Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Briefing of Committee of Three and Commissioners, Thursday, February 28, 1946, 4 p.m.59
Mr. Robertson, United States Commissioner, opened the meeting with the following statement:
“My Chinese colleagues have asked that I act as spokesman in welcoming the members of the Three-Man Committee to Executive Headquarters, which was born of their agreements in Chungking. I take [Page 454] great pleasure in doing so. We are not only honored by your presence, but you have come at a particularly opportune time.
“We have endeavored to implement your agreements in the spirit in which they were made. We have had some measure of success, but there are still trouble spots in the field which are hindering and, if uncorrected, may even thwart the great purposes for which you have labored so faithfully. We feel that your presence here and in the field may lend the influence necessary to straighten out these difficulties.
“According to our information, the fault is not on one side. Apparently there are officials on both sides who have not yet fully accepted the authority of the Chungking agreements and therefore are not lending their full cooperation. However, I am glad to report to you, General Chang, and to you, General Chou, that we have observed no such spirit among your representatives here. There have been differences of opinion, sometimes sharp differences of opinion, but we Americans have been much impressed by the evident sincerity and earnestness of your representatives in their desire to reach agreements which they consider to be fair and equitable and within the scope of our terms of reference.
“The courteous, friendly cooperation shown the Americans by General Cheng and General Yeh has extended down throughout their organizations and has made our work with them a very real pleasure.
“I now present General Byroade, our very able Director of Operations, who, with his chiefs, will brief you on the situation as it now exists. General Byroade.”
General Byroade said:
“The Operations Division of this Headquarters has prepared a brief presentation for your Committee. It is our purpose, in this presentation and in other presentations to follow in the field, to be entirely frank in our statements of the accomplishments, difficulties and problems of this Headquarters. In the brief period of time allotted today it will of course only be possible to touch the highlights of the situation in each team area. Full appreciation of the exact situation in those areas can only be obtained after further discussion and after your visits to the field.
“The first presentation will be made by Colonel Ely, of the Plans and Operations Section. Following Col. Ely, Col. Hill, of the newly organized Railway Control Section, will present in brief the problems connected with railways. The last speaker will be Col. Perrine, who will present briefly the repatriation situation. Col. Ely.”
Col. Ely said that he would present briefly the current situation as shown in team reports, and proceeded to do so, as follows:
[Page 455]“Team No. 1 arrived at Chining on the 16th of February. There it has stopped fighting and has been engaged in investigating breaks in the railway and establishing railway communications from Paotou to Fengchen. It is currently engaged in investigating breaks reported west of Chotzushan.
“Team No. 2 went to Chihfeng on the 17th of January. It has stopped fighting and has made a number of trips in this general area to investigate troop movements. It has found many minor troop movements, but no fighting of any consequence. It has made an agreement on the railway; however this agreement has not been completely implemented as yet. There are still barricades up and still inspection of people moving back and forth along the roads; that condition is improving but has not yet been solved.
“Team No. 3 is now at Taiyuan, but originally went to Tatung on the 19th of January. While it was at Tatung it made some agreements for opening up food supply into Tatung and communications north and northeast of Tatung. It made agreements for the reopening of the Tatung-Taiyuan railway. On the 3rd of February it moved to Taiyuan and has been concerned primarily with the disarmament census of Japanese and the investigation of certain reports of attacks on the railway. On the 20th of February it was supposed to go to Ch’inhsien, but was unable to get there because a bridge was out on the railway. It returned to Taiyuan on the 25th of February and is now engaged in investigating reports of breaks in this railway and National Government troop concentrations in that area. It is also concerned in raising the reported siege of Chungyang.
“Team No. 4 went to Hsuchow on the 20th of January. Fighting there has stopped, and the team has made certain basic arrangements for the reopening of the Lunghai Railway and certain mines in this locality. It is currently engaged in food relief for the garrison at Tsaochuang and in removing all blockhouses and other fortifications on the railway south of Hsuchow.
“Team No. 5 is at Kalgan, having arrived there on the 19th of January. It entered into agreements to open up the Kalgan-Tatung communications and later the Kalgan–Peiping communications. It is now engaged in implementing the Kalgan–Tatung agreements and seems to have made great progress.
“Team No. 6 has been used for special missions and has just returned from Kueisui, where it was investigating alleged Communist concentrations near that point. In the opinion of the team there were no concentrations of any consequence. It has also assisted Team No. 1 in investigating breaks along the railroad.
“Team No. 7 went to Tsinan on the 20th of January. It has charge [Page 456] also of Teams No. 15 and No. 16. Fighting was stopped. Arrangements for opening up the Tsinan–Tsingtao railway are in progress and for opening mines and railway near Poshan.
