Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/12–2645

United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Kremlin, Moscow, December 22, 1945, noon

Moscow, December 22, 1945, noon

Present:8
The Secretary	Mr. Molotov	Mr. Bevin
Mr. Cohen	Mr. Vishinsky	Sir Alexander Cadogan
Ambassador Harriman	Ambassador Gusev	Sir A. Clark Kerr
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Pavlov	Mr. Dixon
		Mr. Rumboldt

Subject:	1. Preparation of Peace Treaties
	2. The Balkans

The Secretary said that the final agreement on the preparation of peace treaties had been agreed to except for one sentence which was in brackets in the paper relating to the preparation of the renewal of the Deputies’ work.⁹ He said he thought it would be wise to leave that phrase in so that there would be no doubt that the Deputies start on the basis of agreements reached at the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Molotov replied that that went without saying and it was not necessary, and in any case they would instruct their Deputies to that effect.

The Secretary urged, however, that in order to avoid any misunderstanding in the minds of our Deputies the sentence be left in.

Mr. Molotov said he would consider it.

Mr. Vishinsky then proposed that in paragraph 4 it was necessary to indicate the purpose for which the treaties would be sent to other United Nations. He suggested the addition of the words “for their adherence”. This was accepted by Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin.

Mr. Molotov then said that the Soviet Delegation accepts the American amendments to the Soviet proposals on Korea.¹⁰ The document was referred to the drafting committee for a final text.

The Secretary then proposed the discussion of the American proposals in regard to Roumania and Bulgaria.¹¹

Mr. Molotov said that he must state that the United States proposals were not acceptable to the Soviet Government. There had recently been general elections in Bulgaria and the population had participated to an unusual degree.¹² The parliament had been elected by secret ballot and, although the opposition was not satisfied, this was true of oppositions in all countries.

After comment by Mr. Bevin that this was not so in England and following an exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Molotov continued that future interference would be greatly resented by the Bulgarian people after the elections, and it was for this reason that the Soviet Delegation could not accept the American proposal.

The Secretary replied that we were connected with these problems through our participation in the Yalta Declaration signed by President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill in which the three countries pledged themselves to act together to assure representative temporary governments and free unfettered elections.¹³ He said that the existing governments could not be recognized by the United States although we had made a sincere effort in sending a special representative to these countries to find some way out of our difficulty. He said, since our proposals were not acceptable, that he appealed to Mr. Molotov to make some of his own. We had just accepted the Soviet proposals on Korea and he hoped very much that Mr. Molotov would give some help in finding a solution to our difficulties in regard to Bulgaria and Rumania.

Mr. Molotov replied that the Yalta Declaration did not oblige the three governments to interfere in every case in the internal affairs of other countries but only when the interests of peace were involved and the furtherance of democratic processes. In Bulgaria these democratic conditions had been met and if the opposition was dissatisfied, that was true everywhere. He added that if the United States and British representatives in Bulgaria had not encouraged the opposition, the situation would have settled down. He said these representatives had protected members of the opposition and had thus encouraged them and worsened the situation. In Rumania the King had caused difficulties for himself and his country but this would not have happened had it not been for encouragement by foreign representatives. The difficulty between the government and King had resulted, according to the King himself, from a request by the United States and British representatives connected with the attitude of those countries. The result had been to delay the elections. Events would have taken their natural course in Rumania had it not been for interference from without. These events could, in the long run, only cause additional difficulty for the King. General elections would show what political figures enjoyed the support of the people. He said the Soviet army was not only in Rumania and Bulgaria but also in other countries such as Hungary and Austria, and their presence had not prevented free elections. In a number of countries, these and Finland, elections had been held, giving this result. The Soviet army had not and would not interfere in the internal affairs of any country. He said we should adopt the same principle in regard to Bulgaria and Rumania since it was fully in accord with the Yalta Declaration.

