861.24591/4–246: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
us urgent niact
[Received April 3—6:45 a.m.]
439. For the Secretary. Most unfortunately I did not receive until late last night urtel 19, March 29 from New York relayed in Deptel 258, March 29.64 (For reasons for delay see mytel 440, April 2.)65
I saw Qavam at 10 this morning and read him your statement in Security Council March 29 together with account of your remarks to Ala as to procedure Iran Govt should follow to induce Soviet Govt to disavow any conditions which might be attached to withdrawal Red Army troops from Iran. Prime Minister had received nothing from Ala this subject.
Qavam said he greatly regretted delay in receipt your message since he would have been glad to adopt course you suggested. He was at first reluctant to take any action now for two reasons:
- 1.
- Because he felt it too late to have any influence on Security Council proceedings and
- 2.
- Because he feared his request to Soviet Ambassador for concerted Irano-Soviet statement would be met by counterproposal that Soviet Govt would agree only if Iran Govt accepted Russian terms on oil deal.
I urged on him that it might not be too late and that in any case it would always be to his advantage to get Soviet acquiescence in unconditional withdrawal of troops regardless of Security Council proceedings. I reminded him that he himself had from first endeavored persuade Soviet Ambassador to eliminate qualifying phrase “unless something unforeseen happens.” With respect possible Russian counterproposal I remarked Russian bargaining position might [Page 402] be weaker than he assumed. Soviet Govt was in very embarrassing position before Security Council and might be glad to give assurances suggested in order to avoid discussion of substantive issues.
Prime Minister ultimately agreed with viewpoint I presented and said he would speak to Sadchikov tomorrow morning along lines you suggested to Ala.