740.00119 Control (Italy)/8–2945: Telegram
Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State
[Received August 30—9:03 p.m.]
3443. We had a long conversation with Supreme Allied Commander today in which we stated frankly we felt it our duty in our advisory [Page 1193] capacity to state to him that insofar as the United States Government was concerned we felt considerable apprehension with regard to the situation in Venezia Giulia and Trieste. We said we felt the situation was not satisfactory and we wondered whether Allied authorities on the spot were being sufficiently firm with Yugoslavs and whether we were not inviting trouble for ourselves later on by not insisting that Yugoslavs carry out their part of Belgrade77 and Morgan–Jovanovic78 agreements in letter and spirit. We pointed out to Alexander inspection of Bassovizza pit79 has not been completed and deported Italians not returned to our zone in Venezia Giulia. We informed him of our surprise on learning of presence of Yugoslav guards in Trieste (see our telegram 3368 of 24 August80). In conclusion we added that we had discussed conditions in Venezia Giulia and Trieste with our British colleague who commented that he too was not completely happy. Alexander replied that he was fully aware of our concern and that he wished to assure us that he would push investigation to the Bassovizza pit through to a successful conclusion. He reminded us of his interest in the matter, his visit to the pit, and invitation to us to accompany him. He added that only this morning he had talked with General Harding81 on the telephone and the matter was being pursued. Unfortunately technical difficulties and lack of proper equipment was causing considerable delay. With regard to deported Italians, he felt British and American Embassies in Belgrade could do more than he could and invited our attention to his message of August (see our 3347 of 22 August80). Supreme Allied Commander went on to say he had instructed British officials in Venezia Giulia and Trieste to report fully on developments and keep AFHQ in closest possible touch with situation. He concluded with statement that while he knew entire Venezia Giulia affair was not a pleasant one, and while he realized there may be things going on underground of which we are not fully aware, he, nevertheless, felt situation was not serious and that in fact things were working out surprisingly well. We then informed Supreme Allied Commander that in our opinion it might be desirable to increase American intelligence personnel in Trieste and Venezia Giulia. He said he would be delighted to have this done and suggested that we arrange this with Chief of Staff. We [Page 1194] also informed him that an American Foreign Service officer had been assigned to Trieste and would arrive there sometime next week and that we planned to escort him to Trieste in order to introduce him to Lt. General Harding and various American Military Government and British and American intelligence officials. Alexander stated he thought this was an excellent idea and promised us that he would send immediate telegram to General Harding instructing him to give every facility to the American political representative at Trieste. We then asked Supreme Allied Commander whether he would have any objection to instructing General Harding to submit a weekly SitRep.83 He said that he would be glad to do so and made a note to this effect. We then informed him we had an appointment to see General Morgan immediately and would report the conversation which we had with him. He summoned General Morgan at once and went over the above. Chief of Staff indicated his concurrence in proposed measures.
After we left Supreme Allied Commander’s office we accompanied General Morgan into his office at which time we reiterated our deep interest in improving the situation in Venezia Giulia and expressed our pleasure with Supreme Allied Commander’s attitude. We stressed to General Morgan that there was a bit of concern in Washington with what seemed to be a tendency at AFHQ to take political decisions regarding Venezia Giulia without reference to our two Governments. We pointed out that every [even?] seemingly unimportant day to day events might have a vital effect on relations with the Yugoslavs if the political elements involved were not given full consideration, and impressed upon him the desirability, indeed the necessity, for keeping in the closest possible touch with Washington on all matters related to Allied administration in Venezia Giulia (reference your 766, August 21, 8 p.m.)84
- Signed June 9, 1945; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 501, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1855. See telegram 106, May 26, to Belgrade, p. 1176, which contains essentially the text of the agreement.↩
- Agreement signed at Duino June 20, 1945; see footnote 70, p. 1186.↩
- There were newspaper stories in Rome to the effect that Allies had recovered 600 bodies in the Bassovizza pit, but the 13th British Corps denounced the stories as false.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Lt. Gen. Sir John Harding, Commanding General, 13th Corps.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Situation Report.↩
- Not printed.↩