740.00119 Council/12–2645
United States Delegation Minutes, Sixth Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 22, 1945, 5:10 p.m.
| Present:20 | Mr. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs |
| Mr. Vyshinski, Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs | |
| Mr. Gusev, Soviet Ambassador to London | |
| Mr. Malik, Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo | |
| Mr. Tsarapkin, Chief, American Section, NKID | |
| Mr. Pavlov, Interpreter | |
| Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State | |
| Mr. Cohen, Counselor of Department of State | |
| Dr. Conant, President, Harvard University | |
| Mr. Harriman, American Ambassador to Moscow | |
| Mr. Matthews, Director, Office of European Affairs | |
| Mr. Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs | |
| Mr. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary | |
| Mr. Bevin, Minister for Foreign Affairs | |
| Sir A. Cadogan, Under Secretary of State | |
| Sir R. Campbell, Ambassador | |
| Mr. Sterndale Bennett, Counselor, Far Eastern Department | |
| Mr. McAfee, Interpreter |
| Subjects: | China |
| Zonal Investigation Committees | |
| Atomic Energy | |
| Preparation of Peace Treaties |
1. China
Mr. Bevin opened the meeting at 5:10 p.m. He invited discussion on point 6 of the agenda (atomic energy).
Mr. Molotov inquired as to when the north China question would be discussed.
Mr. Byrnes said that he had not had an opportunity to study the Soviet paper presented this [yesterday?] morning21 and requested that the subject be taken up at the next meeting. He would be glad to discuss China again.
Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States views on atomic energy had been set forth in proposals submitted a few days ago.22 He desired to hear the views of his associates on these proposals.
2. Zonal Investigation Committees
Mr. Molotov interrupted to state that following yesterday evening’s discussion concerning the disbandment of the German armed forces he had received a telegram from Marshal Zhukov in the light of which the Soviet Delegation wished to withdraw the proposal to form a Joint Commission for investigation of this matter. The question of the German armed forces had been discussed in the Allied Control Council of December 20 at which time Field Marshal Montgomery had presented a plan for disbanding the German forces during January.23 [Page 736] This matter had been satisfactorily settled in the Control Council. In view of this the Soviet Delegation did not wish to press for further discussion and proposed to give up the idea of sending a special commission to investigate the situation. He requested that note be made of his statement.
Mr. Bevin replied that yesterday evening’s discussion had dealt not only with this concrete question but also with the general procedure of dealing with complaints which might arise regarding the situation in one zone or another. He had suggested that the Allied commanders should make arrangements to set up such commissions when complaints arose in order to avoid misunderstandings, especially in the press. Mr. Bevin thought it a good idea to appoint a Joint Commission to investigate any matters of this type. He wished to put this on the basis of a recommendation to the Allied Control Council, which would work out the details. In general, it would be a good thing for inter-relations if such matters were cleared up immediately in order to avoid differences.
Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation would consider Mr. Bevin’s proposal upon receiving it in writing.
Mr. Bevin stated that he would formulate what he understood had been agreed in the discussion yesterday evening. However, the question of forming a Joint Commission immediately to investigate the question of German armed forces would be dropped.
3. Atomic Energy
Mr. Molotov circulated a Soviet draft on the question of atomic energy (enclosure no. 1). He stated that the Soviet Delegation associated itself with the United States proposal regarding the establishment of the United Nations Commission on atomic energy. The Soviet Government also agreed that the five permanent members of the Security Council, together with Canada, should sponsor this proposal at the first session of the United Nations in January 1946. However, the Soviet Government suggested that a modification should be made in the proposals. The Soviet Government proposed that the Commission to be established should be subordinate to the Security Council. This would be in accordance with the United Nations Charter which assigned principal responsibility for the maintenance of world security upon the Security Council.
After a half hour recess, Mr. Byrnes expressed his pleasure at Mr. Molotov’s apparent cooperation in this matter and said that he believed the Delegations would be able to get together upon it. He wished to study the Soviet paper tonight and proposed that a meeting [Page 737] be held tomorrow to discuss it. This was agreed to by the other Delegates.
4. Preparation of Peace Treaties
Proceeding to points outstanding with regard to the peace treaties question, Mr. Bevin inquired whether he was correct in assuming that the language of the last sentence in section 1 (“On the basis of decisions agreed at the first plenary conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers”) was acceptable to all.24
Mr. Byrnes said that it was acceptable to him.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation assumed that the decisions of September 11 had no validity. This was agreed to.
Mr. Molotov raised the question of the addition to paragraph 4 made at the initiative of Mr. Vyshinski at the Kremlin meeting this morning. Mr. Molotov suggested that the language agreed upon yesterday in the drafting committee be restored and that this morning’s addition be deleted.
Mr. Byrnes stated that in his view the sentence added this morning was a very wise one. Without that addition, there was no specification concerning the purpose for which the treaties were being sent to the governments involved.
Mr. Molotov stated that this should be left up to the governments themselves to decide. It went without saying that no pressure should be brought upon them. Their acceptance should be left to their own discretion.
Mr. Byrnes proposed that the words “for adherence at their option” should be employed.
Mr. Bevin proposed that the words “to provide them an opportunity to adhere” after the words “enemy states in question” would be satisfactory.
Mr. Molotov said that the more “flexible” language accepted by the drafting committee last night would be better.
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the addition had been made by Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Bevin said that in his opinion Mr. Vyshinski had noticed a very important point this morning. Without the words “to provide an opportunity for them to adhere” the text looked very bad.
Mr. Molotov proposed to employ the words “for the purpose of informing them”.
Mr. Bevin replied that if the peace treaties were sent merely for the information of the states which are at war with the enemy states in question, would they be expected on this basis to sign the treaties? If Mr. Bevin were to be questioned on this matter in the House of [Page 738] Commons, was he to say: “For their information.”? Mr. Vyshinski’s addition represented the most decent procedure.
