C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirteenth Informal Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, June 26, 1946, 9:45 p.m.
Present
| U.S. | ||
| The Secretary (Chairman) | ||
| Senator Connally | ||
| Senator Vandenberg | ||
| Mr. Bohlen | ||
| U.K. | U.S.S.R | |
| Mr. Bevin | M. Molotov | |
| Sir Oliver Harvey | M. Vyshinsky | |
| Mr. Jebb | M. Gusev | |
| Mr. Peyton-Smith | M. Pavlov | |
| France | ||
| M. Bidault | ||
| Mr. Couve de Murville | ||
| French official | ||
| Interpreter |
The Secretary, who was presiding, called on Mr. Molotov, at whose request the meeting had been called.
Mr. Molotov said that his one desire was to facilitate the settlement of the principal outstanding questions. Perhaps the most difficult of these was the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and the question of Trieste. He said M. Bidault had made a proposal in an effort to provide grounds for a compromise agreement. He would not conceal that the Soviet Delegation was not satisfied with this proposal and did not find it acceptable. In the first place, it did not meet the just desires of Yugoslavia, which was entitled to expect due attention to its wishes; and secondly, it was of a temporary and vague nature. The Soviet Delegation had carefully restudied the question and was taking the initiative in an attempt to find a solution and wished to make the following suggestion in the nature of a compromise. He said that the Ministers must take into account a statement of Marshal Tito made last September that Yugoslavia could not sign any peace which would be unjust and would not give to Yugoslavia Trieste and Venezia Giulia. There was also the statement of de Gasperi that Italy would not sign without Trieste. While these statements must be taken into account they were of course not decisive in regard to the decision which the Ministers were to make. The Ministers should be guided by considerations of justice in the settlement of such cases but it was impossible to place on equal footing the interests of an [Page 642] allied state, Yugoslavia, and Italy, which was not an ally but had been in the opposite camp. He said we must give satisfaction to the national claims of our ally, particularly since they were just, even though this would cause unpleasantness for the other side. He then outlined the substance of the Soviet suggestion as follows: The frontier line should follow that suggested by the Soviet experts, with modifications along ethnic principles in favor of Italy.40a Trieste and its immediately surrounding area should be separated from Italy and formed into an autonomous district under Yugoslav sovereignty to be governed on the basis of a statute drawn up by the four powers. Legislative power would rest in a House of Representatives to be elected by universal secret ballot, the Governor of the district to be appointed by Yugoslavia. The four powers should draw up and supervise the observation of the statute and constitution, but responsibility for the state of affairs and internal matters would rest on Yugoslavia in so far as outside intervention would be required in this autonomous district.
Mr. Molotov continued that he understood that there was objection to the principle of Yugoslav sovereignty. The Soviet Delegation thought that this was unjust, but as an extreme step in an attempt to find a compromise solution was prepared to propose one other variant, as follows: Trieste should be under the dual sovereignty of both Italy and Yugoslavia, with legislative powers in an elected House of Representatives. There should be two Governors, one Italian and one Yugoslav, who would administer in concert. He said that this plan went to the limit in endeavoring to meet Italian wishes and would afford that country right of participation in the government of the area. He said he would like to have the comments of his colleagues on this.
The Secretary stated that he agreed with Mr. Molotov that as an ally Yugoslavia was entitled to consideration. He felt that every effort had been made to meet all reasonable Yugoslav demands. At London they had accepted the ethnic principle and the United States experts after a most careful study had proposed what we thought was the best line, which gave a great deal to Yugoslavia; but in a spirit of compromise the United States had been willing to accept first the British line and finally the French line, which now three Delegations support. As an example of what the Yugoslavs would receive through the adoption of the French line the Secretary gave the following figures: Of the total area under dispute, Yugoslavia would receive 3,124 square miles with a population of 540,000, of which 376,000 were Yugoslav and [Page 643] 128,000 Italian. Italy would only retain 505 square miles with a population of 423,000, of which 278,000 were Italian and 115,000 Yugoslav. He said a time comes when no more concessions can be asked. The United States could not agree to turn over to Yugoslav sovereignty an area that was overwhelmingly Italian in population and this was his principal objection to the first Soviet proposal.
As to the second proposal he felt that the dual control would be completely unworkable and would produce constant friction and disorder. Experience in political matters showed that no matter where the legislative power lay it was the administrative power that counted in the last analysis. He said if this was true in internal political affairs it was even more true in the case where two races and two countries were concerned. There would be constant friction and struggle between an Italian legislature, which would almost certainly be the result of an election in the district, and in the administrative power, if that was in the hands of Yugoslavia. If the administrative power was shared, the conflict would center there. He mentioned that he felt that it would be impossible to run foreign affairs in one country if there were two foreign ministers.
Mr. Molotov interrupted to remark that there were two foreign ministers in Finland.
The Secretary repeated that he felt it would be impossible even if the powers were shared between two nationals of the same country; but when you have an Italian and a Yugoslav it would be utterly impossible. For these reasons he said he could not find acceptable either one of Mr. Molotov’s proposals. He said he had suggested and he wished to repeat the suggestion that if the Ministers could not agree then the only thing was to leave it to the peace conference to give them a recommendation. He personally could see no objection to leaving two or three or possibly only one question open if they could not find a solution, and request advice and guidance in a peace conference.
Mr. Molotov inquired if this meant there was no use seeking a basis for compromise.
The Secretary replied on the contrary that the United States had already made a number of concessions in search of a compromise and for this reason had been willing to accept the French line, which three Delegations now supported. When this was not acceptable to the Soviet Delegation further compromise was made in the form of a suggestion that a recommendation be sought from the peace conference. He said he wished to point out that the peace conference would be composed of 21 countries who were friends and not enemies and who had been our allies during the war. He did not see why we should be afraid of asking a recommendation from friends when we were in difficulties.
