Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

891.00/6–1546: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

top secret
us urgent   most immediate

Washington, June 20, 1946—6 p.m.

533. My 511, June 12.⁶⁹ In reply to Brit memo June 11⁶⁹ Dept will give Balfour informally paraphrase of appropriate portions your 844, June 15, and of following views offered for your guidance.

(1) Joint Anglo-US representations to Qavam are considered inadvisable, since they may give rise to impression that US and UK are forming bloc in Middle East opposed to Soviet Union. Recognizing common interests of US and UK in maintenance of peace in Middle East, however, it would be helpful for you to keep in close touch with Brit Amb with regard to various representations which each may individually make to Qavam. In your conversations with Qavam, you should continue to impress upon him that, if his foreign policy persists in preference for a single great power and apparent disregard for those powers which are truly interested in future welfare of Iran, there is dangerous possibility that Iran will be deprived of its status as an independent nation, either by being absorbed into Soviet orbit of satellite states or by being divided into foreign-dominated spheres of influence. Persistence in such a policy would strengthen those groups who already take view that it is useless to endeavor to support independence of a people who are unwilling to take firm stand on their own behalf. While voluntary abandonment of Iranian sovereignty in favor of foreign domination may appear to be an easy way out of Iran’s present difficulty, it is not an effective long-range solution. Furthermore, Iran could probably never, through its own efforts, extricate itself from this domination.

(2) We agree that Iranian Govt should be encouraged to look not only to Soviet Union but also to other countries, and increasingly to UN, for assistance in solving its social and economic problems. So long as US is convinced that Iran is endeavoring to maintain its political and economic integrity as an independent country, attitude of US will continue to be sympathetic towards Iranian requests for assistance and support. With regard to UN observers in forthcoming Iranian elections, we feel it inadvisable to make such suggestion to Qavam. Soviet resistance, both in and out of SC, would probably in itself defeat such scheme. Further, SC generally does not appear favorable at this time, and conditions presently prevailing in Iran would militate against observers achieving objective of enforced fair elections.

(3) We feel that no opportunity should be lost to impress upon Qavam advantage to Iran of internal reform. Obviously, such reform should be carried out by patriotic Iranians working for good of Iran and not by persons who may use reform program as instrument to bring Iran under foreign domination.

(4) In connection with (3) above, Qavam might well encourage formation of truly Iranian political parties which would provide alternative to Tudeh Party and would carry Iran along road to democratic political advancement.

Acheson

69. Not printed.
69. Not printed.