740.00119 Control (Italy)/6–745
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Phillips)
1. The Italian Ambassador left the accompanying note66 with me this afternoon. Before reading the note I expressed our gratification that the agreement with Tito had been signed and that the situation, which at one moment seemed a dangerous one, had been disposed of temporarily. The Ambassador agreed and said that the importance of maintaining the two principal cities, Trieste and Pola, free from Tito’s forces could not be overemphasized. On the other hand, having studied the text of the agreement, he could not be sure of the boundary line which would run between Pola and Trieste. There was no mention made of such a line and he wondered whether the Yugoslavs were free to occupy coastal points between the two cities. However, the real criticism which he had of the agreement was the fact that Tito’s forces were permitted to occupy parts of Istria which, according to the 1939 boundary, were parts of Italy. Thus, he said, the principle of Allied control in this region had been abandoned. He realized that this Government had stood out for a solution on the grounds of principle and he supposed that the British had given these advantages to Tito on the grounds of practical necessity. In the circumstances he wondered whether it was still not impossible for 2,000 Italian carabinieri to be invited into the picture, no matter where, in order to balance the forces which Tito had available in his locality.
[Page 1184]The Ambassador admitted that this was a secondary matter, but nevertheless of importance in the future. It would also greatly help and strengthen the new Italian Government if it were known publicly that Italy’s position and claims were having equal consideration to those of Tito.
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- Attached copy of instructions sent by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at London, not printed.↩