Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

860C.01/4–1445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harrimam) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 14, 1945—9 p.m.
[Received April 14—8 p.m.]

1168. I have given careful consideration to Stalin’s replies to the President and the Prime Minister and I feel they contribute little of a concrete nature which would be helpful in solving the Polish question except of course for the significant fact that Stalin has indicated that he will use his influence with the Warsaw Government to make it withdraw its objections to inviting Mikolajczyk.

This concession by Stalin again opens the door a crack from the impasse we reached at the last meeting of the Commission, and therefore may mean that the Soviets can be induced to make further concessions to the degree necessary to find common ground for a solution satisfactory to us. On the other hand an analysis of Stalin’s message clearly shows that his statements are based upon willful distortion of the facts either by himself or by Molotov in his reports of our conversations.

In this connection it is possible that the Soviet authorities may be trying to force some of the democratic Polish leaders, reported now arrested and in their hands, to join the Warsaw Government in order that they may thereby claim that it has been broadened by the Poles themselves since the American and British Ambassadors adopted an attitude on the Commission which made it impossible for it to function. I believe this to be a possibility since the Soviet Government has not categorically denied to the British that the Polish leaders have been arrested or that they are in consultation with either the Warsaw or Soviet Governments. Furthermore, this may be the case because of the insistence in Stalin’s message that the Commission has not been able to make progress since the British and American Ambassadors have “departed from the presentation of the case by the Crimea Conference”.

As regards Stalin’s point (a) Clark Kerr and I have a number of times at every meeting made it clear that not only should representatives of the present Warsaw Government be of course fully consulted but that its members should “play a prominent role” in the creation of the new Government as the President stated in his last message to Stalin on this subject.²¹ At our last meeting I insisted on reading the fourth paragraph from the President’s message in order to make our position absolutely clear, not only on this point but also as regards the type of solution the United States Government expected the Commission to attain.

The statement attributed to me in Stalin’s message is also not true. It represents a willful and deliberate distortion. At the fifth meeting when Molotov insisted that the Warsaw Government should be the “basis” of the new Government of National Unity I stated that I did not feel that any useful purpose would be served in introducing a new word into the Crimea decision which would require further definition. I reminded Molotov that the Soviet Government had proposed the word “enlarged” at Yalta and that after full discussion it had finally been agreed to use the word “reorganized”. In discussing the meaning of the word “reorganize” I pointed out that it was a word of broad meaning. A government could be reorganized by the change of only one or two Ministers in a Cabinet or by replacing most of the Ministers. Molotov then asked laughingly whether I meant by that that the Warsaw Government was to be liquidated. I made it clear to him on several ocasions during this meeting that I had made no such suggestion, always emphasizing the important part the Warsaw Poles would play. All of the British and American representatives present at this meeting concur that there could be no question but that Molotov had understood what I meant.

In regard to point (b) in Stalin’s message it should be pointed out that at Yalta there was never any discussion as to the exact number to be invited. Particularly there was no understanding that only eight were to be invited by the Commission. On the other hand Clark Kerr and I have never at any time indicated that we wished to have an unlimited number of persons from Poland and London summoned for consultation. On the contrary, while we have suggested approximately twenty names of persons who might be suitable for consultation we have always made it clear that we were not suggesting that all of them be invited and indicated that we hoped that Molotov would accept from this list approximately five leaders from London and five from Poland, not associated with the Warsaw Governments, to come here to consult with representatives of the Warsaw regime. We have also reiterated to Molotov that if he felt it would be advisable to invite more representatives from the Warsaw Government than the three we had suggested that we would have no objection. We have, however, indicated that if, after the initial consultations take place, it should be deemed necessary to invite other democratic leaders, full consideration should be given to this possibility. Molotov himself has consistently agreed in principle with this.

Concerning point (c) in Stalin’s message, Clark Kerr and I have stated innumerable times that we wished only to invite Polish leaders who were prepared to cooperate in carrying out the Crimea decision and who earnestly desire Poland to have friendly relations with the Soviet Union. We have assured Molotov many times that we would not invite Arciszewski or any other members of the present London Government. From Molotov’s statements to us it seems evident that Stalin’s definition of a person desiring friendship with the Soviet Union is one who is ready to subordinate himself to the will of the Soviet Government.