The Secretary replied that they had several times discussed the point that there was no agreement between us as to the facts of the case. For example, after rechecking he was able to say that at no time had our representative ever advised the King to take his action and the King himself had confirmed this.

Mr. Bevin remarked that the same went for the British representative.

The Secretary continued that as we both knew the other’s position, there was no purpose in reviewing conditions in these countries or in discussing Mr. Ethridge’s report which he had given to Mr. Molotov.¹⁴

Mr. Molotov inquired why Mr. Ethridge had not gone to Greece where the situation was worse but only to Bulgaria and Rumania.

The Secretary said that he had explained this to Mr. Molotov in London, that he had sent Mr. Ethridge to Bulgaria and Rumania because he would be an independent and unprejudiced person who had no connection with events in those countries. He said that in regard to Greece he had already told Mr. Molotov that in response to an appeal from the Greek Government on behalf of the Yalta Declaration the United States had designated Mr. Grady, a former member of the Department of State, to go to Greece and observe the elections.¹⁵ He would have with him a group of Americans including several college presidents. He added that he understood that the Soviet Government had been requested also to send observers but had not accepted this invitation. He said he had not sent Mr. Ethridge to Bulgaria and Rumania to criticize the governments there but to examine means of getting out of our difficulties so that we could carry out our obligations under the Yalta Declaration and proceed thereafter to help out in what we understood was a bad economic situation.

Mr. Molotov said that Soviet troops for the most part carried their own supplies with them.

The Secretary inquired how many troops the Soviets had in these countries.

Mr. Molotov said he could not answer from memory but he believed Marshal Stalin had given that information at Potsdam.

The Secretary repeated his request that Mr. Molotov make some suggestion for a solution of these problems.

Mr. Molotov stated that we should not create difficulties where circumstances did not justify them. In Bulgaria following the elections a new government would be appointed which the United States and Great Britain could recognize even if they would not be satisfied with the whole government. He said this new government would be approved by a parliament elected on the basis of general elections and secret ballot, and so far as the Soviet Government was concerned he felt that the selection of the government was a matter for the Bulgarian parliament to decide. In Rumania our common task is to facilitate the holding of elections so that a new parliament might be elected, and advice might be given to the King and Rumanian Government to set about preparations for these elections. In regard to Greece he must again mention that although the situation was worse there from the point of view of democracy, the attitude of America, to say nothing of England, was quite different toward Greece. Not only the Soviet Union but other democratic elements in other countries were also dissatisfied with the situation in Greece. In Greece there were constant governmental crises and disturbances; yet the United States had recognized the Greek Government. He went on to say that Mr. Ethridge’s reports merely repeated the position of the Department of State which indicated that he was aware of this position. In fact Mr. Ethridge could have written his report without taking his trip.

Mr. Byrnes replied that on the contrary in his opinion Mr. Ethridge’s report merely confirmed the fact that our representatives there had been reporting correctly and without any prejudice. In regard to Greece he said that the question of recognition had not arisen since we had always recognized the Government of Greece throughout the war which was an Allied government. Nevertheless Mr. Grady was being sent to observe the elections, and if the Government of Rumania would request similar observers from the United States, we would be only too glad to do so.

Mr. Bevin said that Great Britain was for a settlement of the problems connected with Bulgaria and Rumania and only wished to see elections in Greece held as soon as possible. He repeated that there was no evidence to justify the charge that the British representatives had interfered in or even advised Bulgaria and Rumania. They had only the control commissions to work through but this had sometimes been difficult. He inquired whether the three governments could not combine on some machinery in regard to elections in Rumania.

Mr. Molotov replied that there had been a misunderstanding. He had not meant any outside supervision of elections but merely that we should not help the King delay the elections.

Mr. Bevin replied that he felt that if we were to advise the King not to hold up the elections, under the Yalta Agreement we would have some responsibility as to the conditions and character of that election. No one, he said, wishes to delay the elections but merely to see that they were fair. The Balkan States had always been a headache and he recalled that in his youth he remembered Mr. Gladstone’s speeches on the Balkans. He said we have this advantage: there were no elections yet in Rumania.

