Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

740.0011 PW/3–1445

Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service)⁵⁷

[Yenan ] March 14, 1945.

Subject: Chinese Communist Expectations in Regard to Soviet Participation in Far Eastern War

Summary: Although they refuse to permit speculation [or?] counting on it, the Chinese Communist leaders seem to expect Soviet participation in Manchuria at a later stage of the war against Japan. They are positive that it will not involve Russian demands for concessions or special rights in Manchuria. The significant result will be Chinese Communist control of that vital area. End of Summary.

1. It is very difficult to draw the Chinese Communist leaders into discussion or prediction of the probability of Soviet entry into the war against Japan.

a. They base their reluctance, in the first place, on the basic assertion that China must not expect or rely on foreign assistance. She must, instead, prepare to drive the Japanese from Chinese soil by her own strength and resources. There is absolutely no question in their minds that Manchuria is an integral part of “Chinese soil”. One of the oldest and most familiar Communist slogans is: “We must drive to the bank of the Yalu River”.

This emphasis on self-reliance is an important part of the Communist Party “line”. They insist that effective prosecution of the war demands full mobilization of the people; that this requires political indoctrination and the granting of political rights and economic reforms benefiting the mass of the population; and that the Kuomintang’s concentration on the decisiveness of outside factors permits it to avoid this vital issue of mobilizing China’s own resources.

Fundamental to this argument is the Communist conception of the war against Japan as a national war of liberation which must at the same time, in order for its success, be an important and progressive stage in the Chinese revolution. The primarily conservative Kuomintang fears this “revolutionary” potentiality of the war—which means democracy and economic reform as a basis for popular resistance. It has therefore destroyed the United Front and, by refusing to carry out the measures best calculated to prosecute the war most effectively, become “defeatist”.

By an extension of this logic, the Communist leaders feel that the permitting of general expectation of easy salvation through Russian participation will be an impediment to the war effort and the accomplishment of its underlying revolutionary objectives.

b. When this theoretical objection has been put aside, the Communists argue that the Soviet Union has done her full share in the war already, and that the losses she has suffered in manpower and resources make it unjust to expect or demand further expenditure in the Far East. Supplemental to this is the statement that, even without active participation, the Russians have nonetheless contributed to the war by pinning down large Japanese forces in Manchuria.

c. Another line of argument is that the persistent anti-Soviet attitude of the Chungking Government during the past several years has certainly not been intended to seek Russian help or encourage Russian participation. (I intend to amplify this subject in a separate discussion of Sino-Soviet relations.)

2. Despite these arguments, it is apparent, however, that the Chinese Communist leaders do expect that Russia will eventually enter the Far Eastern war. They insist, for instance, that Russia must be considered an important Far Eastern Power, that she is uncompromisingly opposed to Japanese Fascism (though forced by necessity to appease it temporarily to save herself from the more immediate menace of Germany), and that she will insist on having a voice in the settlement of the problems resulting from the defeat of Japan. They agree that these factors logically require eventual Russian participation in Japan’s defeat.

3. As to the probable time of Russian entry, the Communists insist that it cannot be expected for some time yet and probably not until a fairly late stage of the war against Japan. It will take a considerable time after the defeat of Germany for Russia to transfer strength and prepare herself in Siberia. (They believe that some Russian forces, especially air and mechanized units, were moved to the European theater.) And just as the Allies had to build up overwhelming forces in England before opening the Second Front, so these Russian forces will have to be strong enough to be sure of success before action is taken. This is particularly true because of the geographical vulnerability of the Maritime Provinces and Siberian lines of communication. A balancing factor will be the speed with which Japanese forces in Manchuria are weakened through general attrition of the Japanese war machine. So far, the Communists think, the drainage from Manchuria to other theaters has not been severe; while some units have been withdrawn, their places are probably being taken by fresh units from the homeland.

In any case, they point out, the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact⁵⁸ still has a year to run, even if the Russians give notice on April 25, 1945.

4. The form and place of this Soviet participation, such Communist leaders as General Chu Teh suggest, will be direct attack by the Red Army against the Japanese Army in Northern Manchuria. They suggest particularly Northwest Manchuria (perhaps in the vicinity of Lake Nomanhan) as most favorable for Soviet mechanized equipment and offensive tactics. All other suggestions of possible lines of Soviet action are discounted.

a. Passage through Sinkiang to supply and cooperate with Central Government forces they regard as impractical because of the distances involved. Furthermore they are sure that the Russians have no confidence in the effectiveness and dis-interested cooperation of the Central Government armies. (By “dis-interested” the Communists mean concentration on the defeat of Japan rather than internal political issues.)

b. Attempts to push south through Inner Mongolia and Ninghsia or Suiyuan to contact the Chinese Communits would be impractical because of the very great distances over which there could be nothing but difficult motor transport and because of the exposure to flank attack from the Japanese bases in Eastern Inner Mongolia.

c. A drive toward Kalgan to reach Peiping and Tientsin would involve the same problems of transport and distance from bases. Furthermore, joining with the Communist forces in Northeast China and even the cutting off of Manchuria from China would not in themselves achieve any major Russian strategical objective. The Japanese in Manchuria would not be weakened and would still be a threat to Eastern Siberia.

