740.00119 EW/7–2346: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 23—2:15 p.m.]
2254. For the eyes only of the Secretary and Matthews. Quaroni, Italian Ambassador, talked to me at length yesterday regarding Italian treaty and its implications. His opinion is worth careful consideration, as I am sure it represents the views of an important section of the Foreign Office and a part of Italian Government.
[Page 9]His opinion is that Italian treaty will come as a shock to people of Italy who have been led up the garden path by Italian Government on strength of indefinite statements by Western Allies prior to and following Italian surrender. (See my 2236 of July 20) He believes Italian people are resigned to territorial losses and expect a period of enforced disarmament and outside supervision, but that unless some definite limit is set to length of time when Italy, as a result of the treaty, will be relegated to status as defenseless and subordinate nation, the hopeless prospect which this situation will present to Italian people may result in local or even general upheaval and possibly a strong trend to left. His opinion is that Italian Government will sign treaty, but that it may be rejected by the Italian Parliament.
It is to be expected that Italian statesmen and diplomats will raise the bogy of communism in an effort to get the best support they can from the Western Democracies. However, other indications lead me to believe that Quaroni statements are not without foundation. For example, a recent article in Pravda placed considerable emphasis on necessity and desirability of Italy’s shortly returning to its place among the Great Powers, and Quaroni told me, after enjoining the strictest confidence, that Molotov had summoned him to the Kremlin, and had stated this to him officially as a policy of Soviet Government.
Thus, it would seem that having sustained a political defeat in recent Italian elections, Soviet Government is now preparing, as we anticipated, to take a softer line toward Italy, and, if possible, to shift to the shoulders of the Western Nations much of the blame for an unpalatable peace treaty which, in its proposed form, will be a severe blow to Italian national pride.
If this opinion checks with Department’s estimates, it would seem to me that our delegation at the Peace Conference should propose a time limitation on the rather drastic restrictions on sovereignty and armaments which will be placed on Italy by the treaty; or at least to propose and support a revision clause which will permit re-examination of treaty after lapse of sufficient time, say 15–20 years, to permit Italian people to demonstrate their conversion to democratic principles. Thus we would afford to a super-proud and hypersensitive nation some hope of again taking the place in the family of nations which it considers its right by reason of its history, location and associations while, at the same time, taking the initiative from Soviet delegation which is very likely to follow the above line in order to conciliate the large mass of non-affiliated voters in Italy whose trend from left to right or back again depends more on their own sentiments than on any party policy or platform.