CFM Files

United States Delegation Journal

USDel (PC) (Journal) 62

The Chairman reported to the Commission that, at the request of the Soviet representative, he had consulted the Secretary General on the question of whether the Commission, in voting 7 to 5 with 2 abstentions on the admissibility of the U.S. proposal for Article 29 bis (Fair Prices for Reparation Commodities) of the Hungarian treaty,28 had or had not voted by a simple majority to admit the proposal. The Secretary General had replied that there was a difference of opinion [Page 678] among the members of the Conference as to the correct interpretation of Article 6 of the Rules of Procedure. As there was doubt as to whether the result had been a simple majority, the Secretary General recommended that the Chairman refuse to put the U.S. proposal on the agenda. The Chairman said that he accepted the advice of the Secretary General and would not put the U.S. proposal on the agenda. Mr. Oliver (U.S.) stated that the U.S. Delegation wished to insert in the Record of Decisions the statement that it protested the Chairman’s ruling and reserved the right to revert to the question at the present session or before another unit of the Conference at the appropriate time.

When Article 22 (Reparation) of the Finish treaty was taken up for consideration, a long procedural debate ensued over the admissibility of the U.S. amendment reducing the reparation obligation from $300 million to $200 million. M. Gusev (U.S.S.R.) opposed the admission of the amendment on the same grounds as in the case of the similar amendment to the Hungarian treaty, i.e., that the deadline for amendments had been August 20 and that the discussions of the Plenary Conference on September 26 regarding the speeding up of the work of the Commissions forbade the introduction of such proposals, which, if admitted, would completely upset the Commission’s schedule. He asked that the Secretary General attend the debate and the Associate Secretary General, M. Garnier, entered the meeting. Mr. Reinstein (U.S.) stated that the procedural question was not the same as in the case of Hungary, for the U.S. amendment in this case merely supported the observations of the Finnish Government. M. Garnier said that, although there was no hard and fast rule against accepting amendments after August 20, the necessity of completing the work was now of paramount importance and only considerations of exceptional importance could justify the admission of a new amendment at this stage. Mr. Reinstein noted that refusal to consider the proposal would constitute in effect refusal to consider the observations of the Finnish Government and would make a travesty of the invitation to ex-enemies to present their views. The problem of reparation was, he observed, the most important economic question in the Finnish treaty and it was a matter of great regret that the problem should have to be considered under these circumstances. The U.S. Delegation had not submitted an amendment earlier because it had hoped up until the last minute that the problem could be discussed and that a considered judgment could be reached on the basis of this discussion. As M. Gusev appeared to be troubled by the form of the submission of the proposal, he would be willing to withdraw the U.S. proposal on the understanding that when the Finnish observations were considered, [Page 679] the U.S. Delegation could formally move an amendment in support of these observations. The Chairman said that he would reopen the question when the Commission took up the reparation settlement. After an intervention by M. Gusev regarding the relation of the U.S. to Finland during the war and the failure of the U.S. to participate in the drafting of the treaty, the Chairman declared the discussion of Article 22 closed. Mr. Reinstein asked to have a statement included in the Record of Decisions to the effect that the Chairman’s decision confronted the U.S. Delegation with the necessity of voting against the Article in order that its point of view could be brought before the Plenary Conference. The U.S. favored the payment of reparation by Finland and its vote should not be interpreted as a vote against such payment. Reparation should, however, be just and the U.S. Delegation did not consider that Article 22 provided a proper solution of the problem. As the U.S. Delegation could not propose an amendment, it had no other choice than to vote against the proposal as a means of recording its view. In reply to M. Gusev’s request that the reasons for the U.S. view should be stated, Mr. Reinstein reviewed the statement by the Finish Delegation, analyzed the burden of reparation on Finland and the country’s economic capacities, and found in this analysis support for the U.S. view that the burden should be reduced. A Soviet representative then made a lengthy reply along the usual lines and attempted in particular to show that the reparation obligation was well within Finland’s capacity to pay. Article 22 was then adopted by 9 votes to 4 (U.S., Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa) with 1 abstention (Australia).29

Mr. Thorp requested the U.K. and Soviet representatives to provide an interpretation of Article 26 (Restoration of Finnish Property Rights in Germany), para 2. He said that he assumed that restrictions on Finnish property in Germany would be removed only to the extent to which they were removed on the property of the nationals of Allied and Associated Powers, for otherwise the paragraph might mean that Finish owners of property in Germany would find themselves in a more favorable position than the nationals of Allied and Associated Powers. This interpretation was confined [confirmed?] by Mr. Berthand (U.K.) and M. Gerashchenko (U.S.S.R.).

