CFM Files
United States Delegation Journal
USDel (PC) (Journal) 43
Discussion was continued on the Czechoslovak amendment (C.P. Gen. Doc. 1. Q. 4.) to add to Article 4 a provision to prevent revisionist propaganda. The Delegates of Byelo-Russia, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia spoke in favor of the Czech amendment, all three pointing out that revisionism was still alive in Hungary and only if eradicated could peaceful relations be established between Hungary and its neighbors. The French Delegate thought the wording of Article 4, which provided for the dissolution of all Fascist and similar organizations, would be sufficient to prevent any further outcropping of revisionism and therefore felt the Czech amendment was unnecessary. Mr. Masaryk (Czechoslovakia) expressed surprise at the French point of view. Article 4 did not adequately prevent the revival of revisionism. Moreover, there was still evidence of this mentality in the present Hungarian Government. He said he did not move in top level circles and so could not explain why the French had objected. However, he would be willing to withdraw his amendment, providing the Commission could accept instead a phrase “or especially against neighboring states on revisionist lines”, which would be incorporated in the Article itself. The French Delegate assured Mr. Masaryk that [Page 467] France well understood the dangers of revisionism and said in view of what Mr. Masaryk had said, he would like to reconsider, and therefore suggested that discussion be deferred until the next meeting. The Commission voted in favor of postponing discussion.
Mr. Masaryk (Czechoslovakia) then made a statement in reply to the U.S. Delegate’s suggestion made in the ninth meeting of the Commission to the effect that consideration of the two Czech amendments: i.e., the territorial claim [C.P. (Gen.) Doc. 1.Q. 3] and the expulsion of the Magyar minority [C.P. (Gen.) Doc. 1. Q. 5] be merged.18 He said he was opposed to this procedure and surprised that anyone could suggest utilizing the Vienna Award to interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. The proposal of the U.S. Delegate that the two countries get together on an equal basis and negotiate what would presumably involve a cession of territory would in effect raise Hungary to the same level as a victorious Allied power. He was not opposed to bilateral agreement. In fact there had already been an agreement between the two countries not only on the question of population exchange but also regarding trade. Even now there was no closed door for further negotiation. However, he could not accept the linking together of the two questions. The expulsion of the Hungarian minority from Czechoslovakia was of such far-reaching importance to the peace of Central Europe that it should be considered at the Conference.
The Chairman stated that the Commission had already decided to deal with the two Czech amendments separately. He proposed that the Commission should hear the Czech Delegation, and then it might decide to hear the Hungarians after there had been a discussion. Viscount Hood (UK) recalled that he had reserved the right previously when proposing the formation of a Subcommittee to study the bridgehead question, to enlarge the scope of the Subcommittee if it seemed desirable, to consider both Czechoslovak amendments together. The Chairman could not agree, contending that the Commission had never decided that the two questions could be linked together. General Smith (US) pointed out that nevertheless the Commission had never decided they were not linked, and suggested that the Hungarians be heard immediately after the Czechs subsequent to which there could be a discussion. The Commission could then decide on what procedure to follow. The Czechoslovak Delegation and the Chairman both stated that this was agreeable.
Mr. Clementis (Czechoslovakia) spoke for half an hour in support of amendment (C.P. Gen. Doc. 1. Q. 5) to incorporate a new Article in the Treaty providing for the expulsion of some 200,000 Hungarians [Page 468] from Czechoslovakia. He traced the history of the minority problem, stressing the fact that the Magyars had enjoyed equal citizenship rights for twenty years and then in the moment of Czechoslovakia’s crisis had turned against her, joining with the quislings. After dwelling on the discrepancies in the numbers actually involved, minimizing the hardships, refuting Hungary’s argument that it had no room to receive 200,000 deportees, and accusing the Hungarians of having failed to live up to the exchange of population agreement, he concluded by stating that the Czechoslovak people had determined to rid themselves of the Magyar minority once and for all. It was in the interest of all of Europe to solve this minority problem, as it was the only hope of peace between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was the first victim of aggression and the last to be liberated; it felt entitled to receive some credit. He urged the Commission Delegates to remember Munich, to remember the sufferings of the Czech people and its history of democracy before passing final judgment.
- For documentation on United States policy with respect to the question of Hungarian-Czechoslovakian exchange of populations, see vol. vi, pp. 361 ff↩