Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

364. Memorandum From the Chief of the Intelligence Coordinating and Planning Staff (Childs) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter⁰

Washington, February 9, 1949.

SUBJECT

• Standing Committee Meeting of 9 February 1949

1. Herewith are some side-lights on the Standing Committee meeting this morning. As indicated in the attached memo,¹ they agreed or concurred in most of the Conclusions and Recommendations.² They did not wish, however, to take up every item in the Report about the IAC. It is thought that the Navy will comment on some of the IAC references throughout the Report, but that the others will confine their comments largely to the Conclusions and Recommendations in the attached memo.

2. Whereas in many of the recommendations in the attached memo there is merely a statement of concurrence or agreement with the Report, there was, needless to say, discussion on most points, as the meeting lasted three hours. Here follow some of the side-lights on the recommendations.

3. On page 63, paragraph 3: Some thought the DCI should do what he wishes about bringing the FBI into the IAC. Navy and State seem to have the only positive feeling on this, and the others have “no objections.” They all, more or less, agreed that the FBI would probably not accept an invitation to become a permanent member, and/or would probably not attend meetings. They feel sure that Mr. Hoover would not come, and that anyone he designated to come might carry the ball to the detriment of pure intelligence discussions among the intelligence agencies.

On page 63, paragraph 5: The Navy is still holding out for its Board of Directors theory about the IAC and will advocate that in its reply. No one else agrees to this theory, although they all favor more active participation by the IAC in substantive intelligence.

On page 81, paragraph 4: All members of the Standing Committee vehemently said that CIA is not doing this and should do it. The general consensus of opinion seemed to be that CIA should follow the JIC procedure, whereby papers would be submitted to the IAC and if they were approved no discussion would be necessary, but if there were a dissent, they would be reconsidered and a discussion would be held with a view toward dissolving this dissent. Then the new paper would be re-submitted, with or without a dissent, depending upon a result of the discussions. It was even suggested that the Standing Committee would do this approval of estimates as well as its policy work!!! Also some thought if it were not resolved on lower levels this would go to the IAC members themselves at a meeting for discussion. But no one would really commit himself, other than saying this should be done, and they would not permit an inclusion in the recommendations to the IAC that it was not being done at present. Furthermore, about “assuming collective responsibility,” the Army and the Air Force think that they do this only in a limited way as it pertains to their own affairs, not as it pertains to the whole estimate.

There was such a diversity of views on this one paragraph that we tried to get them all to say that they would submit their individual comments, but they would not commit themselves even on this point.

In connection with the discussion and approval of estimates, State was vehemently opposed to the things which CIA is producing without consulting the IAC Agencies, and the Army was not pleased either. See my memo of February 8³ about Coordination of Intelligence,” i.e., CIA as well as the agencies really working under NSCID No. 3 and DCI 3/1 and 3/2, and not by-passing them.

On page 81, paragraph 5: None of them agrees that General Irwin’s statements at the IAC meeting the other day provided arrangements for handling “crisis situations.” Booth wants you to march right into the Secretary of State with a club and tell him to give you his “Eyes Only” telegrams and, incidentally, to give them to Booth’s office also!!!

On page 81, paragraph 6: The Standing Committee thought this was a desirable feature and would be a boost for CIA if it were issued by the NSC to the various departments. They agree, however, that a horse may be led to water but cannot be made to drink.

PC

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86–B00269R, Box 5. Top Secret.
1. Not found.
2. The Conclusions and Recommendations of the Dulles Report; see Document 358. All of the page and paragraph references below are to the Conclusions and Recommendations of Chapters IV, Coordination of Intelligence Activities, and V, National Intelligence Estimates.
3. Document 363.