“Team No. 8 has gone to Canton, arriving there on the 20th of January. It has made attempts to get in contact with General Tseng Sen or his representative and has made one field trip with that aim in view. It made this field trip on the 20th of February and returned to Canton on the 24th of February. It is continuing to attempt to get in contact with the Communist representatives, but does not believe it can make any progress until General Chang Fa Kuei is authorized to recognize the Communists in that area.
“Team No. 9 went to Hankow on the 20th of January and is currently engaged in relieving starvation in the general area of Loshan and Kwangshan. Certain special directives have been issued to stabilize the situation where nobody was benefitting by troop movements, but many were very nervous about them.
“Team No. 10 arrived in Hsinhsiang on the 28th of January. It stopped fighting and succeeded in making certain arrangements to open up the Chiaotso–Hsinhsiang branch of the railway. I believe they have the highway operating and have made some arrangements on mines. The feeling in this area has been high, and there has been considerable hard feeling in the Menghsien-Chiaotso-Hsinhsiang area. Unfortunately the American member of that team was sick, and his replacement, taken from Team No. 6, was unable to reach the area with the team today because of weather. The team had been in Peiping for conference.
“Team No. 11 went to Chengte on the 31st of January. It has been investigating alleged disturbances in the area of P’ingch’uan, Ling-yuan and Lingnan. The fighting in that area has been stopped, but they found a barricade on the railway at P’ingch’uan. The team returned to Chengte three days ago to investigate reports of further Outbreaks of fighting to the east. Steps are being taken by this Headquarters to allow coal and food to come into Chengte and possibly to open up the railway on the way to Peiping.
“Team No. 12 went to Shihchiachuang on the 4th of February. It has been engaged in opening up mines in that area. Its principal problem has been to stop local fighting, which, while not on a large scale, is scattered over the whole area.
“Team No. 13 arrived in Tatung on the 2nd of February. It took over the work of Team No. 3 and has done very good work in opening up communications in that area. It is also attempting to get food into Tatung, but there has been a harvest failure in that area and they are having difficulty in getting food in.
[Page 457]“Team No. 14 arrived at Linfen on the 2nd of February. The fighting in that area was in the vicinity of Houma, but the situation is now stabilized and there has been no fighting since the arrival of the team. There was considerable discussion on the withdrawal of troops and possession of towns and villages. At present the situation is stabilized and there seems to be no chance of fighting breaking out.
“Team No. 15 went to Tehsien on the 2nd of February. It has been engaged in relieving the siege of that city and in general making economic arrangements in that area for feeding the troops. It has made valuable local agreements and is now trying to work out some sort of money exchange rate to facilitate commerce.
“Team No. 16 went to Tsinan on the 10th of February and to Taian on the 14th of February. It has been engaged in relieving the food situation in Taian and in keeping the situation stabilized. Due to the shortage of railway teams, it has taken over some railway work there also. It is currently engaged in food distribution.
“Team No. 17 was organized on the 19th of February. It was sent immediately to Paoting, near the railway, and it investigated some threatened fighting and also stopped the fighting further north on the railway. It was originally organized to operate out of the Peiping area, but it appears it will have to go to some other point. This other point would appear to be Ch’iahsien, although there have been several other places where teams have been requested. The National Government would like one at Yenchow (shown on the map as Tzuyang). The Communist Party would like one at Huaiyin to investigate reported difficulties in southern Kiangsu.
“Now, Gentlemen, so far I have given you reports from entire teams that can be justified and verified from reports signed by all three parties. Unfortunately it is impossible to get a strong report signed by three persons. Very often the team member—and this applies to both sides—will be a local man of the local unit and he will not wish to sign anything which is contrary to the interests of his own side. On other occasions he will operate under directives from this or other headquarters—I mean, under directives from his own branch of this headquarters, which are not always in accordance with directives from the Headquarters as a whole. In Shantung Province—what I give you now is from American reports—there is a series of cities down the railway which are in various stages of siege: Tehsien, Tsinan, Yenchow and others. Some are under close siege, others much less closely besieged. Various local agreements have been made in regard to these cities and have not always been kept. The general difficulty is that the Communists claim the troops inside the cities are not entitled to various provisions of the Cease-Fire Order. This Headquarters, [Page 458] and, I am sure, the Communist Branch of this Headquarters have attempted to correct that, but it does not always take effect in the field.
