Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Paris Peace Conference: Proceedings, Volume III

CFM Files

United States Delegation Minutes

September 6, 1946, 5 p.m.

top secret

Present

	U.K.
	Mr. Bevin, Chairman
	Mr. McNeil
	Mr. Jebb
	Mr. MacAfee
U.S.A.		China
Mr. Dunn		Dr. Wang
Mr. Caffery		Dr. Quo
Mr. Reber		Mr. Chang
Mr. Page
	France
	M. Bidault
	M. Couve de Murville
	M. Seydoux
	U.S.S.R.
	M. Molotov
	M. Vyshinsky
	M. Gusev
	M. Pavlov

Mr. Bevin stated that M. Bidault had called the Foreign Ministers together to consider the postponement of the General Assembly. It had been suggested several days ago that an open meeting of the Foreign Ministers be convened with participation of M. Spaak. However, M. Spaak is not in Paris at the present time.

M. Bidault stated that M. Spaak was at Brussels and that his assistant had informed him that M. Spaak had suggested that the meeting take place without his participation.

M. Molotov stated that he had requested a meeting of the Foreign Ministers with the participation of the Chinese Foreign Minister and M. Spaak. Unfortunately Mr. Byrnes was absent,⁴⁶ M. Molotov wished, however, to discuss the substance of the matter at issue. The Soviet Delegation felt that the General Assembly of the United Nations should be postponed to a later date which should be agreed upon by the Council of Foreign Ministers. This date, of course, should be one which would be agreeable to the General Assembly. The present situation was exceptional and one without precedent. It would be extremely difficult to carry on the Paris Conference and the General Assembly at the same time. In the first place, it was most unusual to convene two international conferences concurrently. Sufficient personnel on the part of most of the Delegations would not permit simultaneous meetings. In addition, M. Molotov believed that more favorable conditions would prevail if the General Assembly were convened after the signing of the peace treaties in Paris. M. Molotov was of the opinion that the Council of Foreign Ministers must decide whether the Paris Conference should continue its work, thus requiring the General Assembly to postpone its meeting or whether the General Assembly should be convened and the Paris Conference adjourned. The Soviet Delegation believed that it would be impossible to hold both conferences at the same time. If the other Foreign Ministers believed that it would be desirable to adjourn the Paris Conference in order to make it possible for the General Assembly to hold its meeting the Soviet Delegation would go along with that. It did not believe, however, that this was the desirable course. The Soviet Delegation believed that the Paris Conference could terminate its work in a month or five weeks. It recommended, however, that the General Assembly be postponed in order to permit the Paris Conference to terminate its work.

Dr. Wang stated that he did not wish to repeat the arguments for or against postponement of the General Assembly. He did not wish to suggest that the Council of Foreign Ministers should recommend postponement. However, it was his understanding that some of the members of the United Nations Organization in Paris had expressed a desire to postpone the General Assembly until the beginning of November. Dr. Wang was of the opinion that the Council of Foreign Ministers should transmit the views of these members to the Secretary General and request him to obtain the views of all members in respect to the postponement of the General Assembly. Dr. Wang stated that he would like to submit a draft resolution reading along the following lines:

“In view of the fact that the Paris Conference cannot be expected to conclude its work in time and that a number of the United Nations represented on the Paris Conference have expressed the desire to have the General Assembly postponed to the beginning of November 1946, the Council of Foreign Ministers requests the Secretary General of the United Nations to ascertain immediately the views of the members of the United Nations concerning the suggestion of the Chinese Foreign Minister for the postponement of the General Assembly to November 11, 1946.”

M. Bidault stated that he had previously said that he had no objection to postponement. If he understood the Chinese proposal correctly it referred to a procedure for postponement. He did not object to this procedure. He did not believe, however, that it would be advisable to interrupt the work of the Paris Conference.

Mr. Dunn stated that Secretary Byrnes had authorized him to appear at the present meeting to represent him. Mr. Byrnes had given Mr. Dunn strict instructions not to change the position of the U.S. Government, as expressed by Mr. Byrnes at the last meeting. Mr. Dunn could only refer to the Secretary what was happening at the present meeting.⁴⁷

