891.00/8–1346: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received August 13—3:58 p.m.]
1116. Following my conference with Qavam today regarding Helmand River matter he asked me to stay for very serious talk concerning political situation. He said he expected delegation from Azerbaijan headed by Governor General Djavid to arrive in Tehran in few days. He said he was determined to find out immediately whether Tabriz government wanted Azerbaijan to be part of Iran or not.79 He said he would be very firm, and that if negotiations broke down he might have to use force to bring Azerbaijan back into Iranian nation, much as he hesitated to shed Iranian blood. He said his principal worry was that in case of resort to force he feared USSR would supply Azerbaijan with guns, tanks, airplanes, money and men in civilian clothes who would pose as volunteers. He asked what I thought UN would be able to do to help Iran.
I said that as he was of course aware USSR had veto in Security Council over substantive action by that body. Moreover, UN had no security forces or armaments available. Nevertheless I believed that in case of flagrant support by USSR of separatist movement in Iran and in case Iran placed matter strongly and unreservedly before Security Council, I could not believe that those nations which were determined to make UN a forceful organization capable of defending small nations from aggression, would sit by idly and admit that organization was incapable of any assistance in case of this kind. I referred to speeches by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes calling on members of UN to believe in UN and to base their policies on it as only hope for better organized world in future. I said I thought some means would be found to aid nations which did so.
[Page 512]I suggested to Qavam that if negotiations with Azerbaijan broke off, he should make it abundantly clear to world that rupture came because Tabriz Government was not willing for Azerbaijan to become part of Iran again. This would make it clear that he was fighting for Iran’s integrity. He could cite plenty of evidence that Azerbaijan group have failed even to abide by more than generous agreement Qavam gave them in June.
Qavam was in most determined mood I have found him since my arrival here. He said he knew that Azerbaijan group and probably Soviet press would denounce him as Fascist and reactionary, but he was prepared for all that. He said reason he had been so overly conciliatory to Azerbaijan and Tudeh up to present was his lack of confidence in Iranian Army but he had that confidence now. If USSR would remain neutral he did not fear results.
If Qavam appeals to Security Council again, I believe he will do so wholeheartedly and unreservedly. I hope Council will be able to show its ability to function in what may be real test.80
Sent Department 1116; repeated Paris, London and Moscow.
- In telegram 1104, August 10, 1946, 5 p.m., from Tehran, the Ambassador had reported that negotiations between the Iranian Government and the Azerbaijani authorities regarding the status of Azerbaijani regular and volunteer forces had broken down and that relations between the two governments had seriously deteriorated (891.00/8–1046).↩
- In telegram 1117, August 13, 6 p.m., Ambassador Allen reported a conversation with Prime Minister Qavam during which he expressed the hope that the latter might visit the United States in September since it was especially appropriate for the Prime Minister of the first member of the United Nations to present a substantive case to the Security Council to head his country’s delegation to the General Assembly (891.002/8–1346). In telegram 692, August 16, 6 p.m., the Department expressed its concurrence with the Ambassador’s views regarding Iran’s relations with the UN and Qavam’s attendance at the General Assembly (891.00/8–1346).↩