891.00/6–1746: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received June 17—11:05 a.m.]
852. One of most significant provisions of agreement signed at Tabriz June 13 is article 7, which provides for incorporation of considerable part of Azerbaijan volunteer forces into Iranian gendarmerie. Additional remark to this article provides that since gendarmerie has acted during recent years in manner to arouse hostile public opinion, it is agreed that wishes of people, particularly in Azerbaijan, be brought to knowledge of chief of government in order that decision may be taken changing the name of that organization.
Shah told me last night that he understood plans were afoot to remove Colonel Schwarzkopf. Whether the plans are concurred in by Qavam or are merely Tudeh schemes is not yet certain. Qavam had told both me and Schwarzkopf several times he is pleased with latter’s work; Embassy received note from Foreign Office today approving the 12 additional men for gendarmerie mission who have been under discussion for some time. However, Qavam is taking one step after another to appease Tudeh and might give in to their pressure against mission. Since we have objected strenuously to Tudeh allegations that US imposed mission on Iran, it will be difficult for us to insist on retention of mission if Government requests cancellation. Discussions regarding renewal of mission agreement are due any time after July 2, or 3 months prior to termination present agreement. I am convinced mission could be strongest force for law and order in Iran, if allowed to function at all properly and might be means of preventing Communists from seizing power. However, chances of its being allowed to function properly are not good.
Qavam might possibly propose compromise by which mission would continue on understanding that Schwarzkopf himself be recalled, since he personally has been especially singled out for Tudeh attack. While Schwarzkopf has assured me he is willing at any time to give up position if US interests require, I doubt we should accept such a compromise arrangement if offered. Schwarzkopf has done outstanding job here and we should avoid any action which would indicate our acquiescence in unjustified attacks against him. Moreover, any mission which remained under such compromise would stand little chance of being allowed to function properly.
[Page 502]Possible alternative arrangement might be for mission to remain intact under Schwarzkopf but only as a training mission without executive authority. In all probability, however, this would so weaken gendarmerie, especially if as now proposed it must absorb Azerbaijan Fidayis, that its strength would be vitiated. It is not unlikely that such weakening of mission’s authority would only whet appetite of pro-Soviet elements for further curtailment.
Discontinuance of mission would be serious step along road towards complete Soviet domination of Iran and I hope some means can be found to avoid this step.
Department’s instruction or thoughts in the matter would be welcome.