891.00/11–2946: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)25
most immediate niact
993. (1) After examining urtel 1536 Nov 29 (which arrived 2 p.m. Dec 2) and urtels 153926 and 1540 Dec 1, and after studying Brit Amb’s telegrams on subject which have been shown us by Brit Emb, we are unable to understand precisely what advice or assurances Qavam desires. We observe in his conversation with Brit Amb of Dec 1 a shift in his position and a general weakening of his attitude vis-à-vis Soviet Union. Matter so urgent, however, we feel we should give you our views without awaiting clarification.
[Page 552](2) It seems to us that Iranian Central Govt is justified in taking appropriate measures, including the dispatch of troops, in order to restore its authority in Azerbaijan. We do not see how valid elections can be held in Azerbaijan so long as that province is not under control of Central Govt.
(3) If Qavam should refrain from taking appropriate measures to restore authority of Central Govt in Azerbaijan merely because of pressure brought to bear upon him by Soviet Amb, he will be adding to difficulties which we have been encountering in carrying out our policy of supporting integrity and independence of Iran. If on other hand following dispatch by Qavam of troops into Azerbaijan he should have reason to believe that Soviet Govt is interfering in Iranian affairs by giving support to Azerbaijan movement and he should bring this matter to attention of Security Council, American Govt will be prepared to pursue matter energetically. You can assure Qavam that this Govt will give its unqualified support to Iran or to any other power the integrity and independence of which may be threatened by external forces, provided that power shows courage and determination to maintain its own independence and freedom of action and provided it is willing to make its position clear to world.
(4) You may further inform Qavam that we feel that he would be justified at this point in informing SC of situation with regard to Azerbaijan. If he decides to do so he might care to incorporate in his communication some of following points: (a) Iranian Central Govt, despite protracted negotiations, has not as yet been able by peaceful means to reassert its authority over the province of Azerbaijan; (b) he has therefore decided to send Iranian forces into Azerbaijan to supervise elections and to reestablish order and restore authority of Iranian Govt; (c) he has taken this decision notwithstanding a message delivered to him by Soviet Amb on behalf of Soviet Govt to effect that if Central Govt forces are sent to Azerbaijan there will be disturbances in that province and along the Soviet border; (d) his present communication to SC is in nature of further report on developments in Iranian question pending before SC and he hopes that in view of situation in Azerbaijan SC will continue to be seized of Iranian question.
(5) Such communication would not of course be considered as invitation for SC to act at this juncture. It would however place SC upon notice re possibility that Iranian case might again become active in immediate future.