Mr. Molotov replied that in his view this was a disadvantage. He then cited the Yalta Agreement concerning the right of sovereign states to settle their own internal affairs as set forth in the Atlantic Charter. He felt that all three governments should support this principle. He repeated that the United States adopted a different attitude toward Greece than it did toward Bulgaria and Rumania although the situation was infinitely worse in the former country. He read a press report taken from the New York Times concerning the orderly fashion in which the elections in Bulgaria had taken place. He said no one could deny the fact that there was wider participation in these elections than in any other in the history of Bulgaria. He said order reigns in that country, which was likewise carrying out faithfully its obligations to the Allies. The Soviet Government could not in any circumstances agree to a cancelation of these elections when the holding of new elections was not necessary. Such action would be contrary to the Yalta Declaration. He repeated that the Bulgarian parliament would confirm a new government shortly and this should make it possible for the United States and Great Britain to establish relations with that government. It would be a government approved by their own parliament and not imposed by foreign pressure. The Soviet Government would consider no proposal which would not accept the result of the elections in Bulgaria. He said in Rumania no general elections had been held and that since our three governments were interested in having such elections a time might be fixed, perhaps next summer, and appropriate advice given to the King and the government to proceed with the preparation of an electoral law.

Mr. Byrnes repeated that the problem of recognition had not arisen since we had always had relations with the Greek Government and the King had merely transferred his power to a regent. He said in regard to Rumania, would it not be possible to suggest a reformation in the Rumanian Government whereby the Ministry of Internal Affairs would not be in the hands of one party? This would give greater assurance that the elections would be free and unfettered. He said that, according to our information, the National-Peasant Party and the Liberal Party were not represented in the government although these parties had vigorously opposed pro-fascist policies of former King Carol. He said he felt these parties should be given representation and some arrangement made for the Ministries of Interior and Justice to be in the hands of several parties and not just one since these ministries would control the election.

Mr. Molotov observed that elections had been held in Hungary and Austria with no changes in the Ministry of the Interior and no control by foreign states.¹⁶ He said in these countries the Soviet Government had equally great influence as in the Balkan countries. These elections had permitted the people to express their views freely, as the results of the elections testified. He felt it was a mistake for the three governments to interfere in the internal affairs of another country or to attempt to exercise control over elections, which would be contrary to the Yalta Declaration. It was for these reasons that the Soviet Government had refused to participate in the control over the Greek elections although conditions there were unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union as they were to other democratic-minded countries. The only thing to do in Greece was for the agreement which was accepted by the British and Greek Governments to be carried out without interference from outside. The Soviet Government felt that the Greeks themselves should decide their own internal affairs.

Mr. Molotov continued that in regard to Bulgaria, elements of the opposition had not wished to take part in the elections although they could have, and therefore if the three powers were now to insist upon the inclusion of these opposition elements in the government, it would be a violation of the Yalta decision. The Soviet Government felt strongly that the Bulgarian parliament alone should decide the composition of the Bulgarian Government and not have a government imposed upon them from without. In any event the Soviet Government would never be a party to such action.

In the case of Rumania there had been no elections. Our three governments desired to see these elections take place and could reach an agreement on the time, perhaps next summer, and advise the King and government to undertake immediately the drawing up of an electoral law. He also thought that if Rumania would not object—and it would be necessary to ask her opinion—the three governments could advise the Rumanian Government to broaden itself by the inclusion of one or two Ministers without Portfolio to be named from non-party statesmen, on the condition that the three governments would agree not to delay the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Rumania. This suggestion could be considered provided Rumania had no objection.

The Secretary remarked that it would be wise also to ask for the inclusion of representatives of the National-Peasant and Liberal parties.

Mr. Molotov replied that they were already included.

Mr. Vyshinski explained that there were a number of posts in the government held by representatives of these parties.