Mr. Byrnes agreed with Mr. Bevin. If he were asked why these peace treaties were being sent, he would say that this was in order to give the countries an opportunity to sign. Then the question would arise as to why this was not stated in so many words. This would not constitute pressure. It would simply be better to tell the countries why the peace treaties were being sent to them. This was merely a courtesy.
Mr. Vyshinsky said that in suggesting this addition he had failed to take one circumstance into account. Having taken this circumstance into account, he wished to withdraw the addition. If the language which he had added were to be employed, this would in fact amount to an invitation to adhere. But was it necessary for the four powers to invite these other states to adhere? No, it was not necessary. If these states were to be invited to adhere, that should be stated clearly. That, however, went too far. But, as regards the right to adhere, that went without saying. As soon as the states in question had received the treaties they could take whatever action they saw fit. The morning addition appeared simple but in reality it only confused the issue. Therefore he wished to withdraw it. Nothing would be altered in substance since the right to each state to adhere or not to adhere would be preserved.
Mr. Bevin suggested that the matter might be settled by adopting an agreed covering letter to send along with the peace treaties.
Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Vyshinski’s remarks were correct. If the peace treaty text were sent to the other states for their adherence, this would create the impression that such adherence was a prior condition of the validity of the peace treaties. In reality, each government was free to make a statement in one form or another, expressing its approval or disapproval of the treaty.
Mr. Bevin stated that if he were asked in open Parliament concerning the form in which the peace treaties were being sent to the other United Nations, he would reply that they were being sent in order to provide the other United Nations an opportunity to sign.
Mr. Molotov said that it was obvious what answer Mr. Bevin should give. The answer would be that the government to which the peace treaty was being sent was free to adhere or make a statement as it sees fit. Different governments would react in different ways. Some might adhere, others might make a statement, and others react in still different ways. This was up to them. In Mr. Bevin’s place, Mr. Molotov would reply to the question raised in Parliament by saying that this was a matter for the governments themselves to decide.
[Page 739]Mr. Bevin inquired whether they would be permitted to sign if they so decided.
Mr. Molotov said that they would, of course, be permitted to sign as far as he was concerned.
Mr. Byrnes said that as he understood it, Mr. Vyshinski’s position was that any United Nation at war with an enemy state had the right to adhere to the peace treaties. He, therefore, suggested that following the word “question” at the end of the first sentence in section 4, the phrase “reserving to other United Nations at war with the enemy states in question the right to adhere” be added. The second sentence should be deleted.
Mr. Molotov reiterated that the language agreed upon by the Drafting Committee yesterday should be accepted.
Mr. Byrnes said that it had been previously agreed that the treaties would be sent for signature. Then Mr. Vyshinski had suggested that they be sent for adherence and the other Delegates had agreed to that.
Mr. Bevin stated that there was no reason to hide the intentions of the governments sending the treaties by not stating what they wished the states receiving them to do.
Mr. Molotov requested again that the language of the Drafting Committee be accepted without modification.
Mr. Cohen pointed out that the language suggested by Mr. Byrnes embodied the very words proposed by Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Vyshinski replied that this language went too far. Every state which had been at war had the right to adhere irrespective of whether this right was explicitly granted. It would be impossible, in fact, to grant a right which they already possess.
Mr. Cohen proposed, then, to say “recognizing” the right rather than “reserving” the right.
Mr. Vyshinski inquired how the right could fail to be recognized.
Mr. Cohen stated that the language should express that to which everyone was agreed. There could be no objection to putting this into words.
Mr. Bevin stated that he was no lawyer but it seemed to him that not every state had the right to sign. For example, the United States did not have the right to sign a treaty between the Soviet and British Governments.
Mr. Molotov said that there was a difference between such a treaty and treaties of peace.
Mr. Bevin said that he would announce in the House of Commons that the peace treaties were being sent to the other governments so that they could exercise their right to adhere if they chose. That would be his public statement.
[Page 740]Mr. Vyshinski reiterated his statement that all interested states had the right to adhere or not to adhere.
Mr. Byrnes said that he would make a similar statement. He understood that each of the governments could announce the reason why the treaties were being sent.
Mr. Molotov said that each of the ministers could make any statement regarded as correct.
Mr. Byrnes replied that he merely wished to have this understood so that no question would arise later. He suggested that the word “sent” should be eliminated in favor of the word “submitted”. This would be in accordance with the Berlin Agreement. No objection was raised to this proposal.
Mr. Bevin inquired whether the Delegates were in agreement with the entire document on peace treaties.
Mr. Molotov and Mr. Byrnes said that they were in agreement.
It was decided to discuss the question of the evacuation of Japanese troops from north China at tomorrow’s session and that the question of atomic energy would be discussed in a meeting at the Kremlin at noon tomorrow.
The meeting was adjourned at 7:00 o’clock.
- According to the United Kingdom delegation minutes of this meeting, Sir Reader Bullard, British Ambassador in Iran, Major General Jacob, and Mr. Ward were also present with the United Kingdom delegation.↩
- For the Soviet memorandum concerning American armed forces in China, see enclosure 1 to the minutes of the Informal Meeting, December 21, 2:30 p.m., p. 719.↩
- For the United States proposals on atomic energy, see enclosure 3 to the minutes of the Third Formal Session, December 18, p. 663.↩
- For a report on the 15th meeting of the Allied Control Council for Germany, see telegram 1316, December 21, from Berlin, vol. iii, p. 859.↩
- See the memorandum prepared by the Drafting Committee of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, December 21, p. 723.↩
- See enclosure 3 to the minutes of the Third Formal Session, December 18, p. 663.↩