Since you are interested in the Polish question and should be familiar
with Mr. Churchill’s message to me concerning this question, dated April
28,24 I feel it appropriate to transmit to you the
full text of my reply to Mr. Churchill, sent to him on May 4, 1945.
[Enclosure—Translation]
Copy of Message From the Chairman of the Council
of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)
I have received your message of April 28, 1945, on the subject of the
Polish question.
I am obliged to say that I cannot agree with the arguments which you
advance in support of your position.
1. You are inclined to regard the suggestion that the example of
Yugoslavia should be taken as a model for Poland as a repudiation of
the procedure agreed between us for the creation of a Polish
Government of National Unity. This cannot be admitted. The example
of Yugoslavia is important, it seems to me, first of all because it
points the way toward the most expedient and practical solution of
the problem of establishing a new united government, when a
governmental organ exercising state authority in the country is
taken as a basis for this.
2. It is quite clear that unless the presently acting provisional
Polish government, based on the support and trust of the majority of
the Polish people, is taken as the basis for the future government
of national unity, there is no possibility of expecting a successful
solution of the problem placed before us by the Crimean
Conference.
I am unable to share your views on the subject of Greece in the
passage where you suggest that the Three Powers should supervise
elections. Such supervision in relation to the people of an Allied
State could not be regarded otherwise than as an insult to that
people and a flagrant interference with its internal life. Such
supervision
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is unnecessary
in relation to the former satellite States which have subsequently
declared war on Germany and joined the Allies, as has been shown by
the experience of the elections which have taken place, for
instance, in Finland;25 here
elections have been held without any outside intervention and have
led to constructive results.
Your remarks concerning Belgium and Poland as theatres of war and
corridors of communication are entirely justified. It is a question
of Poland’s peculiar position as a neighbor State of the Soviet
Union which demands that the future Polish government should
actively strive for friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet
Union, which is likewise in the interest of all other freedom-loving
nations. This is a further argument for following the example of
Yugoslavia. The United Nations are concerned that there should be a
firm and lasting friendship between the Soviet Union and Poland.
Consequently we cannot be satisfied that persons should be
associated with the formation of the future Polish government who,
as you express it, “are not fundamentally anti-Soviet,” or that only
those persons should be excluded from participation in this work who
are in your opinion “extremely unfriendly towards Russia.” Neither
of these criteria can satisfy us. We insist, and shall insist, that
there should be brought into consultation on the formation of the
future Polish government only those persons who have actively shown
a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union and who are honestly
and sincerely prepared to co-operate with the Soviet State.
3. I must comment especially on paragraph 11 of your message, in
which you mention difficulties arising as a result of rumors of the
arrest of fifteen Poles, of deportations and so forth.
As to this, I can inform you that the group of Poles to which you
refer consists not of fifteen but of sixteen persons, and is headed
by the well-known Polish general, Okulicki. In view of his
especially odious character the British Information Service is
careful to be silent on the subject of this Polish general, who
“disappeared” together with the fifteen other Poles who are said to
have done likewise. But we do not propose to be silent on this
subject. This party of sixteen individuals headed by General
Okulicki was arrested by the military authorities on the Soviet
front and is undergoing investigation in Moscow. General Okulicki’s
group, and especially the General himself, are accused of planning
and carrying out diversionary acts in the rear of the Bed Army which
resulted in the loss of over 100 fighters and officers of that Army,
and are also accused of maintaining
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illegal wireless transmitting stations in the
rear of our troops, which is contrary to law. All or some of them,
according to the results of the investigation, will be handed over
for trial. This is the manner in which it is necessary for the Red
Army to defend its troops and its rear from diversionists and
disturbers of order.
The British Information Service is disseminating rumors of the murder
or shooting of Poles in Sedlitz. These statements of the British
Information Service are complete fabrications, and have evidently
been suggested to it by agents of Arciszewski.
4. It appears from your message that you are not prepared to regard
the Polish Provisional Government as the foundation of the future
Government of National Unity, and that you are not prepared to
accord it its rightful position in that Government. I must say
frankly that such an attitude excludes the possibility of an agreed
solution of the Polish question.
[For statement by the Secretary of State at San Francisco on May
5, 1945, regarding the concern of the United States Government
over the arrest of prominent Polish democratic leaders by Soviet
authorities, see Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1945, page 850.]
