Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

860C.01/5–445

Memorandum by the Appointed Ambassador to Poland (Lane) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹³

[Washington,] May 4, 1945.

On April 5, 19451 submitted a memorandum¹⁴ (supported by a chronology, regarding the proposed establishment of a United States Embassy in Poland) to the Secretary setting forth my recommendations on the Polish question. The essence of my discussion of the problem is contained in the last two paragraphs, with footnote, of the memorandum:

“Appeasement or apparent appeasement can be as dangerous to United States interests in 1945 as it actually was in 1940 and 1941.

“Sooner or later the facts regarding the Soviet actions in Poland, as well as elsewhere, and the deterioration of Soviet-American relations will become more fully known to the American public. The question arises as to when it would be advisable in our national interest to place publicly the responsibility for the difficulties in the settlement of the Polish problem squarely on the Soviet Government, where it belongs. Such a public statement should refer to the efforts on our part at Yalta and elsewhere to effect the closest possible working agreement with the Soviet Government. It should indicate how greatly we regret having been brought to the conclusion, by the recent actions and attitude of that Government, that it is not equally concerned in the importance of effectively carrying out the terms of the Crimea agreement. Consideration should be given to the advisability of specifically referring to the breakdown of the Moscow conversations and the evident intention of the Soviet Government and the puppet regime now set up in Warsaw to prevent democratic Poles from outside of Poland taking part in the formation of a representative Polish Government.^*”

Since April 5 there have taken place the abortive conversations in Washington with Molotov and Eden, the further telegraphic exchanges between President Truman, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, and the present conversations at San Francisco between the three Foreign Secretaries.

The San Francisco conversations have been characterized, both officially and in the press, as presenting a more hopeful picture of the Polish question because of the reported willingness of Marshal Stalin to permit Mikolajczyk and perhaps Grabski or Stanczyk to proceed to Moscow in accordance with the terms of the Yalta agreement. The record does not, however, justify optimism. No American or British observers of the Moscow commission have been permitted to enter Poland to investigate conditions; 15 Polish underground leaders, under assurances of their personal safety, left for a conference with Soviet authorities on March 29 and have not been heard from since; in other “liberated” countries in which Soviet military forces have control, our representatives are confronted with the greatest obstacles in obtaining information. Even should Mikolajczyk proceed to Moscow, what assurance can we have that he will be allowed to participate in the formation of a free, democratic and independent government or that he will not disappear in the same manner as the 15 underground leaders? In my opinion Stalin, sensing that President Truman intends to adopt a strong stand with respect to Poland, is now endeavoring to temporize by offering a concession, already agreed upon at Yalta.

I view with grave apprehension any public manifestation of hopefulness on our part. Not only is such an attitude an encouragement to the Soviet Government to persist in its present policy to prevent the formation of a truly democratic and independent government but it gives to the American people an erroneous impression of the present state of relations between Great Britain and ourselves, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other.

There is only one satisfactory solution: to stand firm on our final position as communicated in President Truman’s message of April 18 and in Mr. Churchill’s telegram of April 28 to Marshal Stalin.¹⁶ Any deviation or compromise on our part will be interpreted as weakness by the Soviet Government and will merely serve to encourage it to make further demands or conditions. It would, furthermore, be disastrous to the prestige and interests of the United States.

I recall your telling me on April 25 at Blair House that the Department would maintain a strong position with respect to Poland. Since my convictions conform so fully to such a stand, I feel the present moment appropriate for me to state that it is only on the basis of the maintenance of this position that I could conscientiously continue in my present position.

Arthur Bliss Lane

13. According to Ambassador Lane, the Acting Secretary of State read this memorandum in the Ambassador’s presence and agreed with it fully. See Arthur Bliss Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People (New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948), p. 107.
14. For text of pertinent portions of Ambassador Lane’s memorandum of April 5, see ibid., pp. 86–88.
15. The technical steps to be taken would include acceptance of the resignation of the Ambassador, assignment of the staff in Washington to other duties, and leaving a chargé d’affaires ad interim near the Polish Government in London. [Footnote in the original.]
16. Prime Minister Churchill’s message of April 28 to Marshal Stalin was transmitted to President Truman as the Prime Minister’s telegram No. 21, April 29, p. 265.