Mr. Bevin stated that his Government had considered the entire problem from a different angle. It thought that the General Assembly could convene on September 23 on condition that it work on a restricted agenda. His Government felt that if the General Assembly limited itself to the business items and postponed the political items the session would not be of long duration. Mr. Bevin did not believe that any great difficulty would arise in having the General Assembly and Paris Conference in session simultaneously. It was, however, very difficult to ascertain when the Paris Conference would terminate its work. The Secretary General had suggested that the Paris Conference would end by October 20. If the CFM could agree on that date it could equally agree on the date for the opening of the General Assembly. Mr. Bevin stated that M. Molotov had referred to the fact that the General Assembly would be assisted by the signing of the peace treaties. But would this be necessary to the convening of the General Assembly? The final drafting of the peace treaties would be done by the Council of Foreign Ministers. They could carry on this work simultaneously with the General Assembly. In addition, there were two important questions which the CFM had to consider; i.e., the peace treaty with Austria and the German question. The United Kingdom considered these questions as very vital and desired to know what effect the postponement of the General Assembly would have on them. The British Government would like to have the whole picture in front of it before it made up its mind. Mr. Bevin was not adverse to meeting the wishes of his colleagues as long as he knew what the general plans were for the future. When did they envisage the end of the work of the Paris Conference? When would the CFM meet again to study the Austrian and German questions? When would the General Assembly meet? Mr. Bevin was especially interested to ascertain whether the CFM would continue its work to complete the treaties and to go on to the Austrian and German questions parallel with the convening of the General Assembly. In conclusion, Mr. Bevin stated that he had two proposals: (1) that the General Assembly meet with a restricted agenda, and (2) that the General Assembly be postponed on condition that it did not interfere with the work of the CFM on the peace treaties, on Austria and on Germany.⁴⁸

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation supported the Chinese proposal to postpone the General Assembly until November 11. If this date were unacceptable another one could be agreed upon. With respect to Mr. Bevin’s proposal concerning a restricted agenda, M. Molotov did not believe that it would be advisable for a General Assembly to be convoked to discuss second-rate questions. In addition, it was difficult to foresee what questions would be placed on the agenda. M. Molotov stated that Mr. Bevin had inquired whether it was necessary to sign the peace treaties prior to the convocation of the General Assembly. There was, of course, no obligation that the peace treaties be signed. However, it would be preferable if they were signed for this would improve the atmosphere of the General Assembly and facilitate its work.

M. Molotov referred to Mr. Bevin’s statement concerning the necessity to fix certain dates and added that according to his understanding Mr. Bevin had agreed to a postponement of the General Assembly on condition that such dates were determined. The CFM could endeavor to reach agreement on these dates although this would be difficult since everything was not dependent upon them. All the Foreign Ministers wished to expedite the work of the Paris Conference. In addition, it had been agreed upon by the CFM that the German question would be discussed in November. The Soviet Delegation adhered to this agreement. M. Molotov did not wish to include Austria on any agenda since there had been no definite agreement on this question.

M. Molotov continued that three Delegations (Soviet, French and Chinese) had come out in favor of postponement of the General Assembly. A number of other United Nations Delegations had also favored postponement. M. Molotov stated that the CFM should endeavor to reach agreement on this question in order not to interrupt the work of the Paris Conference. It would, of course, be necessary to ascertain the views of the other members of the United Nations on this question.

M. Molotov stated that it would be possible for the General Assembly and the Paris Conference to carry on their work in Paris or Geneva at the same time. He pointed out that the General Assembly had never adopted a decision to the effect that it could not meet outside of New York. There were, of course, difficulties in connection with the convening of two conferences simultaneously.

Dr. Wang stated that Mr. Bevin had advanced two proposals. With respect to the first (restricted agenda for the General Assembly), he wished to point out that at the beginning of the year the General Assembly had before it a limited agenda. If it were now to discuss another limited, technical and non-political agenda a bad impression on world opinion would be created concerning the functions of the General Assembly. Dr. Wang did not consider that Mr. Bevin’s proposal in this respect was acceptable. With respect to Mr. Bevin’s second proposal (simultaneous meetings of the General Assembly and the CFM), the Chinese Delegation wished to support this proposal. He suggested that a date for the future meeting of the CFM be fixed, on which occasion it would discuss the Austrian and German questions. Dr. Wang continued that if the majority of the members of the United Nations agreed to a postponement of the General Assembly until November 11 the CFM and the Paris Conference should stick to this elate notwithstanding the status of the work in the Paris Conference. With respect to M. Molotov’s proposal that the two bodies meet in Geneva or Paris, Dr. Wang stated that the Chinese Delegation could not concur with this suggestion.

M. Molotov inquired whether he understood that Mr. Bevin had agreed in principle to the postponing of the General Assembly provided the other questions relative to the CFM were settled.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would report this evening’s conversation to his Government immediately. Up to the present time, his instructions had been not to postpone the General Assembly. He had been authorized to put forward the restricted agenda. He was always ready to listen to any favorable proposal and the Chinese proposal was the first practical one he had heard. He wished to emphasize that his Government opposed any transfer of the General Assembly to Europe at this time. It did not dispute the right of the Assembly to determine where it would meet. But to suggest a change at this time would only cause misunderstanding and suspicion. His Government was also concerned with the postponement of the Austrian discussions which it considered an urgent matter. His Government did not wish anything to happen which might cause the CFM to postpone this question. It also was anxious not to postpone consideration of the German problem which had caused so much trouble between the British and Soviet Governments. His Government was interested in the over-all picture—it wished to solve all the problems and difficulties which had risen out of the war and which were causing so many difficulties between the two governments.

