861.24591/4–146: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 1—3 p.m.]
435. Qavam told me this morning he has still not arrived at any agreement with Russians.
[Page 400]He has received and answered message from Ala conveying Trygve Lie’s request for information on Irano-Soviet conversations. I understood his reply to Ala gave latter summary of talks substantially as I have previously reported them.
PriMin said that Soviet Ambassador had made oral reply to his notes on oil and Azerbaijan. On latter points Soviets agreed to conditions Qavam had laid down (mytel 411, March 27) and said they would use their moral influence to bring about settlement on that basis. Qavam indicated to me he is no longer worried on this score.
With respect oil, however, Sadchikov said Moscow made following counterproposals:
- 1.
- Since Iran proposed to furnish no capital other than value of land, USSR could not accept equal participation of two countries and must insist on 51% Russian holdings.
- 2.
- Western Azerbaijan must not be excluded.
- 3.
- Instead of requiring Majlis approval within 3 months of its reassembly, agreement must call for Majlis approval within 6 months after March 24 (date of commencement of Red Army evacuation of Iran).
Moscow accepted stipulation that security in connection oil exploitation should be furnished solely by Iranian forces.
On March 31 Qavam sent emissary to Sadchikov to say that he could not recede from his demand that Irano-Soviet participation must be on equal basis. (He would, however, consent to some sort of subsidiary arrangement whereby USSR would in fact receive 51% of profits.) Further he could not include western Azerbaijan except for small piece of territory contiguous to USSR and not contiguous to Turkey or Iraq. PriMin told me he had sent message that if Russians were not satisfied with these terms, “they could do whatever they pleased”.
PriMin said he had received report this morning that Soviets had established new military post east of Qazvin which he feared might be intended as intimidation following his rejection of counterproposals on oil.
Qavam asked me what attitude I thought Security Council would take toward his negotiations. I replied that I thought he had done wisely to give Ala facts and that so long as he (Qavam) was negotiating freely, not under duress, I believed Security Council would recognize his right to make agreement with USSR.
He also asked my views as to possible British reaction, to which I made substantially same reply.
(In this connection I realize that in broad picture mere presence Soviet troops in Iran constitutes form of duress. However, it may also be argued with some force that course of Qavam’s negotiations to [Page 401] date in Moscow and Tehran demonstrates pressure on him is not overwhelming and that agreements which may be reached will have been result of give-and-take discussion by both sides.)
Qavam seemed worried by fact he is in position of revealing subjects of Russian communications to him which Soviets had marked “Secret”. He feared this would antagonize them. I tried to reassure him by pointing out these matters must necessarily come out eventually.
Sent Dept, repeated Moscow 140, London 89.