a democratic government to accept the demands of the people.
“On the 3rd of February it was agreed to cease all hostilities in the 85th Army and to exchange liaison officers. On the following day, it was agreed to cease hostilities in the entire 31st Army Group. On the 8th, pledges were reiterated to cease hostilities.
“During the period of the 9th to the 15th, there were conversations relative to Meng Hsien again, with the final suggestion being made by Colonel Cummings and the agreement being come to by the Communist member, that if the Nationalists would withdraw across the Yellow River, the Communists would withdraw from Tsui Wu to Ta Wang Chien. The Communist representative also states that it was also that the Nationalists draw back toward Tsui Wu from their position which was a short distance outside of Tsui Wu. The Nationalist [Page 482] member would not agree to this combined stipulation. As this was one of the most important situations locally, this failure to agree was reported to Executive Headquarters, and the following day the entire team was ordered to Executive Headquarters for conference. I joined the team on March 1 and brought the team back here to Hsin Hsiang. There are now many claims of unauthorized troop movements to be considered by this team.
Gen. Marshall: “I would like to interrupt. Are you going to cover the results of the visit to Executive Headquarters?”
Col. Ferguson: “In just a moment. These claims happened during the absence of the teams in Peiping. During the meeting in Peiping, Colonel Cummings was hospitalized in Shanghai and I was unable to consult with him before coming here. I have talked the situation over with the National and Communist members and it appears that no decision was reached on Meng Hsien at the Executive Headquarters. To my personal knowledge I have no notes from Colonel Cummings.”
Mr. Robertson: “It was considered that there was agreed that [in view of?] the policy of no fighting and the National Government having the strong position, it was unfair to make them withdraw across the River and at our meeting we agreed to let these forces stay as they were.”
Gen. Byroade: “May I add a statement. This problem of separation of forces was considered along with the same problem in two other areas. Three teams were at Executive Headquarters at the same time on the problem of separation of forces. In consideration of all three of those and others that have been reported, the action Mr. Robertson just described was arrived at.”
Col. Ferguson: “I am very glad to hear these statements from the Executive Headquarters because I believe that it will make our task here possible.
“There is a great deal of want and hunger. I have reports of people starving and dying in Yung Nien and Tung Ming. Only last night we received a radio from Executive Headquarters directing that our team look into the matter of the starving situation and the blockade of the cities causing it at Yung Ning—to investigate, lift the blockade and report. However, at the meeting, the Communist representative on my team stated that under the instructions he had received from his Headquarters he could do nothing until Meng Hsien was settled.
“I have also other stalemates with this same explanation. This comes under the Railway Section and I will ask Colonel Cole to give you the situation of the railroad situation. Colonel Cole.”
Lt. Col. Cole: “Team number 19 was sent from Executive Headquarters to supervise carrying out the General Directive Number 4 in the area of An-Yang. In particular, the team is to supervise the [Page 483] reconstruction and especially of the Peiping–Hankow railroad. This railroad is operating as far north as An-Yang. But from there to the North, a distance of about 120 miles, it is completely torn up. The team contacted the Commanding General of the 40th National Army at An-Yang and obtained from him the necessary data for the procedure. On 28 February, the team met at Lieu Ko Chen with the Commanding General of the Communist General involved. General Liu stated that he had received General Directive Number 4 and he was enroute to direct carrying out the cease-fire order. He also stated that until these matters were settled, he could not discuss the reopening of communications. Accordingly, Team 19 has come to Hsin Hsiang to consult with Team 10 and obtain further information. As the situation now stands at An-Yang, neither side has started to carry out Directive 4 [4A?].66 The railroad engineers have stated that they are ready to commence reconstruction immediately.
“That is all I have.”
Gen. Marshall: “Aside from disagreements—no other comments on the program?”
Lt. Col. Cole: “The problem at An-Yang is so unfortunately connected with the problem in this whole area that it cannot be solved separately.”
Gen. Marshall: “I don’t think you understood my question. You must have some opinion aside from these difficulties as to the extent of your problem.”
Lt. Col. Cole: “All the rails, sleepers, telegraph poles, everything is missing. The roadbed is dug up, and it is estimated that the repair of that stretch will take approximately three months.”
Gen. Marshall: “Is there any material in sight?”
Lt. Col. Cole: “I have personally seen that there are some rails left along here. I have not been able to get to go into this territory. I have a verbal report from the officer of the Railroad Control Section who made an aerial survey that there is nothing up in here. The railway engineers have stated that they have enough on hand to repair 80 li immediately.”
Gen. Marshall: “Is there any expectation of receipt from the outside?”
Lt. Col. Cole: “Yes, Sir.”
Gen. Marshall: “Do you know where that is?”
Lt. Col. Cole: “No, Sir. I was informed that the technical matters were left to the railroad men, and I was to assist if they asked for supplies.”
[Page 484]Gen. Marshall: “Do you know anything about the rest of the track?”
Lt. Col. Cole: “The track is in operating condition from An-Yang to Hsin Hsiang. I have ridden over it personally. There is one train a day running.”
Gen. Marshall: “Does there seem to be ample rolling stock?”
Lt. Col. Cole: “Not in evidence.”
