I am enclosing a memorandum which has been prepared in the Department of
State, setting forth answers to the questions propounded in your
memorandum.
Twice in your lifetime and mine, the United States has, while engaged in a
World War, demonstrated that our country can build up and effectively
utilize military strength at a prodigious rate, perhaps faster than any
other country has ever done in history. We seem to be in a fair way of
demonstrating a second time that our country can demobilize and tear down
its military strength more rapidly than any other country in the world.
I am deeply concerned at the rate at which we are losing our military
strength. It is not so much that I am unduly pessimistic about the
international situation with its admitted uncertainties. It is rather that I
know that this is a time when our country should be united and strong in
order that it may make its influence for good, for peace, and for justice
effectively felt in the councils of the world and on the peace
settlements.
As the President said in his address on October 27 (after listing the “four
principal tasks” which determine the kind of armed might we propose to
maintain):
I am sure that you will understand that it is not possible to answer some of
the questions which you put to me as definitely as both of us would desire.
I shall, of course, be glad to work in the closest possible cooperation with
you and with the Secretary of the Navy in jointly endeavoring to meet the
problems which face us in the field of foreign affairs and defense.
[Enclosure]
Answers to Questions Contained in the Memorandum
Dated November 1, 1945 From the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State
Question:
1. Is it your estimate that as of 1 July 1946, 1 Jan 1947, and 1 July
1947, the situation will require occupation forces in the countries
listed below? If you so estimate, what will the functions of these
forces be in each listed country?
Answer:
a. Europe:
(1) Germany:40 It is
anticipated that occupation forces will be required in Germany on July
1, 1946, January 1, 1947 and July 1, 1947. The precise functions of
these forces in Germany on the indicated dates are difficult to
determine at this time. If by these dates considerable progress has been
made in the Control Council on the reestablishment of German agencies,
the possible transition from military government to a general
supervisory civilian control, it is conceivable that a police type force
of occupation would be sufficient. It is understood that the War
Department is already developing plans for this type of occupation
force.
If this system can be developed, the functions of the ocupation forces
would presumably be limited to the maintenance of order and the many
functions of military government now in effect could be transferred to
German agencies and to Allied civilian control. This transition in the
occupational system of Germany will, however, require negotiations with
the other powers represented on the Control Council in Berlin
[Page 1130]
and will no doubt require a
modification of the present agreement on control machinery for Germany.
The Department of State cannot predict with any certainty at this time
when or exactly how this transfer of functions may be effected.
(2) Austria:41 The
Department of State expects to initiate discussions shortly with the War
Department for the purpose of presenting proposals in the Allied Council
at Vienna for a reduction of Allied occupation forces in Austria.
We shall require military advice as to how this proposal can most
effectively be presented. The Department of State would like to obtain
agreement in the Allied Council in the near future for a reduction of
occupation forces in Austria. It would certainly be desirable to have
the occupation forces in Austria transposed into a police type by July
1, 1946 and, if possible, withdrawn entirely by January 1, 1947. The
qualified recognition which has now been extended to the Renner
Government in Austria is the first step in this direction.
(3) Czechoslovakia:42 The
American Government and the Russian Government have now agreed that
American and Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia by
December 1, 1945.
(4) Italy and Venezia Giulia:43 The Italian campaign was initiated and carried through as an
Allied campaign. Allied Military Government was set up in the liberated
territory as a joint organization, and both British and American forces
have been used for the maintenance of order. There would appear to be at
least a moral obligation on our part to maintain American forces for
AMG as long as required.
The establishment of Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia, as a
disputed area, and the continuation of AMG in that area, and perhaps in Bolzano as well, until the
final peace settlement, was approved by the President on September 19,
1944. This approval was confirmed to the Secretary of War by the Acting
Secretary in a letter dated April 26, 1945, in which it was also stated
that participation of American forces in these areas was a “sine qua
non” in British agreement to the establishment and maintenance of AMG.
On April 28, 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended that the
forces necessary in Venezia Giulia be provided jointly by the US and UK,
and directive in this sense was despatched to SACMED on April 30, 1945.44
[Page 1131]
b. Far East: Japan45
(1) Occupational forces will be needed on a fairly wide scale on July 1,
1946. By January 1, 1947, if progress continues at the same rate as at
present toward achievement of the objectives of the occupation, it
should be possible for the occupation forces to be concentrated in a few
important strategic places and their numbers perhaps reduced in
comparison with the forces maintained on July 1, 1946. Occupation forces
will continue to be required on July 1, 1947. If the same tendency as
mentioned above continues in Japan, it may be that a further reduction
by July 1, 1947 will be possible. Perhaps by that time a minimum number
of mobile occupational units will be needed to assure the continued
control over Japan, but that, of course, depends upon developments.
