Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

711.00/4–2846: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Moscow, April 28, 1946—noon.
[Received April 28—11:06 a.m.]

1378. ReDeptel 766, April 25.⁸⁹ There has been absolutely no Soviet reaction to report of Secretary’s Committee on International Control of Atomic Energy. Not only has report not been published or described to public here but no mention has even been made publicly as far as we are aware, of its existence. It can be known therefore only to a very small circle. In addition, it must be remembered that Soviet officials and citizens rarely dare to mention subject of atomic energy in conversation with foreigners. If report is criticized in Daily Worker that is fairly good indication of Soviet disapproval.

That report should be viewed with disapproval here is only to be expected for Russians will not greet with enthusiasm any proposed solution that does not:

(a) Provide for turning over to Soviet Govt full technical data available in other countries on production of atomic explosives, and

(b) Leave Soviet Govt complete freedom to do what it wishes with this information without rendering account to outside world or submitting to any form of observation, supervision or control.

This is not to exclude possibility that Soviets would reluctantly accept a more moderate and reasonable solution if they were faced with impelling considerations of national interest. It is hard for us, however, to see what these considerations might be. They know that our system of govt will not permit us to use our temporary ascendancy in atomic power as a means of pressure to force them to accept a reasonable system of international long term control. They have been provided already with considerable information on this subject and are probably confident that they can safely await the moment when they will by their own efforts have acquired atomic weapons. In our opinion, therefore, they will hold out strongly for the objectives outlined in (a) and (b) above and will be inclined for tactical reasons to frown initially on any solution which falls short of realization of those objectives.

As for suggested discussions between scientists we are aware of strong conviction among American scientists that such discussions provide the real solution to the problem and we doubt that any amount of argument or persuasion will convince them that the approach is not a promising one. If our Govt feels it necessary to defer to pressure from this group and the section of public opinion which supports it, a proposal to the Soviet Govt for such discussions might be desirable in the interest of clarification. Such a proposal should of course come from the US Govt and not from the scientists direct. It remains, however, the deep conviction of this Mission that it is quixotic to suppose that any Soviet scientist who might be designated by Kremlin to take part in such discussions would have anything in nature of freedom of expression or could wield any influence except as technical consultant on ultimate Soviet policy. This Govt has its scientists like everything else, well in hand.

I must point out one additional element of danger in the line of action suggested in the preceding paragraph. Our own scientists would probably approach a joint conference in an attitude of high-minded altruism admirable in itself but a handicap in dealing with their Soviet opposite numbers, some of whom would certainly not be similarly minded. Accordingly it seems very possible that the result would be to provide the Soviet delegation with more information than our Govt would willingly give at this time, unless the most careful safeguards were maintained.

Smith

89. Not printed; in this telegram, the Department asked for the Embassy’s comments on the reaction in the Soviet Union to the “Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy” prepared by a Board of Consultants for the Secretary of State’s Committee on Atomic Energy (800.2423/4–2546). This report was issued on March 16. For excerpts, see Department of State Bulletin, April 7, 1946, pp. 553–560. The complete text of the report was printed as Department of State publication No. 2498.