“I have another report which is so new that Captain Young has not seen it, so I must give him a copy to familiarize him with it. It has not yet been presented to the Commissioners because it came in so very recently. It has been typed in English and translated and should be ready for transmission now. However, in order to save time, I am going to cover it. This is a report from Colonel Holly, American member of the team at Taiyuan. He went on a trip to Ch’inhsien, but stopped about 90 li north of Ch’inhsien. Col. Holly writes a comparatively complete report and makes some very serious charges. He states that Gen. Yen Hsi-shan, the National Government Commander, has refused to establish contact with Gen. Liu Po-cheng and has refused to receive Gen. Liu’s liaison officers. He further states that Gen. Yen repeats the orders received from Executive Headquarters to his Field Commanders, but does not issue directives of his own to see that they are carried out. He states that Gen. Yen considers it the team’s duty to make all decisions and issue all the orders for execution of the Cease-Fire Order. He states that Gen. Han Tuan-pei, Army Commander, at the time he interviewed him (which I believe was the 25th), had received no order since Directive No. 2.”60
In reply to General Marshall’s question, Col. Ely said that it was about a month since Directive No. 2 was issued; January 20 was the official date, but it was hard to say just when it was actually received in the field. Col. Ely then continued:
“Col. Holly further states that the places he visited were known ahead of time and things were always dressed up so that he could neither see anything nor could he get reliable information.
“Col. Holly’s charges against the Communist Party are substantially as follows: (a) that Gen. Lee Ta was to meet the team in the Ch’inhsien area and would not come to the Funshuiling area where the team had been set up; (b) that the Communist Party is still tearing up the railway tracks and tore them up while Col. Holly was there; (c) that in his opinion the Communist Party representative may be evading contact with the field team—this refers not to the regular team representative, but to a special representative for the Ch’inhsien area.
“Col. Holly sees no possibility of any satisfactory solution and no object in sending a team to Ch’inhsien. He considers this worthwhile only if Executive Headquarters—to use a colloquialism—“cracks down” on the field commanders and makes them issue directives clear down to the lowest unit and see that those directives are carried out. [Page 459] He believes also that the commanders should be forced to contact each other and maintain liaison.”
Col. Ely asked whether there were any questions on his part of the presentation; there were none, and General Byroade introduced Col. Hill.
Col. Hill made the following statement:
“The Railway Control Section has assumed jurisdiction over all lines of communication in North and Central China. Of these, of course, the railways are the first and pressing consideration. There are a total of approximately 1,000 kilometers of railroad which require reconstruction or repair within the North and Central China area. Given free rein it would be possible to have an effective railway net within three months. However, a complete and thorough job of reconstruction will require perhaps 18 months.
“The Chiefs of the Railway Control Section have agreed to assign Priority 1 to the Tientsin-Pukou road. On this road there are a total of 322 kilometers which require repair, in four different sections. The sections marked in red on the map are those which are non-operative, and those in blue are operative. Our Field Team No. 18 was dispatched to Potou on the 18th of February. That team reports a great deal of difficulty encountered in the past ten days. For one thing, the National Government member of the team was almost lynched in a little town just south of Potou. On the other hand, the Communist Party member has resigned from the team and returned to Peiping, refusing to serve with the team. In spite of these difficulties, the American member reports he has established contact with the local commanders. They have agreed to permit extension of telephone lines as far as Potou, and he believes he may have further success. That last report was received from the team this morning. The Combined Chiefs of Section agree that there should be set up immediately field teams for these three points (Yucheng, Taian, Hsuchow). Departure of those teams has been delayed due to the fact that we have been unable to secure United States members for the teams.
“Second priority has been assigned to the Tsinan–Tsingtao railway. On that road there are a total of approximately 100 kilometers of breaks in three different, short localities. Our field team No. 21 was dispatched to Kaomi, at the eastern extremity of these breaks, on 22 February. Although there are men and materials available for the repair, the field team has been unable to accomplish any results yet, due to the fact that the Communist Party member of that team has not reported. Immediate repair of that road is very important due to the repatriation problem, which will be explained in a few moments.
[Page 460]“Third priority is assigned to both sides of the Lunghai Railway, particularly from Hsuchow east, I have not shown the total amount of distance of breaks in that road, because repairs are now going on just east of Hsuchow, and I don’t know how far that repair has gone. The problem at that point has been handled up to now by our Cease-Fire Field Team No. 4. This field team has reported considerable difficulty due to disagreement between National Government and Communist members, but those disagreements were handled by direct order from this Headquarters day before yesterday. A report received this morning states that work is now progressing satisfactorily on the road north of Hsuchow, or first priority road, and east of Hsuchow on the Lunghai railway. No field team from the Railway Control Section has been dispatched there for various reasons, among which is the fact that the American member of Field Team No. 4 indicates he believes he can handle the situation.
“Fourth priority has been assigned to the Peiping–Suiyuan railway. On this railway there is a small break of 23 kilometers between Peiping and Kalgan. There are also breaks to the northeast and northwest of Tatung, which are now in process of repair. Our Field Team No. 20 was sent to Nankou on the 25th of February. The team reports they have been unable to arrive at any agreement for the reconstruction of this break due to the fact that the Communist member of the team has not reported. The Communist member of the party, however, left Peiping this morning to join the team at Nankou.