The following are my comments on Stalin’s five recommendations:

1. We have already made it as clear as words can do so that in conformity with the Crimea decisions the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis and that members of this Government should play a prominent role in the new Government. While it might appear superficially that we are in general agreement on this point, I feel that if we accept Stalin’s use of the word “kernel” we will find that he will interpret this as meaning that we have agreed that only minor changes should be made in the present Warsaw regime. I therefore recommend that we should remain firm on the wording as contained in the 4th paragraph of the President’s message to Stalin and make it absolutely clear that this is the only interpretation of the Crimea decisions we can accept.

2. Although Stalin’s meaning is not quite clear on this point there appears to be little doubt that when he suggests that five people be invited from Poland he intends to include therein three representatives of the Warsaw Government, plus Kutrzeba already agreed upon by us and one of the other persons suggested by the Warsaw Government. Regarding the three from London he most likely is thinking of including at least one of Molotov’s suggestions who are already committed to the Warsaw regime. In this case there would be at most three individuals from the names suggested by us from both London and Poland. Such a solution would obviously not be acceptable.

Since Stalin’s message on this point is ambiguous and can be interpreted as granting us the right to invite three persons from London and five from Poland, of our own selection, I feel that tactically it would be advisable in any reply for us to assume that this latter interpretation is what he suggested.

I recommend, therefore, that we should remain firm in insisting that from three to five persons from London and an approximately equal number from Poland who are independent of the Warsaw regime should be invited for consultation. We should also make it clear that if it should be deemed necessary, the Commission should have the right subsequently to invite other Polish democratic leaders. In making this clear to the Soviet Government we should indicate that we have no objection to the inviting of additional persons associated with or named by the Warsaw Government if Molotov desires them. In this connection, I have contended without success at the Commission meetings that the term “other Polish democratic leaders” was clearly intended to mean persons not already affiliated directly or indirectly with the Warsaw regime.

3. While I feel that it might have been advisable at the beginning of the discussions to talk with the Warsaw Poles first and explain to them our interpretation of the Crimea decision, I do not feel, in view of the recent developments in the discussions, that we should consult with the Warsaw Poles before we have agreed upon an acceptable list of other Polish leaders who should be invited at the same time as the representatives of the Warsaw regime. In view of the reliable reports we have received from liberated prisoners of war and other foreign observers in Poland I do not believe that much credence can be given to Stalin’s contention that the Warsaw Government enjoys tremendous influence in Poland except as a result of the support of the Red Army and Navy and also partially by the land reforms.²²

4. We have always insisted that we only desired to invite democratic Polish leaders who are willing to accept the Crimea decision and earnestly desire to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union. There would be no differences regarding this point if the Soviet Government will permit us to invite a sufficient number of other leaders who are not foils of the Warsaw Government.

5. In this point it seems to be clear that Stalin is asking us to agree to the establishment of a thinly disguised version of the present Warsaw regime. This would appear to be confirmed by the reference to the composition of the Yugoslav Government. We should remain firm in our insistence that we cannot accept a mere whitewash of the Warsaw regime.

Stalin’s contention that the Warsaw Government would be offended if we insisted on sending observers there, cannot be taken on its face value. The real reason for this attitude may be found in the various reports from foreign observers we have received recently indicating that the Warsaw regime has little backing in the country and therefore the Soviet Government apparently does not desire us to obtain confirmation of this fact on the spot.

In view of Stalin’s qualification regarding Mikolajczyk’s acceptability I recommend most strongly that he be induced to make a statement similar to the declaration of the 14 members of the Polish National Council in London reported in Schoenfeld’s 111, March 27,²³ or that he adhere to this declaration. If Mikolajczyk does this Stalin would find it difficult to refuse to permit him to come.

If we do not recede from the basic positions suggested above, I do not feel that we should insist upon Stalin’s full acceptance of our interpretations of the Crimea Conference, the important thing is to get a representative group of Poles here so that the consultations can begin. I feel however that since the question is now being discussed at the high level, no useful purpose would be served for the commission to meet again until a firm agreement has been reached on a higher level regarding the number and names of the persons to be invited for consultation.

Harriman

21. Telegram 218, April 1, p. 194.
22. In September 1944, the Communist-dominated Lublin Government proclaimed a land reform law providing for the confiscation of large estates and the enlargement of small holdings.
23. Not printed; it reported that 14 members, or nearly one-half of the Polish National Council in London, which had been dissolved on March 21, 1945, had signed a declaration, dated March 26, dissenting from the policy pursued by the Arciszewski government and urging the importance of implementing the Crimea decisions (860C.00/3–2745).