The functions of the occupation forces, after the complete disarmament
and demobilization of the Japanese forces is completed, will be to
assure that Allied policies, as implemented by the directives of the
Supreme Commander, are carried out. These forces will act primarily as
enforcement agencies and may also be required to carry out the
inspection of Japanese industry to prevent the growth of Japan’s
war-making power.
Far East: Korea46
(2) It is hoped that by July 1, 1946 an international trusteeship will be
in operation in Korea. If so, only those armed forces requested by the
High Commissioner for Korea (provided for in the trusteeship draft) and
approved by the proposed Executive Council for Korea for the maintenance
of internal law and order will remain in Korea. The same answer applies
to occupation forces as of January 1 and July 1, 1947. Since it is hoped
that native police and a native constabulary will, to an increasing
degree, assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in
Korea, it should not be necessary for the High Commisioner to request
that large numbers of troops be made available to assist him.
Question:
2. a. Forces presently planned to be available in
Europe on and after 1 January 1946 will be capable of policing Germany
and enforcing surrender terms. These forces will not be capable of
making a show of force to implement political policies should a firm
stand against a militant power prove desirable. Are these military
capabilities in consonance with foreign policy of our government?
[Page 1132]
Answer:
a. It is undeniable that the presence of large
numbers of United States forces in Europe gives tangible evidence of the
interest of our Government in European affairs and lends authority and
support to the position taken by our Government on political questions.
This is true even though no conscious effort is made, or should be made,
to create “a show of force”. It seems unlikely that the size of the
occupation force in Europe by next July (probably under 200,000) will be
large enough to be impressive in providing support for our political
policies. The situation would not be greatly improved if the size of the
force were double that figure next July. The important thing is that our
Country must have sufficient military strength at home and abroad to
give evidence of a determination to back up the policies of our
Government anywhere that may be necessary. Our influence and prestige
throughout the world are to a large extent dependent on this. Our
military potential, demonstrated in 1917–1918, was not enough to keep us
out of World War II.
Question:
b. (1) What is the maximum
proportionate military participation which the U.S. will allow our
Allies in the occupation of Japan? The composition of Allied
occupational forces depends upon the answer to this question.
b. (2) In connection with granting our Allies
certain rights in Japan, what, if any corollary involvement in continental affairs in the Far East do we foresee
and accept?47 From a military point of view, this determines what
military steps must be designed against unacceptable aggression in the
Orient. For instance, it would be most valuable to have a clear cut
statement of minimum interests from which the U.S.
will not retreat in the event of a clash of interests in the
Far East, particularly concerning Manchuria, Inner
Mongolia, North China and Korea.
Answer:
b. (1) In a memorandum from the JCS to the SWNCC of October 24 it is stated:
“General MacArthur considers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concur, that if the United States is to maintain the controlling
voice in the occupation of Japan, U.S. participation in the
occupation forces must be at least equal to that of all other
nations combined.”
The Department feels that it is essential for the United
States to maintain the controlling voice in the occupation of Japan. The
proportionate United States military participation in the occupation
necessary
[Page 1133]
to maintain this
position is considered to be primarily a military question. Therefore,
in accordance with General MacArthur’s view, the Department feels that
the maximum proportionate military participation which the United States
should allow our Allies in the occupation of Japan is not more than
fifty per cent.
b. (2) In the absence of any indication as to the
character of “certain rights” which we might grant to our Allies in
Japan, it is difficult to answer this question. If the reference is to
stationing of military contingents by our Allies in Japan, we do not
understand how such stationing of contingents would give rise to any
corollary involvement by the United States in continental affairs in the
Far East. As to your request for a statement of minimum interests from
which the United States will not retreat in the event of a clash of
interests in the Far East, the Department does not believe it possible
to give any such statement which would be sufficiently reliable or
certain as to furnish the basis on which the War Department might
determine in advance the military steps to be taken against possible
aggression in the Far East. It is believed that the problem posed by
your question in regard to this Department’s contribution of political
guidance to the Armed Forces can best be met by consistent and close
cooperation between the Departments concerned.
Question:
3. Are there any U.S. requirements other than
military which will necessitate continuation of the operation
of ATC facilities by the War Department
in occupied areas or on foreign routes? If so, what are these
requirements in detail, including length of time and specified operation
to be continued?
Answer:
3. We do not know of any U.S. requirements other than military which will
necessitate continuation of the operation of ATC facilities in occupied areas or on foreign routes. It
seems likely that military requirements will for some time necessitate
operations by the ATC to Berlin and
certain other places in Europe. Since our only means of communication
with Berlin is over ATC service it is
our hope that it will be continued until regularly scheduled commercial
services are instituted. The same situation applies at various other
places in Europe and in the Far East. In these circumstances it is hoped
that the War Department will confer with the Department of State
informally in advance before reaching a decision to terminate important
ATC services to Europe and the Far
East.
Answers regarding Japan, Korea and Far Eastern matters based on memoranda
prepared by FE.48