The Commission considered the problem of Bulgarian reparation at length. M. Politis (Greece) put forward the Greek claim of $150 million, payable over six years, and defended the claim along the usual lines. M. Bartos (Yugoslavia) attacked the Greek position, commended Bulgaria for its part in the war against Germany, stressed [Page 680] the country’s low capacity to pay, and proposed that the total reparation obligation on Bulgaria should be put, as had been agreed in the case of Italy, at one percent of the damages caused by Bulgaria, or about $25 million. There ensued a long procedural debate as to how the Commission should proceed in attempting to reach a solution. The Chairman’s suggestion that the problem should be referred back to the CFM was taken up and pressed by M. Gusev. Mr. Smith (U.K.) proposed that the amount of reparation for Greece should be put at $100 million payable over eight years. Mr. Thorp said that everyone realized that it was necessary to find an amount as the total obligation which would be small in comparison with the damages inflicted by Bulgarian forces. Taking everything into consideration it could be said that the reparation settlements of $300 million imposed the least burden on Rumania, a heavier burden on Hungary, and a still heavier burden on Finland. However, he was prepared to take the Rumanian settlement as a basis for considering the others. A comparative anlysis of the Bulgarian and Rumanian economies indicated that a rough approximation of equality of burden would be achieved if Bulgaria’s obligation was put at one-third of Rumania’s obligation. For this reason he proposed that Bulgaria’s total obligation be put at $100 million. After a further lengthy exchange of views, devoted chiefly to questions of procedure and particularly to M. Gusev’s vigorous opposition to considering any figures for Bulgaria’s obligation, the Commission finally voted on a three-part Soviet proposal: (1) to create a fact-finding subcommittee which would study the problem and report to the CFM; (2) to vote on Article 20 as it stood in the draft treaty (i.e., without any amount being specified); (3) to recommend to the CFM that it take no decision before hearing the Greek and Yugoslav views on the matter. The Chairman strongly supported this proposal. The Commission rejected the proposal by 9 votes to 5 (Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia). The Commission then unanimously adopted the text of Article 20 (with the addition of the sentence providing that the basis of the settlement should be the gold dollar). The Commission then voted on the global [total?] sum of reparation to be paid by Bulgaria, rejecting the Greek proposal of $200 million by 13 votes to 1 and the Yugoslav proposal of $25 million by 9 votes to 5 and adopting the U.K. proposal of $125 million by 9 votes to 5. The Commission then adopted, by 7 votes to 6 (U.S., Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia) with one abstention (France), the Greek amendment to Article 20, as contained in CP (B&F/EC) Doc 67 and revised to specify $125 million, to refer to Yugoslavia as well as Greece, and to provide for equal division of the payments between Yugoslavia and Greece.30

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This summary has not referred to most of the 80–odd votes taken in the course of the session to complete the Commission’s work on the Rumanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Finnish treaties. The voting did not differ significantly from the pattern which had been established and which has been previously reported in the Journal.31 The Commission sat continuously from 10:00 a.m. Friday, to 2:35 p.m. Saturday, with two intermissions for meals on Friday.

  1. For text, see C.P.(Plen) Doc. 34, Report of the Commission on the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary, vol. iv, p. 535.
  2. Regarding United States interest in Finnish reparations, see telegram 501 from Helsinki, July 19, p. 6, and telegram 5337 from Paris (Delsec 1090), October 23, vol. iv, p. 887.
  3. For text, see C.P.(Plen) Doc. 31, Report of the Commission on the Draft Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, vol. iv, pp. 486, 488.
  4. The reports of the Commission provide additional information on the decisions taken at this meeting. For references to the texts of the reports and summaries of the final six meetings of the Commission, see the editorial note on p. 819.