SWNCC Files: Series 59
Memorandum by the Ad Hoc Committee Appointed at the 42nd SWNCC Meeting99
As directed by SWNCC at its 42nd meeting, there is submitted herewith a draft text of a trusteeship agreement (Appendix)1 for the Japanese Mandated Islands. This text has been developed by the ad hoc Committee solely for exploratory purposes. The ad hoc Committee considers that with one exception as described below, the draft is fully consistent with the applicable provisions of the United Nations Charter.
[Page 623]The draft trusteeship agreement is based on the hypothesis of a strategic agreement for the entire area.
The ad hoc Committee believes that substantially the same text could be used for other islands which were pre-war Japanese territory.
The members of the ad hoc Committee agree on all Articles of the attached draft except Article 8 concerning the application of Article 76(d) of the Charter, which requires equal treatment in social, economic and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals.
On this Article, the State Department representatives consider that Article 76(d) requires “national” treatment and believe that if made subject to security requirements could be safely applied. They further believe that if “most-favored nation” treatment, as suggested by the Navy representatives, were adopted it would react unfavorably on our economic interests in other mandated territories.
The Navy Department representatives agree that Article 76(d) of the Charter may be technically applicable under the terms of the Charter to a strategic trusteeship. However, the provisions of this subparagraph do not seem appropriate for the area in question. The sparseness of population and the lack of indigenous resources are factors which should make unnecessary provisions in the agreement for free-for-all social, economic and commercial exploitation.
The principal objections to Article 76(d) of the Charter as applied to the ex-Japanese Mandates are:
- a.
- The area would be open to exploitation by nationals of all Members of the United Nations while the United States, under the terms of the agreement, holds responsibility for the protection of the social and economic welfare of the inhabitants.
- b.
- Subversive activities could be undertaken under the guise of commercial development, inter-island traffic and welfare activities.
The above objections are not removed by the State Department representatives’ proposal that the application of the terms of Article 8 in the draft agreement should be stipulated as subject to the requirements of security. This test could not be practically or equitably applied for adequate protection of security interests. The Navy Department representatives have proposed a “most-favored-nation” clause in Article 8. This was done because the terms of the Charter seem to require provisions for equal treatment of all Members of the United Nations. It is believed that “most-favored-nation” interpretation can be applied to the terms of Article 76(d) of the Charter. Even this provision, however, does not appear adequately to protect security interests.
The difference of opinion between the members of the ad hoc Committee as demonstrated by Article 8 is not based on the relative philosophical [Page 624] merits of “national” treatment versus “most-favored-nation” treatment but principally on security considerations alone.
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This paper with its appendix was circulated by the Secretariat of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on September 10 to the Committee as SWNCC document 59/4.
A month earlier the ad hoc committee had had under study five different types of trusteeship agreements “to cover all possible contingencies for territories formerly mandated to Japan or formerly under Japanese control” (a report of the ad hoc committee to this effect was circulated to the Committee on August 8, not printed; unnumbered document dated August 8 filed with the papers of Series 59 in the SWNCC Files).
↩ - Appendix not printed. Except for Article 8 the text of the draft agreement included in 59/4 is the same with minor technical revisions as that printed in the White House press release of November 6 on the proposed trusteeship arrangement (see Department of State Bulletin, November 17, 1946, pp. 889 ff.)↩