Mr. Robertson: “There were no strings attached whatsoever to our agreement to leave troops in this area. Both sides have taken the position that the legal position of troops was that occupied as of midnight of January 13. Not only in this area, but everywhere else over which we have jurisdiction. There are many instances where it has been impossible for us to determine where those positions were because we have gotten violently conflicting reports from both sides. General Cheng and General Yeh and I agreed that where there was no fighting that we would not press for an evacuation of troops until we could determine to our satisfaction what was the legal position as of midnight January 13. In the meantime we would go ahead with our other program with no restrictions. Insofar as Executive Headquarters is concerned there is no situation here dependent upon the withdrawal of troops in any part of this area. That is all.”
Gen. Chou En-Lai: “Since the American representative of Team 10 is here for a few days, and Mr. Robertson has just made the supplementary statement about the decision of the Three-Man Committee, I think this decision is well grounded, because only in this way can the work proceed; because only in this way the repair work will not be delayed by other disputes and the repair work can be started immediately and to execute the General Directive Number 4 which stipulates the immediate starting of the repair work and the construction will not be used for military reasons. Apart from the repairing of the railroad communications, all other kinds of communication should also be restored. When this has been completed, the food can be sent to the towns and the villages, to also buy goods from the towns, and communications will be restored between the towns and villages. With such an understanding, I think the work of the field team can go on smoothly and it will facilitate Colonel Ferguson to lead the field team to go ahead and the disputes will be smoothed over.
“At the same time, it is my hope that both the Government and Communist representatives of this field team will take up the position of mutual confidence and cooperation. They should try to solve all problems with the actual facts as basis, and they should conduct investigations and try to solve the problems on the spot. At the same time, I wish to point out that both the teams covering the cessation of hostilities and the team for restoration of communications, they have new [Page 485] agreements issued by the Executive Headquarters, but in particular, I wish to call their attention to the basic agreement in Chungking which is much better basis for their future work if they are aware of the fact that now we are all working toward the demobilization and integration of the armies and soon all the problems will disappear.
“Last and finally, I wish particularly to speak to the Communist member on the team that he should have a careful study of these agreements and understand their full significance, and, after the meeting, I will have a talk with him.”
Gen. Chang Chih Chung: “Colonel Cummings may have worked too hard and so he got his recent illness. If this is the case, I and I am sure General Chou, express our gratitude and thanks. We can observe the situation here is somewhat similar to others in Hsuchow and Tsinan. The point of issue is that cessation of hostilities on both sides should be carried out without reservation. In these areas, although the two sides may not open fire, but the state of siege in certain localities still remains; stop traffic on the civilians, stop food into towns—that state still remains in localities. They cause famine and cause inaccessability to buy things and vice versa. I hope this state should be relieved as soon as possible, because although both sides may not open fire, this is contrary to the fundamental spirit of the cease-fire order.
“Talking about the release of siege—of course, there are many technical problems to be solved. I concur with General Chou that we should have mutual confidence, but in addition to that, I hope that the spirit of making concessions on both sides should be cultivated. If we are armed with those spirits—mutual understanding and mutual concession—I think it is not impossible for us to overcome our difficulties.
“I would like to take this opportunity to make a recommendation to the members of both parties. That is, don’t care so much about the Army interest; don’t be shortsighted; don’t be narrow-minded. We must have a broad view and foresight. Don’t care about trivial things. We must care for the people of this country. We must make concessions on both sides. It is not to lose face to make concessions. Then everything will come out amicably.
“The repair and the reopening of the communications is the second step we take after the cessation of hostilities. It is decided in Chungking in the Conference of Three that the repair and reopening of the communications should be carried out as soon as possible. Destructions should be repaired immediately and the operation of railways should be done at the earliest possible time. No other point of issue or dispute should be hinged on that. We must do that immediately without involving any other disputes and points on this vital step. [Page 486] That is the fundamental spirit we reached in Chungking. Both the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of communications were signed by the Three Gentlemen in Chungking and those agreements should be carried out without reservation.
“All this trivial local disputes should be solved in the primary work of restoration of communications. I hope both sides will consider and reconsider all these agreements and get an earlier amicable solution.
“I have just remarked that starting from the agreement of cessation of hostilities, the agreement of the restoration of communications, and then at last, the basis of reorganization and disintegration, were three agreements that were actually three steps in one overall plan. If the members of both sides were to study those three agreements together, then these local disputes will be no longer. I hope everyone will have such an understanding. I reiterate to everyone that they should have foresight and broad sight, not only for local interests on these disputes [which] can be solved very easily.
“I would like to call the attention of both parties to the agreement on cease-fire agreement, on restoration of communications, and the basis of reorganization and disintegration [which] have been reached on the highest level in Chungking and those agreements and instructions will be sent through the Executive Headquarters in Peiping to the field teams concerned, and in a sense, it is like a military chain of command from the highest level to Executive Headquarters to the field teams. Executive Headquarters has the authority, and the field teams should carry [out] these orders very loyally. I hope everyone understands that.
“I realize that the problem at hand still needs some effort on the part of Colonel Ferguson, Colonel Cole, and I wish to express my appreciation of the hard work and effort these American officers have done for us and I wish to thank you gentlemen.”
Gen. Marshall: “I have no comments to make in addition to those of General Chou and General Chang. I suggest that we adjourn now so that General Chang and General Chou may meet with their own people. And I suggest you delay the lunch hour until one o’clock. We have another visit, and we should all be very prompt at one o’clock. I would like, at the same time, to see the American representatives of the Commission and Executive Headquarters, and the team.
“If it is agreeable to General Chou and General Chang, then we adjourn.”