860h.00/11–2945: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 30—1:30 a.m.]
702. Recent national elections have convinced us that our efforts to help create democratic government in Yugo broadly representative of the people have failed and we are of opinion US should not recognize new Government which is now being formed.
Contrary to wishes of great majority of people, present ruling clique under Communist control maintains itself by force and secret police as satellite of USSR. Democracy, freedom and civil liberty, as we understand these terms, do not exist. As regards foreign policy, Belgrade is like the capital of a Soviet Republic and regime is hostile to America and Britain, ostensibly [because?] of Trieste affair but really because without Russian support and Russian methods it could not remain in power.
This regime is now so firmly entrenched that internal opposition has no chance. The small Communist group in control is dominated by a few fanatics, mostly from backward areas, who have no use for western democracy and would not easily give up seats of power in Belgrade to return to their barren homelands, or relinquish armed power and Communist organization now in their hands.
Our British colleagues say in a free election people would vote overwhelmingly against Communism. Nevertheless they favor recognizing new regime on basis that by withdrawing we would cut off our direct access to information; lend support to Government’s contention that Russia is Yugo’s best friend; increase misery and discontent especially of opposition; hinder our assisting opposition if, as they think likely, opposition should develop later, perhaps in 10 years; and play into hands of fanatics who find our presence here burdensome and would be pleased to see us go. British further think that elections have increased regime’s self-confidence, it having become in sense victim of its own propaganda, and that it will therefore be “less beastly” to opposition. They think we would later have to crawl back on Yugo’s own terms, as was British experience in Russia. They [Page 1293] think that we will gradually gain influence with regime and induce it to soften its policy and return liberties to the people. They cite opportunity to exercise economic pressure in this direction.
We consider British hopes vain and our evidence indicates that if regime is given few years to improve its organization and indoctrinate youth, hope of restoring democracy will be completely lost. We feel that by supporting regime we are undermining American prestige by abandoning the agreements we have made and the issues on which we fought the war.
Economically, people are rapidly being stripped of their possessions. Before long private capital and business will have disappeared, even if some business continues to be done in some of private firms. Government gives lip service to private trade hoping to gain our economic support while concealing its ultimate objectives. For example, Government lately suggested returning two American plants to their owners. Both firms are losing money so fast owing to regulations and taxes that if owners take them back they will soon be legally stripped of what capital they still have in Yugo. One plant has no raw materials. The other has had price of its product fixed at 30 percent below cost.
US has no influence on this regime and cannot have as long as normal recognition is extended.
If recognition is withdrawn, Yugo propagandists may at first boast that our support is unnecessary, that “democratic sovereignty and liberties” will not be sold to “Foreign reactionaries” for “imperialist gold”.
But propagandists can say this now, when UNRRA is giving more millions of dollars worth of American commodities to Yugo is [in?] a month than this country formerly imported in a year. But when UNRRA aid ceases the regime may well be sufficiently in need of our support to be willing to conform to principles of western democracy in order to gain our approval.
But we should not wait until then to withdraw. The presence of this Embassy in Belgrade now is an outward indication of our approval of this regime and its methods, and the propagandists make the most of this. Many people have joined the front, believing that since it enjoys Anglo-American support they have no alternative but imprisonment or starvation. Others still holding to their ideals have lost heart. By withdrawing our support we will restore their courage and perhaps help to rejuvenate an opposition capable of overthrowing the oppressors.
There is also question of whether USSR is to continue to try to set up Communist regimes in foreign countries aided by our maintenance of normal diplomatic and economic relations with the victimized [Page 1294] country. We believe that Yugo, where such a Communist regime is firmly established, as [is] a good place to call a halt to this situation.
Although our attitude towards Tito’s regime in Yugo may be only a small part in the greater problem of American relations with Russia, Department may from this broader viewpoint find it inadvisable to take the step we recommend, we must point out that from the standpoint of the situation in Yugo itself it is time to act.