Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

860C.01/6–1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 18, 1945—11 p.m.
[Received June 19—6:55 a.m.]

2150. Trial of 16 arrested Poles opened in Moscow this morning. Proceedings were held in one of smaller lecture halls in House of Trade Unions which had been transformed into court for occasion. Trial was attended by all the fanfare usually surrounding events which Soviets intend to exploit for propaganda purposes. Searchlights played on court and accused and activity of cameramen deprived ceremony of all dignity and made it difficult to follow proceedings. Although admission was by pass and documents were carefully verified, entire foreign press corps was present and correspondents were permitted to enter and leave at will to file flash stories. Majority of audience consisted of unidentifiable Soviets who presumably will be described as representatives of “social organizations”.

Clark Kerr and I learned yesterday that trial would begin today, and carefully considered question of attending.²² I took position that in view of Stalin’s assurances to Hopkins my attendance might be interpreted as casting doubts on Soviet good faith and I decided not to attend but to send Stevens to follow the proceedings. Clark Kerr likewise decided against attending and sent his Counselor and two officers of the Embassy.

Fifteen of sixteen accused (one²³ was reported to be ill) were marched in between NKVD guard and seated in crudely built wooden dock where they were attended by two NKVD guards with fixed bayonets. They were well dressed, apparently well nourished, seemingly composed and gave no indication of mistreatment.

In opening trial, President of the Court²⁴ announced that accused would be permitted to make statements in their own defense and that defense counsel had been appointed for those who desired it. Several of the accused including Okulicki had rejected offer of counsel and elected to defend themselves. Court then proceeded to hear lengthy indictment by prosecutor outlining charges against accused. Subject to confirmation when record of trial²⁵ is published these charges in the main consisted of six counts:

(1) Organization of subversive activities in rear of Red Army

(2) Deceiving of Soviet Command regarding alleged dissolution of Home Army

(3) Execution of terroristic and diversionary acts in rear of Red Army

(4) Maintenance and operation of illegal radio transmitters and caching of supplies of arms

(5) Conduct of espionage activities on behalf of London Govt

(6) Publication of underground newspapers containing propaganda directed against Soviet Union and Red Army.

Indictment contended that Underground Govt had fostered formation of independence organization “Niepodleglosce” and planned organization of military political committee to foment uprising in Poland in event of attempt to Sovietize country. It was also charged that Underground Govt had cooperated with Germans and advocated Polish-German alliance against Soviet Union. Principal charges were levied against Okulicki as Commander-in-Chief of Home Army and Jankowski, Bien and Jasiukowicz as Ministers in Underground Govt. Others were charged with being accomplices in carrying out policies formulated by four principal accused.

After charge had been read accused were asked individually whether they admitted their guilt. Replies in several cases were inaudible, but as nearly as could be determined only one of accused returned clearly negative answer. Majority admitted their guilt without reservation while some qualified their admissions.

First of accused to be examined was Jasiukowicz who was still on stand at lunch interval. His general line was to throw blame on Okulicki and Jankowski and to deny his own responsibility for anti-Soviet Policy of Underground Govt. He alleged that he himself favored friendly and sincere relations between Poland and Soviet Union.

During examination of Jasiukowicz he stated that Okulicki had been of opinion that Military Political Commission should continue to function even if govt. of national unity was established based on Crimea decision, to be used in event that policies of new govt. were not acceptable to political parties represented in Committee.

It is difficult to see how conduct of the trial during the present conversations in Moscow can fail to have a most unfortunate effect on the non-Warsaw Poles and greatly diminish prospects for a satisfactory understanding.²⁶

Repeated to London for Schoenfeld as 293.

Harriman

22. In his telegram 2140, June 18, 5 p.m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that invitations had been extended to him and to the British Ambassador to attend the trial of the 16 Poles (860C.01/6–1845).
23. Antoni Pajdak.
24. Col. Gen. (of the Judicial Service) Vasily Vasilyevich Ulrich, President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.
25. For the official record of the trial, see Trial of the Organizers, Leaders and Members of the Polish Diversionist Organizations in the Rear of the Red Army on the Territory of Poland, Lithuania, and the Western Regions of Byelorussia and the Ukraine; Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. June 18–21, 1945, Verbatim Report (London, New York, Melbourne, Sydney, Hutchinson & Co., n.d.).
26. The trial was concluded on June 21. Because of illness, Pajdak was not tried. Three of the defendants (Michalowski, Kobylanski and Stemler-Dombski) were acquitted; the other twelve were condemned to imprisonment ranging from 4 months to 10 years. Telegram 1428, June 27, 3 p.m., to Moscow presented observations based on incomplete reports which were indicative of preliminary reaction in Washington to the Moscow trial; the telegram read in part as follows: “Trial appears to he primarily political in nature and directed more against Polish Government in London and its supporters of Polish and other nationality in Western World than against defendants. It seems designed in part at least to discredit, in advance of its formation, any block which might endeavor in future to make use of an unreconciled Poland as an anti-Soviet spearhead.… Mildness of sentences appears a concession to our representations and intervention and an effort to propitiate an aroused public opinion in the Western democracies.… It is felt strongly here that Soviet authorities displayed a disheartening lack of cooperative spirit in refusing to answer our requests for information about the missing Poles and in staging this trial at the very moment you were engaged as member of the Polish Commission in critical conversations looking towards a solution of the Polish question.” (860C.01/6–2145)