Mr. Molotov said that Tatarescu was the leader of the Liberal Party since he had received a majority over Bratianu in the last party congress.¹⁷

Mr. Vyshinski added that Antontinescu [Constantinescu-Iasi] was Minister of Propaganda and Ralli [Ralea] was Minister of the Fine Arts, and others were in the government.¹⁸ He remarked that there were six or ten leaders of the National-Peasant Party none of whom recognized the other.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether it was not true that Tatarescu had been accused of collaborating with the Germans.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vyshinski said this was not true because he had not been in the government. On the contrary he had been closely associated with Titulescu.¹⁹

The Secretary remarked that according to our information they were not the real representatives of these parties but he would have to check on that with Mr. Matthews. He inquired whether it would not be possible to do something about the Ministries of Interior and Justice so that other parties would have a voice in the control of the elections and not leave this control to representatives of one party.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Government could not agree to that as it would be an unjustified interference in the internal affairs of Rumania.

The Secretary replied that he felt that a suggestion for a commission of three to run these ministries would not, in his opinion, be resented by the King.

Mr. Molotov replied that it was not only a question of the King but of the people. The King’s policies were undermining his authority and popularity with the people. He repeated that elections had taken place in a number of defeated countries without outside interference and without any violation of the Yalta Declaration. There were no grounds for believing that the elections in Rumania would be any different and would not correspond to the wishes of the people. He again repeated his suggestion that if Rumania agreed, it might be possible to suggest the inclusion of one or two Ministers without Portfolio but not to suggest specific Ministries as that would be unjustified interference.

The meeting then adjourned to reassemble in formal session at 5 o’clock the same afternoon.

8. According to the United Kingdom delegation minutes of this meeting, Ambassador Malik was also present with the Soviet delegation and Mr. McAfee was also present with the United Kingdom delegation.
9. For text of the draft agreement on the preparation of the peace treaties, as prepared by the Drafting Committee on December 21, see p. 723.
10. The memorandum by the United States delegation regarding a suggested rephrasing of the Russian proposal of December 20 is included as enclosure 2 to the United States delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 21, 2:30 p.m., p. 721.
11. For texts of the memoranda by the United States delegation setting forth suggested procedures with regard to Bulgaria and Rumania, see enclosures 2 and 3 to the minutes of the Fifth Formal Session, December 20, pp. 700 and 701, respectively.
12. Regarding the Bulgarian national elections of November 18, 1945, see telegrams 702, November 19, and 708, November 20, both from Sofia, vol. iv, pp. 389 and 390, respectively.
13. Reference is to the Declaration on Liberated Europe, included as section V of the Report of the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 971.
14. For text of the Ethridge Report, see Mr. Ethridge’s letter of December 8, to the Secretary of State, vol. v, p. 638.
15. On October 20, 1945, Henry F. Grady was appointed personal representative of President Truman to head the United States mission to observe the forthcoming Greek elections; Grady arrived in Greece on November 27.
16. Regarding the Hungarian national election of November 4, 1945, see telegram 886, November 9, from Budapest, vol. iv, p. 904. Regarding the Austrian election of November 25, see telegram 498, November 27, from Vienna, vol. iii, p. 664.
17. Gheorghe Tatarescu, Vice Premier of the Rumanian Government, was a leader of a group of dissident members of the Rumanian National Liberal Party, Dinu Bratianu was the long-time president of the National Liberal Party.
18. According to despatch 158, March 15, 1945, from Bucharest, reporting on the formation of the Petru Groza government in Rumania, Professor Constantinescu-Iasi was a member of the Communist Party and Mikhail Ralea was a member of the Communist-oriented Plowmen’s Front (871.00/3–1545).
19. Tatarescu was Rumanian Prime Minister, 1933–37; Nicolae Titulescu was Rumanian Foreign Minister, 1933–36, during which period Rumanian relations with the Soviet Union were improved.