[Page 644]Mr. Molotov answered that in any circumstances these 21 allied countries would have the right to express their views and to give recommendations and no one intended to restrict this right. However, to go to the conference without an agreed draft would mean to split the conference into two parts and cause great discord between big and little nations. He said should we take the line of the French experts and separate Trieste from Italy and place it under the United Nations, even this decision, if we should adopt it, would be fraught with difficulties and would not be acceptable to Yugoslavia. He repeated that to leave the question to the conference would cause great friction and would not be in accordance with the responsibilities placed in the four Ministers. He added that in making these suggestions the Soviet Delegation was basing itself on the belief that it would be possible to find compromise solutions for the question of Trieste and for other outstanding questions and thus permit the four powers to make a concerted effort at the peace conference.
The Secretary stated that he did not see why leaving it to the peace conference would cause trouble between the large and small powers.
Mr. Molotov inquired what if Yugoslavia refuses to sign.
The Secretary pointed out that if we presented only agreed drafts with every comma in place, the members of the conference would consider they were being treated merely as a rubber stamp, whereas if their views were asked on certain important questions as yet unsolved they would feel they were being asked to make a contribution, and he did not see why that should cause discord and difficulties.
Mr. Molotov said he felt we need not be afraid of too little argument in the conference but on the contrary of too much.
Mr. Bidault stated that the French Delegation had acquired the habit of conciliation and he did not wish these remarks to be taken as indicating that he had something new to propose. He said naturally the French line appeared a good one to the French Delegation and, he understood, to others. Since, however, general agreement had not been reached on this line he had ventured to outline in general terms another suggestion although it was difficult for him to have done so. He said he would like to mention certain basic factors in the situation which were clear for the present exchange of views. First is that Yugoslavia will not accept a treaty without Trieste, and Italy will not accept a treaty without Trieste. It is evident under such conditions that the Ministers could either seek the arbitration of 21 nations or try to find a solution themselves. He admitted that the question was difficult but not insurmountable. He suggested two general conditions which might be adopted: (1) to remain faithful to the ethnic principle, and (2) to evolve some scheme for Trieste which would assure [Page 645] adequate control and participation to guarantee peace and prevent conflict between the two elements in the area. He concluded by saying that he had had no proposal tonight on this subject but if there could be general agreement on these two principles some plan might be worked out.
Mr. Bevin stated that after the London decision the United Kingdom had agreed to send its experts to this spot and that after careful examination of the facts the experts had produced four plans. The British Delegation had taken the line of least resistance and had agreed to the line proposed by the French experts, although he felt that this did some injustice to Italy in regard to Pola. However, all evidence collected by the experts indicated that Trieste, the area of Gorizia and Monfalcone should go to Italy. He had heard no arguments or facts except the political arguments for compromise to satisfy the national feelings of one or another of the parties, which had caused him to change his attitude concerning the facts of the situation. He had heard the clamor both in Yugoslavia and Italy but he had refused to let his mind be influenced by one or the other. He repeated that we had agreed on the principle in London that all facts and concrete evidence supported the Italian right to Trieste and the area west of the French line. He therefore cast his vote for the French line although he recognized it did some injustice to Italy. He said in fact the only ones making the compromise were those who had abandoned their own lines in favor of the French line. He said he felt on every basis—commercial, ethnic and justice—the Italian case was established. Great Britain had no great interest in this problem but merely wished to see it settled on the basis of equity and justice, but he had heard no valid reason advanced for changing the London decision. He concluded by saying that he had given no pledge to Italy or Yugoslavia and would give none but wished to see the matter settled on the basis of rigid facts. The British Delegation would study any proposal in an endeavor to get peace established but he would not compromise what he thought was just and right.
The Secretary renewed his suggestion that the matter be referred to the peace conference. He said he felt that both Yugoslavia and Italy could accept a decision based on a recommendation from 21 countries more easily and with better grace than a decision of only four men. He said our consciences would be clear since we have done everything humanly possible to find an agreement, but we have not the right to delay the making of peace because of our inability to agree. He wished to state on behalf of the United States that it would accept whatever recommendation the 21 nations would make for the solution [Page 646] of this problem. He mentioned that these nations had been selected with great care at Moscow and had been personally referred to Generalissimo Stalin and that we should have no concern at submitting this question to them.
Mr. Molotov said as to the peace conference this matter had been discussed at great length and that while all admit its importance this does not divest the Ministers of the responsibility for adequate preparation for the conference. He said that in regard to certain observations which had been made on the subject tonight he had the impression that certain of his colleagues were obstinately sticking to their points and would not permit themselves to be influenced by arguments. In such circumstances he was not willing to repeat his arguments in favor of the proposals he had made as he felt it would be useless. He felt it significant that the Soviet proposal for dual sovereignty had found no support. The question then was what to do next. It was of course possible that other attempts would be made to find a compromise solution but if these are not successful then the result could only be attributed to those who did not wish to find a compromise solution. He said only the future would tell and concluded with a Russian proverb to the effect that morning brings counsel.
Mr. Bevin remarked that they had discussed three subjects this afternoon and one this evening without decision. It appeared to him that the procedure of this conference was not to decide anything.
Mr. Molotov remarked that Bevin should not underestimate his services in helping to produce that result.
M. Bidault said there was also a French proverb which stated that night brings counsel and also another one that the handle should not be thrown after the axe head.
After some discussion it was decided that the Ministers would try to complete as soon as possible examination of the draft treaties with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, if possible by Friday, and then having a full picture of the situation in regard to all treaties before them decide what was to be done in regard to the open questions.
It was agreed that there should be a plenary session at four o’clock tomorrow in order to continue the examination of the Rumanian treaty.