890.0146/10–946
Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles of the United States Delegation to the Secretary of State 22
I spent the morning with Mr. Hiss and Mr. Gerig discussing trusteeship in anticipation of the next meeting of the General Assembly. I had previously told the President and Secretary Forrestal that I would be in Washington and the President had asked me to call on him at 12:45 and Forrestal had asked me to lunch with him following that. I took advantage of these two meetings to try to advance somewhat what Messrs. Hiss and Gerig had told me was the Department’s policy with respect to Trusteeship.
In the course of the conversation with the President, I said to him that I felt it of the ultmost importance that he or you should at the next Assembly meeting make an authoritative and definite statement of U.S. intentions with regard to the Japanese Mandated Islands which are now under our administration. The President said that he expected to discuss this with you as soon as you returned.
I then lunched with Secretary Forrestal and told him that in my opinion it was very important that the United States clearly state its intentions at the next Assembly. I recalled that there had been indecision for about eighteen months. I stated that in my opinion from an over-all standpoint the United States needed to demonstrate to the rest of the world its capacity to act decisively in relation to international affairs. There were, I said, a number of countries who were doubtful as to whether we had that capacity and whether it was safe for them to associate themselves with us. I said that the indecision shown with reference to the Japanese Mandated Islands would, if prolonged, weaken our position in the world; that the differences of opinion between the State Department, War Department and Navy Department were well known and could not be continued without giving the world the impression that in such matters our Government was unable to make up its mind and come to a decision.
I said that while some decision was of first importance, irrespective of what that decision was, I thought it was important that the decision should be in favor of strategic trusteeship rather than annexation. There was a long history beginning with the Atlantic Charter which had given other nations reason to believe that we would not annex outright and if we did so it might set an example for others to do likewise with a result that the entire trusteeship system might collapse.
[Page 638]Secretary Forrestal seemed impressed by what I had said and he asked me to talk to Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Sherman. I repeated to them the substance of the above emphasizing that I thought it entirely possible and proper to get, in these largely uninhabitated islands, the military rights which the Navy felt indispensable. I referred to the fact that we had not annexed the Panama Canal Zone but had a lease in perpetuity. Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Sherman put various questions to me which I was able to answer so that they felt fairly satisfied, and I gained the impression that the Navy people were by no means unalterably opposed to strategic trusteeship for the Japanese Mandated Islands. Admiral Nimitz asked me to look over an agreement which had been drafted to cover this contingency and to let him know what I thought of it, and I am planning to do so.
- The Secretary could not have seen this immediately, as he was still at the Paris Peace Conference.↩