Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Paris Peace Conference: Proceedings, Volume III

CFM Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frederick T. Merrill of the United States Delegation

secret

Paris, August 2, 1946.

In a conversation yesterday, the Hungarian Minister in Paris, Paul Auer, discussed at some length his personal views on the draft treaty for Hungary and also gave some indication of the official position the Hungarian Delegation will take in presenting the Hungarian case to the Conference. Some of his opinions are expressed in an open letter addressed to Walter Lippmann, published in the Paris Herald-Tribune of July 21 (attached). Auer made the following points:

1. Hungary will endeavor to rebut Molotov’s recent intimation that Hungary took little or no part in the final defeat of Germany and will recall previous statements made to the Hungarian Government by Marshal Voroshilov in Budapest to the contrary. The Hungarian Delegation may indirectly suggest that certain countries equally culpable (i.e., Slovakia) are now sitting in judgment on Hungary.

2. Fearing Soviet displeasure, the Hungarian Foreign Minister may be hesitant to question directly the territorial decisions of the CFM. The Hungarian documentation of claims for territory in Transylvania and for protection of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia will probably be tabled without a direct request that the territorial question be reopened. It is Auer’s belief that since nothing will be gained in this respect, the Hungarians must now ask for a one year “cooling off period” before the Hungarian frontiers are finally defined. He said he has already discussed with Australian and Canadian delegates the possibility of inserting a proviso in the territorial articles of the treaty to this effect and is hoping for their support and the support of the French with whom he is apparently on very close terms. Should he be able to persuade his own Foreign Minister to accept this view, he hopes that the Canadian or Australian delegate will sponsor this proposal in the Commission for Hungary. Auer argues that a proviso in the territorial clauses to the effect that the delineation of the frontiers be further examined and that no final decision be taken for a year will

(a) enable Hungary to negotiate bilateral agreements with the two countries concerned which would be impossible unless permanent territorial settlements are postponed. When international tensions are lessened and the atmosphere more favorable (i.e., after Rumanian elections) there might be some hope of success for such negotiations.

(b) avoid a territorial decision which world opinion could castigate and which would be recognized as not in accord with America’s frequently expressed ethnic and humane principles, etc.

(c) prevent an internal political crisis in Hungary in which the Smallholders would probably have to resign from the Government. According to Auer, Nagy could not be expected to survive as Prime Minister should his government accept the territorial clauses as they now stand. If such a political crisis is precipitated prior to the withdrawal of the Soviet occupying forces, it might align the rightwing Smallholders and Catholic conservatives, which groups now include many real reactionaries and Soviet-haters against the Communist-controlled left parties. According to Auer in any such open conflict, the Communist Party, backed as it is by the Soviets, would be likely to come to power.²⁷

In opposition to his own arguments, Auer recognizes the validity of two:

(a) In the interim period some Hungarian politicians might well employ for their own political ends unsettled territorial questions and reawakened revisionism among the people.

(b) The Soviets might use the opportunity to blow hot or cold on the countries concerned. (He believes this would not affect the Hungarians since they now have no illusions regarding Soviet policies.)

Auer is convinced that in a less heated atmosphere than now prevails the Czechs would be willing to settle bilaterally their outstanding problems with the Hungarians. He would therefore like to see the Conference recommend suspension of the deportations of Hungarians from Slovakia in the interim period while an allied commission investigated the situation and made recommendations, possibly to UN.²⁸

3. The Hungarian Delegation will probably raise the reparations question in connection with other Allied claims on Hungary. (The recent adjustments in reparations conceded by the Soviets (Budapest’s 1390 July 29)²⁹ is presumably an effort by them to forestall any such complaint). Hungary will attempt to demonstrate its inability to meet all its obligations, which will imply the necessity of scaling down all claims, particularly reparations. The Conference might then feel it necessary to create an economic Commission to determine Hungary’s capacity to pay. This the Hungarians strongly favor, all except, of course, the Communists.

4. Auer expressed grave doubts regarding the article which provides for the evacuation of occupational forces 90 days after ratification of the treaty, since he fears the Soviets will ratify only when it suits them. He would therefore like to see a maximum time limit set for ratification, as well as a maximum limit on the number of Red Army troops which will then remain in Hungary to safeguard Soviet communication lines into Austria after withdrawal of the occupational forces. The Hungarian Minister was not particularly optimistic that any such limitations on Soviet action could be included in the treaty.

5. Auer expressed also a fear that any customs union proposals growing out of the treaty would result only in a Danubian zollverein, which would sooner than later be dominated by the U.S.S.R. Auer foresaw in such moves the possibility of an eventual Hungarian-U.S.S.R. Customs Union, which would complete the Soviet economic penetration of Hungary and effectively prevent trade with Western Europe. Auer stated that he will attempt to head off any plans for customs unions with Yugoslavia and Rumania by counter proposals for a “European Customs Union”. He said he had already interested certain French officials in this.

6. According to latest reports from Budapest, Elek Bolgar, the Communist Deputy Foreign Minister, will not accompany the Delegation to Paris because of illness. Auer believes this to be a diplomatic illness and contends it is evidence that it is now Communist policy not to participate in presenting the Hungarian case to the Conference. He told me he had wired the Prime Minister recommending that a leader of the Communist Party be included in the Delegation in order that all members of the coalition and not the Smallholders Party alone should bear the onus of a failure to modify a proposed treaty now considered by most all Hungarians as little less than catastrophic.

27. For documentation on United States efforts to assist in the maintenance of democratic government in Hungary, see vol. vi, pp. 250 ff.
28. At this point Reber made the following marginal comment: “This would be in line with the position taken by the Secretary on previous occasions.” For documentation on the concern of the United States over the Hungarian-Czecho-Slovak dispute regarding the exchange of populations and revision of frontiers, see ibid., pp. 361 ff.
29. Not printed.