Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt ⁸⁰

[Translation]

In connection with your message of April 11 consider it necessary to make the following remarks on the question of Poland.

Matters on the Polish question have really reached a dead end.

Where are the reasons for it? The reasons for it are that the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow—members of the Moscow Commission have departed from the principles of the Crimea Conference and have introduced into the matter new elements not provided by the Crimea Conference.

Namely: a) At the Crimea Conference all three of us considered the Provisional Government of Poland as the government functioning in Poland at the present time which is subject to reconstruction and which should serve as kernel of the new government of national unity. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow depart from this principle, ignore the existence of the Provisional Polish Government, do not notice it, at the best—put a sign of equality between singletons [individuals] from Poland and from London and the Provisional Government of Poland. Besides, they consider that the reconstruction of Provisional Government should be understood as its liquidation and formation of an entirely new government. Besides, the matter reached such a state when Mr. Harriman stated in the Moscow Commission: “It is possible that no member of the Provisional Government will be included in the composition of the Polish Government of National Unity.”⁸¹

Naturally, such a position of the American and British Ambassadors cannot but cause indignation on the part of the Polish Provisional Government. As regards the Soviet Union, it certainly cannot agree with such a position, as it would mean direct violation of the decisions of the Crimea Conference.

b) At the Crimea Conference all three of us agreed that not more than five persons from Poland and three persons from London should be called for consultation. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow have departed from this position and demand that each member of the Moscow Commission be given the right to invite an unlimited number of people from Poland and from London.

Naturally, the Soviet Government could not agree with this as the summons of people should be carried out according to decisions of the Crimea Conference, not by individual members of the Commission, but by the Commission as a whole, namely by the Commission as such. But the request of an unlimited number of persons summoned for consultation contradicts the plans of the Crimea Conference.

c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that in accordance with the meaning of the decisions of the Crimea Conference such Polish leaders should be invited for consultations who, firstly, recognize the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the decision on the Curzon Line, and, secondly, are really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government insists on this as blood of the Soviet troops abundantly shed for the liberation of Poland and the fact that in the course of the last 30 years the territory of Poland has been used by the enemy twice for attack upon Russia,—all this obliges the Soviet Government to strive that the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland be friendly.

But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow do not take this into consideration and strive that Polish leaders should be invited for consultation regardless of their attitude towards the decisions of the Crimea Conference and the Soviet Union.

Such, in my opinion, are the reasons hindering the solution of the Polish question on the basis of mutual agreement.

In order to leave the dead end and reach a harmonious decision it is necessary, in my opinion, to undertake the following steps:

1) To agree that the reconstruction of the Provisional Polish Government means not its liquidation but just its reconstruction by way of broadening it, bearing in mind that the kernel of the future Polish Government of National Unity should be the Provisional Polish Government.

2) To return to the projectings [provisions] of the Crimea Conference and to summon only eight Polish leaders, five of whom should be called from Poland and three from London.

3) To agree that, under any conditions, a consultation with representatives of the Provisional Polish Government should be carried out, bearing in mind that this consultation with them should be carried out first of all as the Provisional Polish Government is the greatest force in Poland as compared to those singletons [individuals] who will be called from London and from Poland and whose influence on the population of Poland cannot be compared with the tremendous influence which the Provisional Polish Government enjoys in Poland.

I draw your attention to this point as, in my opinion, any other decision on this point can be perceived in Poland as an insult to the Polish people as an attempt to force upon Poland a government formed without taking into consideration the public opinion of Poland.

4) To summon for consultation from Poland and from London only such leaders who recognize decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland and are really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

5) To carry out the reconstruction of the Provisional Polish Government by substituting [replacing] some of the present ministers of the Provisional Government by new ministers from among Polish leaders not participating in the Provisional Government.

As regards the numerical correlation [ratio] of old and new ministers in the composition of the Polish Government of National Unity, there could be established approximately a similar correlation [ratio] which was realized in respect to the Government of Yugoslavia.⁸²

I think that, taking into consideration the above-stated remarks, a harmonious decision on the Polish question can be reached in a short time.

April 7, 1945.

80. Transmitted to President Roosevelt under cover of a letter dated April 9, 1945, from the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, not printed. Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
81. Quotation marks not included in the original Russian.
82. For a description and analysis of the United Yugoslav Provisional Government which was sworn into office on March 7, 1945, see telegram 849, April 12, 1945, 8 p.m., to Moscow, p. 1219. For documentation regarding the concern of the United States with the internal conditions in Yugoslavia and the recognition of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, see pp. 1208 ff.