Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

891.00/8–2546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Tehran, August 25, 1946—noon.
[Received 3:46 p.m.]

1153. Principal points of my conversation yesterday with Qavam were:

(1) He was especially interested and impressed by Department’s approval of views I had previously expressed to him regarding ability of UN to assist Iran in case of Soviet interference (Embtel 1116, August 13 and Department’s 692, August 16⁸¹). I pointed out again that while USSR has veto in Council and UN has no security forces, nevertheless nations which were determined to make UN successful and potent international organization would find means to make it function in defending member states against aggression. I added I again that Iran must be prepared to place its case unreservedly and wholeheartedly before SC if Iran expected latter to be able to help. Qavam said security measures his Govt was already taking to prevent infiltration of Soviet civilians into Iran and to defend capital against Soviet-inspired Tudeh uprising were already straining Iranian budget and that possible need for assistance would be financial.

(2) I told Prime Minister in all friendliness but frankly that I was disturbed by reports I had received that he was not following course, in his discussions with Azerbaijan delegation, which would maintain Iran’s integrity. I said I would welcome his correction if my information was wrong but that according to my reports he was inclined to accept Azerbaijan demands that Azerbaijan Army and Fedaiyeh forces remain as they are, under Soviet control and infiltrated with Soviet secret police. I said no surer or quicker road to loss of Iran’s independence could be taken. Qavam admitted that Azerbaijan demands were exorbitant but denied he had made any concessions. He said he was merely listening to them at present, to draw them out.

(3) Qavam admitted he had been disappointed in his experiment of taking Tudeh members into the Cabinet. He had hoped they would prove to be patriotic Iranians when they saw from the inside how USSR was treating Iran every day but they had continued to follow the Soviet line. Qavam said Tudeh Party was clearly directed by Soviet Embassy. He strongly implied that he was searching for good basis for throwing Tudeh members out of Cabinet.

(4) Conversations with Azerbaijans will continue for several days. So far only military matters have been discussed but today equally difficult financial questions will be on agenda. Bank Melli Director Ebtehaj telephoned this morning just before conference with Azerbaijans to find out Prime Minister’s mood and to repeat his own determination to remain absolutely firm against Azerbaijan demands.

(5) My general impression is that Qavam is very reluctant to resort to other than conciliatory means with Azerbaijan but that in the end he will use force.

Allen

81. No. 692 not printed, but see footnote 80, above.