860C.01/4–1745
Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of State
Mr. Stettinius: Yesterday evening about seven o’clock Mr. Allen52 of Mr. Eden’s staff telephoned me to say that they had received from Clark Kerr an urgent telegram suggesting certain changes in the joint message from the President and the Prime Minister to Stalin on Poland. Mr. Allen said that he understood that we received a similar message from Harriman.53 I told him this was the case, that Harriman’s telegram had been received in the middle of the afternoon and that in view of the time element, since the two Ambassadors were leaving on the morning of the 17th, the Secretary had decided that it was impossible to get clearance for any changes of substance. I said, however, that we had authorized Harriman, if Clark Kerr felt able to do so for the Prime Minister, to delete the sentence which referred to an alleged statement of Harriman himself.
I told Mr. Allen furthermore that in regard to the change of substance in the number of Poles, namely, that five non-Lublin Poles should be invited to the first consultation from within Poland, we had doubts as to whether this would be wise since it would mean that in the first group there would be eight non-Lublin Poles and only three Lublin Poles. I told him that although this, of course, was a personal opinion I felt that any such weighting of the consultants against Lublin would insure Stalin’s refusal of the proposal and also expose us to the charge which he had previously made to President Roosevelt that we were attempting to interpret the Crimea decision in such a way as to eliminate the Lublin Government.
Mr. Allen said that he saw that point very clearly but that Clark Kerr had strongly recommended against anything that looked like a concession and that Mr. Eden shared his views. I pointed out to Mr. Allen that on Sunday54 when Mr. Dunn55 and I had discussed [Page 229] the question with Mr. Eden we had agreed that the list of Poles in the joint message was satisfactory and that it had also been approved by the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. I concluded by saying that I felt that since it was then 3:00 a.m. in Moscow of the day on which the Ambassadors would depart it would physically be very difficult to make any change and told him that in any case if Mr. Eden felt sufficiently strong about it he should communicate with the Secretary. I said I would be available that evening if I were needed. I heard nothing further from Mr. Allen.