761.91/4–846
Memorandum on Private Meeting of Members of Security Council, March 28, 1946, 4:10 p.m.58
New York, March 28, 1946, 4:10 p.m.
top secret
(Memorandum based on confidential minutes of the meeting which were seen by officers of the Delegation but were not available for circulation and were not to be copied.)
Present:
| President— | Mr. Quo Tai-Chi | (China) |
| Mr. Hodgson | (Australia) | |
| Mr. Velloso | (Brazil) | |
| Mr. Hassan Pasha | (Egypt) | |
| Mr. Bonnet | (France) | |
| Mr. Najera | (Mexico) | |
| Mr. Van Kleffens | (Netherlands) | |
| Mr. Lange | (Poland) | |
| Mr. Cadogan | (United Kingdom) | |
| Mr. Byrnes | (United States) | |
| Mr. Stettinius | (United States) | |
| [Mr. Lie] |
- 1.
- Dr. Quo stated that since he had been unable to assure Mr. Gromyko that the Iranian question would not be discussed, Gromyko had felt himself unable to attend the meeting, but that the Soviet representative had indicated his willingness to discuss the situation with the President, or one member or a group of members of the Council.
- 2.
- After a general discussion in which the desirability of sending a delegation to discuss the situation with Gromyko was considered, general agreement was reached that no delegation should be appointed since such a procedure was not thought fitting for the Security Council and might be embarrassing to Gromyko, but that individual representatives might consult with him.
- 3.
- Mr. Van Kleffens remarked that executive meetings should be held only when no other course was open, and then business should be confined to procedural matters with discussions of substance held to a minimum. Colonel Hodgson stated his government thought that in such meetings under no circumstances should matters of substance be discussed.
- 4.
- Mr. Cadogan said that since his government wished the Security Council to conduct an immediate investigation of the Iranian application, he considered the Council should resume its meetings to show that it was impossible for one member to veto discussion.
- 5.
- Mr. Byrnes then presented a preliminary draft of a proposal he intended to make, which he stressed was not being submitted for adoption, but merely as a basis of discussion. The draft was almost exactly similar to the statement the Secretary delivered at the Council on March 29 (see page 437 of Journal No. 22 of the Security Council), except that in the draft of March 28 Mr. Byrnes specified April 1 as the date replies should be received, and in his statement the next day the date was April 2.59 Mr. Byrnes then said in his opinion the seriousness of the dispute would be greatly diminished if the USSR could assure the Council that the withdrawal of troops was not predicated upon any Iranian concessions, and that the “unforeseen circumstances” did not refer to further agreements or concessions. Mr. Byrnes emphasized that the assurances he specified would not only be consistent with the Soviet-Iranian understanding as quoted by Gromyko, but would also agree with the statement Vyshinsky had made at the January 30 Council meeting that under the resolution then adopted, any member, at any time, could call for an immediate report from the parties.
- 6.
- Subject to detailed consideration, Mr. Hassan expressed general agreement with the Byrnes’ statement. Mr. Hodgson, however, thought that such proposals would be appropriate only after investigation, and that since no evidence on the merits had been called for, the Iranian representative at the next meeting should be asked to confine his statements to the issue of postponement. If there was no postponement, he continued, both the Iranian and Soviet representatives should be asked to submit a written statement setting out the full facts since in the absence of the Soviet representative Ala should not make an oral statement. Mr. Hodgson was willing to have a time limit set, since he only wished to secure the facts, and had no desire to delay the proceedings. Mr. Byrnes in reply said that the information sought in his proposal, plus the statement already before the Council, would be sufficient to enable the Council to form its conclusions, and would further obviate the embarrassing situation of obtaining a full Iranian, but no Soviet case. Mr. Cadogan thought that if Ala were to make an oral statement, public opinion might be distressed if he were denied the right to make further oral statements. Mr. Najera agreed with the substance of Mr. Byrnes’ proposals, which he considered a compromise between the Egyptian and Soviet motions in the Council, and suggested that Mr. Gromyko be informed of them before the next meeting. Mr. Bonnet, while in general agreeing with Mr. Byrnes, pointed out that the Council would be unable to vote on questions of substance.
- 7.
- Dr. Lange considered that the request for information from the two governments involved a decision of susbtance, that such a decision could not be taken with[out] the USSR’s concurring vote, and that while the Secretary General might request information his action could not be taken in the name of the Council. Replying, Mr. Cadogan thought the Council could advise the President to request the information, but in any event no decision of substance was involved, for at San Francisco there had been agreed that no one power could prevent investigation. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the parties to a dispute did not vote. Dr. Quo then reminded the group that the Committee of Experts was considering the procedure by which the existence of a dispute should be established, and Mr. Byrnes said he considered this a highly important question which would have to be discussed in an open meeting.
- 8.
- There was general agreement that Ala should attend the next meeting to answer Mr. Lange’s questions as well as any others. It was also agreed that Mr. Byrnes would revise his draft and express his views at the next meeting; that Mr. Gromyko should be informed of the meeting in the usual way, and that the next meeting would be held at 3 PM the following day.
- 9.
- Mr. Lie considered it would be necessary for him to talk with his legal experts concerning both Mr. Byrnes’ proposal and the general position arising from Mr. Gromyko’s withdrawal. He also suggested an informal meeting of the Council members to discuss the temporary headquarters of United Nations, and said in conclusion the Committee of Experts would present additional rules of procedure within a few days.
The meeting rose at 6:40 PM.