874.00/11–446: Telegram

The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

top secret

885. Since my talk with Obbov, briefly reported paragraph 5, mytel 869, October 29, I have had several conversations with him and number of exchanges of messages. For most part he has sought these exchanges of ideas. He obviously has no liking for possibility that he may definitely be stamped Communist in our estimation.

Yesterday he expressed some rather startling views. I had asked him what this [his?] reaction would be should Petkov make public appeal [Page 165] for formation of truly Communist-Agrarian coalition on grounds that only Govt based on two great currents of political opinion revealed by elections could solve Bulgarian recognition problem and reestablish domestic calm necessary to country’s economic rehabilitation; also that constitution volted [apparent garble] only by Communist Party could not, in long run, serve even Communist interests and certainly could not serve interests of country as whole. He concurred that logically such Govt should issue from elections, but said that from point of view of practical politics solution along this line out of question because of Communist intransigeance against Opposition. He added, and this remark seemed most significant, that perhaps such development, if it could be accomplished, would be of doubtful advantage to country.

In his opinion coalition Govt would surely obtain US and UK recognition while at same time United Agrarians would not be sufficiently strong to have any real effect on Communist designs; that within Govt Agrarians would always be outvoted by Communists. In these circumstances, he seemed to think that perpetuation for time being at any rate of split between himself and Petkov was perhaps more desirable. Petkov would be unfettered in Parliament and through his efforts could bring more and more of population back to sane ideas of Agrarian and Liberal thought that had obtained before Communists had started to tamper with Agrarian and Socialist views and organizations while at same time he, Obbov, would be gaining time in which to weed out as best possible Communist fifth column in his own wing of Agrarian Party.

Obbov then asked me rather surprising question, coming as it did from him, of whether I possessed sufficient proof of election and falsification to make it clear to my Govt that elections were not of order to be accepted by US Govt. I said that I knew what most other people in country knew about them and that I had tried to keep my Govt fully informed but naturally that I did not possess his “inside knowledge” of how elections had been made. He passed on to other matters with cryptic comment that I should wait until meeting tomorrow, that is today, of Executive Committee of his party, implying that he himself is about to make public some of inner facts.

Conversation came to an end with statement by him that perhaps best thing for Bulgaria under circumstances would be continued non-recognition by US and UK. He feels bitterly over bad showing of his group in elections and blames Communists for underhanded action against him throughout campaign and during polling. In his present frame of mind he sees Communists as do not other non-Communist elements in country, namely determined minority group that is bent on compromising every other political force in country to point where [Page 166] Communists can assert that they and only they can dig country out of morass into which it has sunk.

Sent Dept; repeated Moscow 363, London 206.

Barnes