861.24591/3–2946: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received March 30—11:25 a.m.]
424. Following is substance of talk I had with Qavam today:
He has not yet reached agreement with Soviets and thinks final understanding will still take some time.
Yesterday he delivered to Secretary of Soviet Embassy three notes: First dealing with troop evacuation, second with oil and third with adjustment Azerbaijan situation. First two evidently followed lines indicated mytel 411, March 27. In connection troop withdrawal I gathered he did not insist on completion in 4 weeks. He said he had been unable obtain from Soviet Ambassador any clarification of phrase “unless something unforeseen happens”. With respect oil I understood he had modified his previous draft proposal to provide for 50–year duration of company as requested by Soviet Govt instead of 30 as he had intended. Otherwise these two notes presumably were as he showed them to me March 27.
Note on Azerbaijan stated Qavam’s willingness to allow use of Turkish language so long as Persian remained official language and to allow Provincial Council to appoint all subordinate officials in province. Governor General would be appointed by Tehran Govt subject to approval by Provincial Council. Three functions: War, finance and police (and, of course, foreign affairs) must be reserved absolutely to Central Govt.
[Page 395]PriMin did not make clear to me whether he was merely informing Russians of his position this regard or was requesting their intercession to bring about Azerbaijan settlement on this basis. He said, however, that he had told Soviet Secretary that unless his proposal on Azerbaijan was accepted he would regard any oil agreement as nullified (I pointed out that obviously he should also refuse oil agreement if troop evacuation was not carried out on schedule. He agreed and said he would make this clear to Soviets.)
We had lengthy discussion on question of whether he should inform Security Council of these negotiations. I cited points made by Ebtehaj (mytel 414, March 2860) and added suggestion that revelation need not necessarily be embarrassing either to him or to Russians since it could be said that negotiations had been free and based on logic of situation. Although I did not directly urge him to take decision either way, at end of conversation and in reply my direct question, Qavam stated emphatically that he had decided to instruct Ala to give full information to SC whenever he requests such authority. I suggest you convey this to Ala.
PriMin stated he had already sent telegram to Ala touching lightly on steps where he had felt latter might have gone too fast but in effect fully endorsing Ambassador’s actions to date.
I asked whether Qavam intended to withdraw complaint from SC if his exchanges of notes with Soviets resulted in agreement. He replied that Ala had been and would be instructed to see that matter remained of continuing concern to SC until last Russian soldier had left Iran.
PriMin remarked that he had not told British of his oil negotiations and asked whether I thought he should do so. I said I could give no official advice. However, I thought he should remember that Britain was also signatory to tripartite treaty of 1942 and might well feel entitled to be informed. If he failed to tell British what he was doing he would risk their displeasure and would gain little since news of agreement would soon reach them in any case. He wanted British support in SC and wanted to be on good terms with all Iran’s neighbors. I felt he could present matter to them in such way that they would not object since he could point out importance of laying foundation for permanent good relations with USSR. He should, however, take care not to invite counter-demand by Britain for oil rights. Qavam said he agreed with my observations and would inform British on this point.
In conclusion Qavam declared that he did not take seriously Soviet walk-out from SC and believed they would eventually return to [Page 396] meeting. He expressed optimism that satisfactory settlement would be reached.
Sent Dept 424; repeatd London 86, Moscow 137.
- Not printed.↩