740.0011 EW(Peace)/8–146
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
| Participants: | Mr. Joao Neves da Fontoura, Brazilian Foreign Minister |
| The Secretary | |
| Mr. Matthews |
The Brazilian Foreign Minister called at his own request on the Secretary this morning. He said that there was great sympathy within Brazil for Italy and he was under instructions to do all he could to obtain a just and fair peace for Italy. He said that he believed he knew American opinion well enough to feel that the United States similarly wanted such a peace for Italy. The Secretary agreed and said that the question is what constitutes a just peace. Mr. Neves da Fontoura then talked of the proposed Trieste settlement and his belief that the Free Territory should be extended to include Pola. The Secretary outlined at some length his 10 months’ effort to obtain Trieste for Italy and his subsequent endeavors to extend the Free Territory area. He referred to Mr. Molotov’s proposal that the Free Territory include only the city of Trieste and did not even extend as far as the end of the streetcar lines. He said that it was, in his opinion, more important to obtain a contiguous frontier for the Free Territory with Italy than to obtain Pola and that it was impossible to obtain both. He said that the alternative to agreement on Trieste would have been separate treaties of peace with Italy and the possibility that if Italy did not accept the draft proposed by Russia and Yugoslavia which would have given the whole territory to the latter, one week after the withdrawal of American and British troops the Yugoslavs would have marched in. The Brazilian Foreign Minister said that the Italians claimed that most of the population of the Istrian Peninsula was Italian and that therefore it would be wiser to hold a plebiscite. The Secretary explained that he had proposed a plebiscite for the western area, which was predominantly Italian, but contrary to the Brazilian Foreign Minister’s belief the majority of the whole Peninsula was Slavic. He explained how Molotov had readily accepted the plebiscite idea but had insisted that it must apply to the whole Peninsula. This was not, of course, satisfactory and would have given the whole area to Yugoslavia. The Secretary had therefore been compelled to drop the proposal.
The Brazilian Foreign Minister then brought up the question of the Italian Colonies with particular reference to the renunciation of [Page 67] all rights therein by Italy. The Secretary indicated that he agreed that that provision should, if possible, be omitted and that he was taking steps to consult the other members of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He said that he hoped Mr. Molotov would go along with that and he understood that the French were agreeable. Mr. Neves da Fontoura asked what the British attitude would be and the Secretary said that he had not yet ascertained. The Brazilian Foreign Minister said he himself would like to propose at some stage the omission of the renunciation provision. The Secretary said this was agreeable to him and that he would continue his own efforts in this direction.
The Foreign Minister then said he did not wish to take any more of the Secretary’s time at this interview but there were two other points he would like to raise briefly. One was the question of the exclusion of Brazil from participation in the allocation of German reparations. He said that this psychologically gravely injured Brazilian opinion as Brazil was the one country which had contributed substantially to the war effort, yet was excluded from participation in the German reparations allocation. He referred to the value of Brazil’s aid when air bases were so badly needed in Brazil and the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy. The Secretary said that he was not familiar with the question but was inclined to agree with the Minister as a first reaction. He promised to look into the matter and said that he imagined the real reason why Brazil had not been included was the feeling that she would get more reparations through seizure of German assets in Brazil than through any other system of allocation. The Foreign Minister denied that this was correct and emphasized the psychological and political effect from his point of view of Brazil’s exclusion. He said that his President had written President Truman and he was raising the matter with the Secretary under instructions.24
The other question he raised was that of the holding of the Rio de Janeiro Conference and he asked the Secretary’s views. The Secretary referred to our difficulties with Perón and the fact that only several weeks ago Perón had said that Argentina had not legally ratified the United Nations Charter or the Act of Chapultepec. The Secretary pointed out that if plans were now made for the Rio Conference and subsequently Perón took the line that his Government was not bound by the United Nations Charter or the Act of Chapultepec a very difficult situation would arise. Perón had said, he understood, [Page 68] that he was asking for Argentina’s ratification and that while the Secretary knew, if he really wished to, he could obtain it in one day this had not yet taken place. As soon as such ratification does take place he will be glad to talk to the Brazilian Foreign Minister about plans for the Rio Conference. Mr. Neves da Fontoura remarked that Perón was keeping one eye on Moscow and one eye on Washington and trying to get the most out of it, but he felt something must be done soon with regard to the Rio Conference. As the Secretary had to leave for a meeting, he said that he would like to talk to him again about it some time.25
In conclusion he emphasized Brazil’s great friendship for the United States and his desire fully to support American policy except on occasional minor points.
- A memorandum drafted by Oliver for Matthews, dated August 3, 1946, explained that had Brazil attended the Paris Reparations Conference of 1945, she would probably have been allocated an amount inferior to the German assets; she had seized. Brazil would have had to make payments to help satisfy the claims of other nations. Moreover, Brazil could not have been invited without inviting Mexico and Cuba, which countries would have faced similar difficulties. (740.0011EW (Peace)/8–346).↩
- For documentation concerning United States policy toward Argentina, Brazil, and the proposed Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, see volume xi.↩