5. Communist expectations—or, perhaps, hopes—seem to be about as follows. By the time the Russians are ready to move (say the late Spring of 1946) the situation will be:

a. The Japanese home islands will be under direct American attack.

b. Manchuria will be isolated from Japan by complete American air and naval supremacy.

c. The Communist forces will be greatly strengthened by: (1) continuation of their present rapid growth, and (2) some American supplies and cooperation—probably from the Pacific.

d. Chinese military activity, and possibly an American landing even though not on a major scale, will hold the Japanese forces in China, cut Japanese north-south communication lines, and thus isolate Manchuria from China.

When the stage has thus been set, the Red Army will cut off North Manchuria, then advance south. Simultaneously the Communists will commence active infiltration into South Manchuria.

To prepare for this the Communists have expended great energy during the past two years consolidating their base in East Hopei and in extending the area of their guerrilla operations into Jehol and South Liaoning. The “solidity” of this East Hopei base has been tested by the rescue of several American air crews, including a B–29 crew which parachuted near Changli, east of the Peking-Liaoning Railway, and was brought from there in safety to Yenan by foot. That the potential significance of these Communist bases on the southwestern fringe of Manchuria is not lost on the Japanese is shown by their present intensive mopping-up campaign, which has been going on in the area for more than three months without conspicuous success.

The Communists also have sent large numbers of political organizers (recruited from natives of the area) into Manchuria and claim a well established underground and contacts with remnant nuclei of the old “Manchurian volunteers”. Communist reticence in discussing the details of these organizations is understandable at the present time. But the Japanese have from time to time announced the rounding-up of Communist suspects; anti-Communist measures and propaganda in Manchuria and North China continue unrelenting; and there are stringent restrictions on travel from China into Manchuria. It is interesting that most of the natives of Manchuria now in Chungking seem to believe that Communist organization in Manchuria is fairly extensive.

Possible coordination with this Communist activity from the southwest may come from remnants of old guerrilla forces which are reported to be still existing in the mountains of southeast Manchuria. These units are close to the borders of both Korea and the Maritime Province of Siberia and can probably be supplied from the latter. Any Russian assistance to Korean resistance groups and use of whatever Korean forces the Russians have armed will probably start in the same general area and be related to this activity.

As the fighting in Manchuria develops, therefore, the Red Army will advance southward toward the heart of the country in large scale frontal attack on the main Japanese Army while the Chinese Communists and other affiliated resistance forces will work toward Central Manchuria from the southwest and southeast, disrupting communications, creating disturbances, and assisting the Russian main front by tieing down as many Japanese forces as possible in the rear.

There is obviously no doubt in the minds of the Communists that the Russians will recognize and cooperate with whatever Chinese forces they meet in Manchuria, i. e. the Communists. This is so taken for granted that it is not worthy of mention.

6. Regarding the possibility of Russian demands of territory or special rights in Manchuria, the Communists are most emphatic. They insist that because “the days of Russian imperialism are over” there will be no such demands. But Russia does want, they believe, a China which will have cordial and friendly relations with Russia, and which will permit normal use, on a commercial basis and without any infringement of Chinese sovereignty, of Manchurian transport and port facilities. This would mean absence of unreasonable or onerous impediments to trade between the two countries or in transit. Such conditions, the Communists maintain, would be of advantage to both countries.

7. It does not need to be pointed out that such a course of development will leave the Chinese Communists in control of Manchuria. That the Communists are confident of gaining this control, by the particular process described or otherwise, is obvious.

The Communists are fully aware—as is the Kuomintang—of the importance of Manchuria as China’s major and only well developed heavy industrial base. The description of Manchuria as “the Cockpit of Asia”⁵⁹ is truer now than when it was used as the title of a book written twelve years ago on the significance of the original Japanese invasion.

John S. Service

57. Received in the Department about April 27.
58. Signed at Moscow, April 13, 1941; see telegram No. 763, April 13, 1941, 11 p.m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 944.
59. George E. Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1932).