Mr. Bevin stated that if he could advance some constructive suggestion in respect to the date for the future CFM meetings, for the termination of the Paris Conference and for the General Assembly he believed that his Government might look favorably on M. Molotov’s suggestion. He suggested that the CFM meetings on Austria and Germany and the meeting of the General Assembly might well dovetail together. His Government would be greatly surprised if Austria were not discussed in the CFM meetings. Mr. Bevin could see no reason why the Foreign Ministers could not tackle the outstanding problems at the same time the General Assembly was in session in New York. Mr. Bevin stated that he could not give M. Molotov a firm answer this evening, but that he could promise him one on Monday.

M. Molotov stated that the matter was urgent and that a decision should be made by Monday evening. He hoped that a meeting of the CFM might be convened at which M. Spaak and Mr. Lie would be present. He was of the understanding that M. Spaak thought it possible to postpone the General Assembly.

M. Bidault stated that there was some doubt that Mr. Lie could arrive in Paris by Monday evening.

M. Bevin stated that he believed it to be a grave mistake to request Mr. Lie to attend such a meeting. It would be misunderstood if the Secretary General of the United Nations were asked to attend a meeting of the CFM at which United Nations matters were to be discussed. M. Spaak was being asked to attend unofficially.

M. Molotov suggested that Mr. Lie be invited by the five permanent members of the Security Council and not by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Bevin stated that if Mr. Lie were invited he could see many members of the General Assembly protesting most vigorously. In addition, needless suspicion would be aroused. Mr. Bevin thought that only trouble would be caused by inviting Mr. Lie to a Council meeting.

Mr. Dunn stated that he was sure that Mr. Byrnes would not wish to be a party to the issuance of an invitation to Mr. Lie.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would have to report the evening’s meeting to his Government. He wished to know the attitude of the CFM on the Austrian and German questions. It was his understanding that the CFM had agreed to take up these questions at their next meeting. He was now disturbed in hearing M. Molotov remark that the Austrian question would not be on the agenda.

M. Molotov suggested that the CFM postpone the consideration of this matter until they met to discuss it specifically.

Mr. Bevin suggested that the CFM adjourn until Monday.

M. Molotov inquired whether Mr. Lie would be present.

Mr. Bevin stated that Mr. Lie’s presence had not been agreed upon.

M. Molotov suggested that Mr. Lie be informed that the CFM was going to discuss the question of the General Assembly.

Mr. Bevin stated that M. Spaak could inform Mr. Lie accordingly. Mr. Bevin did not like to make any decision regarding this question without Mr. Byrnes’ concurrence.

M. Molotov suggested that M. Spaak inform Mr. Lie that the CFM was going to hold a meeting for the above indicated purpose.

Mr. Bevin stated that he opposed M. Molotov’s proposal. He did not wish it to be thought that the CFM was taking on any powers it did not possess. He believed it a great mistake for the CFM to request M. Spaak to advise Mr. Lie of the meeting. M. Spaak would receive an invitation to attend the CFM meeting and if he wished to inform Mr. Lie accordingly that was entirely within his province. It was not up to the CFM to request M. Spaak to do so. Mr. Bevin thought that it would be preferable to adhere by the decision, with which Mr. Byrnes had concurred that M. Spaak, and M. Spaak alone, be invited to attend the meeting.

Mr. Dunn stated that he knew that Mr. Byrnes would desire it to be known that he could not associate himself with any communication addressed to Mr. Lie concerning the meeting.

M. Molotov suggested that the Foreign Ministers meet on Sunday in order not to lose any time.

Mr. Dunn stated that he did not know whether Mr. Byrnes would be in Paris.

Mr. Bevin suggested that the CFM meet on Sunday evening at 9:00 on condition that Mr. Byrnes had returned.

His suggestion was agreed upon.

M. Bidault suggested that the Chairman, Mr. Bevin, should inform M. Spaak of the matter.

The meeting adjourned at 7:30 p.m.

46. The Secretary of State was in Germany consulting with military and civilian leaders of United States occupation forces. He delivered a major policy statement at Stuttgart on September 6, which is printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1946, p. 496. For documentation on United States policy with respect to Germany, see vol. v, pp. 481 ff.
47. Dunn reported this discussion to Secretary Byrnes in a telegram of September 7, text of which was included in telegram 4487 (Delsec 912), September 8, from Paris (not printed). In the telegram Dunn stated: “As I understand it, you, in the role of representing the host government, would not wish to change your position one way or another as to postponement but would wish any decision on that to be based on a canvass of the members of the UN by the Secretary General.” (740.00119 Council/9–846)
48. In the telegram cited in the preceeding footnote, Dunn also reported that Bevin had told him afterward that he considered it more important to obtain firm dates for consideration of Austrian and German problems than to agree to postponement of the General Assembly (740.00119 Council/9–846).