“Fifth priority has been assigned to the trunk line from Peiping to Hankow. On this line there is one very serious break 190 kilometers long where the railway has been almost completely destroyed. Materials and men are available at each end of this break to effect repairs. Our Field Team No. 19 was sent to Anyang, at the south end of the break, on February 20. I have not received a report from this team for several days, and I am not sure what the situation is. The last report, received about three days ago, states they were unable to begin repairs. The north end of the break is being handled by Field Team No. 12. A report from that team received this morning says that they are unable to effect repairs on the north end because the Communist member of that team has not received instructions from his higher headquarters.
“Other railways on which a lower priority has been assigned are: Priority 6, Tungpu Railway; Priority 7, Chengtai Railway; Priority 8, Pingch’en Railway.
“The chief difficulties which the Railway Control Section has encountered so far are: first, that the National Government personnel either fail or refuse to destroy military works along the lines of communication; [Page 461] the second big problem is the fact that Communist Party personnel frequently fail or refuse to obey orders issued by this Headquarters.
“Are there any questions?”
General Marshall inquired how many more American officers were needed by the Railway Control Section. Colonel Hill replied that he needed four immediately, and should have five altogether—three for the field teams mentioned, one for Headquarters, and one other for the proposed Team No. 25. General Marshall asked whether these officers had to be engineers; Colonel Hill said it made no difference whether they were or not, so long as they had sufficient rank—that is, Lieutenant Colonel or higher.
Gen. Byroade then introduced Col. Perrine.
Col. Perrine presented a chart showing figures on Japanese to be repatriated, as follows:
| “Total Japanese in North and Central China | 388,400 | ||
| “To be shipped from following ports: | |||
| Shanghai | 60,000 | ||
| Laoyao | 20,000 | ||
| Tsingtao | 72,800 | ||
| Tangku | 235,600 | ||
He then made the following statement:
“An overall plan for repatriation of the Japanese was agreed upon by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Japan, and United States Forces in China. Responsibility for moving the Japanese through the areas of conflict in China was assigned to the Executive Headquarters under the agreement for cessation of hostilities as signed by the Committee of Three in Chungking. On February 14 in Peiping, at the direction of the Commanding Officer, Executive Headquarters, a meeting was held and it was decided that the responsibility for the moving of Japanese repatriates to ports of embarkation would be the responsibility of Executive Headquarters. At the ports of embarkation the Navy and the Marine Corps would assume responsibility. The National Government and Communist Party Commissioners in the Executive Headquarters have agreed that they will not interfere in any way and will assist in the movements of Japanese repatriates to meet the shipping schedules at the ports. A large number of Japanese in some areas are creating food and coal problems in addition to those already existing in those areas. In other areas they are causing disagreements between the local troop commanders. Therefore it is of extreme importance that the Japanese repatriates be moved at the earliest possible time.
[Page 462]“The total Japanese in North and Central China to be repatriated are 388,400. They will move through the following ports: Shanghai, Laoyao, Tsingtao, and Tangku.
“Those located in Honan Province and west of the railway break at Yunho will be shipped through the port of Shanghai.
“Those east of the break of the Lunghai railway will be shipped through Laoyao.
“The 72,800 located in the Tsinan-Tsingtao area will be shipped through the port of Tsingtao. As explained by Col. Hill, there are several breaks in this railway, and it requires the establishment of camps one day’s march apart in this area. These camps are not completely established, but the repatriates are moving over this line at the present time.
“Repatriates located in the Peiping-Taiyuan-Tatung areas will be moved out through the port of Tangku. To do this it is necessary to establish a camp at Shihchiachuang, because this part of the railway is operating with a different type of rolling stock from the rest of the line.
“The last report for the ten day period ending 24 February showed that we have shipped out through Tangku 11,710 Japanese during the ten day period. The same report indicates that 10,075 have been shipped out through Tsingtao.
“Are there any questions?”
General Marshall asked what were the last reports on repatriation through Shanghai. Col. Perrine replied that reports from Shanghai were not furnished this Headquarters.
General Marshall asked whether the figures referred to soldiers only. Col. Perrine said they covered both civil and military.
General Byroade then stated:
“Gentlemen. That concludes the presentation. The combined staffs of this Headquarters are now assembled in an auditorium a short walking distance from here, just opposite the main gate of this compound. They are of course most eager to have the pleasure of being presented to the members of the Committee of Three. If it is agreeable to you, therefore, we will now walk over to the auditorium. On the stage there are chairs for the Committee of Three and the three Commissioners. The remainder of the personnel in this room should take seats in the front rows of the auditorium. I will there introduce you to the staff and request each of the members of the Committee of Three to say a few words to the personnel of the staff.”
The meeting adjourned to the auditorium.