761.91/12–746
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)
The Iranian Ambassador telephoned from New York today at noon to tell me the contents of two important telegrams he had received from Prime Minister Qavam in Tehran.
The first telegram reported a second interview with the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran. The Soviet Ambassador referred to the “friendly advice” which he had given, on instructions from his Government, to Mr. Qavam a few days ago, namely that “difficulties” would ensue from the despatch of Iranian Central Government forces into the province of Azerbaijan abutting on the Soviet frontier. He recalled that Mr. Qavam promised to take the matter up with the Iranian Council of Ministers and stated that he had awaited the decision of the Council. The Soviet Ambassador reiterated that the action contemplated by the Iranian Central Government would lead to “disturbances” to which “the Soviet Government cannot be indifferent”. He stated that if there were any shortcomings in the agreement reached by the Iranian Central Government and the Azerbaijan authorities, Qavam should remedy them by “friendly conversations” with Azerbaijan officials. Otherwise, he stated, there would be “clashes of arms” involved in “partisan warfare” which would extend to the Soviet frontier. The Soviet Ambassador continued that defeated forces in Azerbaijan might be expected to cross the border into the Soviet Union and that there would be “trouble”.
Mr. Qavam replied that delay in communicating to the Soviet Ambassador the decision of the Iranian Council of Ministers was occasioned by the fact that a Friday holiday intervened and that certain Cabinet Ministers had been in Zenjan in connection with the Central Government’s reoccupation of that city. Mr. Qavam could now state, however, that the decision had been taken with regard to the despatch of troops to the whole of Iran in connection with the forthcoming elections. This attitude, he stated, cannot be changed and no exception can be made for the province of Azerbaijan. Mr. Qavam stated that he attached importance to the friendly advice of the Soviet Ambassador but that he was responsible to Iran and the Iranian laws, and that no pressure or possibility of disturbances should deter him in his duty to send forces into all provinces of Iran. Mr. Qavam stated that it was not intended to attack any province of Iran but merely to assure security during the course of elections. The Soviet Ambassador suggested that Mr. Qavam send a commission of “liberal-minded men” and of the press to observe elections in Azerbaijan. He recalled [Page 557] that the Soviet Union had acted as mediator in the initial negotiations between the Central Government and Azerbaijan and stated that the Soviet Union “cannot remain indifferent to dangers on its frontiers”.
Mr. Qavam replied that such a commission would give no assurance of orderly elections, that Azerbaijan is Iranian territory, and that there is no danger to such a powerful state as the Soviet Union. He reminded the Soviet Ambassador that Soviet frontiers are not confined to Azerbaijan and enquired whether internal affairs in other states bordering the Soviet Union might likewise be considered dangerous to the Soviet Union. Mr. Qavam stated that the Soviet Government should be able to protect itself and should leave Iran free in this internal matter.
The Soviet Ambassador concluded by saying that he had fulfilled his mission undertaken on instruction from his Government. He stated that if Mr. Qavam does not accept Soviet advice and persists in his course toward Azerbaijan, the Soviet Government “will have to revise its attitude toward you personally”.
Mr. Qavam concluded his statements by saying that if he were subject to threat, should abandon his efforts on behalf of Iran and step aside, anyone chosen to succeed him as Prime Minister would take the same action that Qavam is taking now. Mr. Qavam stated that his decision was not a personal one but reflected the public opinion of Iran.
Having reported the above conversation Mr. Qavam requested Ambassador Ala to send the contemplated report to the United Nations and let him know the results as soon as possible.
The second telegram was received at 10 p.m. Friday, December 6. Mr. Qavam referred to the statement which Mr. Acheson had made to him recently concerning Iranian relations with the United States and the United Nations.28 Mr. Qavam stated that he had sent instructions to Mr. Ala before receipt of Mr. Ala’s telegram embodying that statement. Mr. Qavam said he was “steadfast” before the Soviet Ambassador and that Iranian forces would soon move into Azerbaijan to maintain security there during elections. He reported that Azerbaijan was considering hostile measures and had mined the roads at the provincial border. Mr. Qavam stated that the Tabriz radio had been violent in its attacks upon him and the Central Government, that the Tudeh press had apparently taken the lead of the Soviet Government, and that the Soviet Ambassador had threatened him personally. In spite of all this, Mr. Qavam emphasized that he will not change his position. He recalled that the subject of Iran is still [Page 558] on the agenda of the Security Council and that Council action is the only hope Iran has of preventing Soviet interference. He recalled that Iran had assisted the Allies during the war and now wished to be helped in its efforts to implement reforms already announced, certainly not to be threatened by great powers and at least to be left alone. He stated that other powers should not, by assistance to traitors, encourage the dismemberment of Iran but should leave Iran to set its own house in order. Mr. Qavam stated that he is relying upon Security Council attention to the present Iranian situation and hoped for positive results.
The Iranian Ambassador said he intended to see Mr. Herschel Johnson, United States President of the Security Council, Saturday afternoon and to attempt to see Mr. Bevin if he were still in New York. Mr. Ala said that on the strength of his latest telegrams from Tehran, he wondered whether a second note for the attention of the Security Council was now in order. Mr. Henderson observed that Mr. Qavam appeared to be steadfast in his present course of reliance upon the United Nations and that Mr. Ala might wish to take action only on specific instruction from his Prime Minister. Mr. Ala stated that he would immediately ask Mr. Qavam what further action was now desired.