Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

363. Memorandum From the Chief of the Intelligence Coordinating and Planning Staff (Childs) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter⁰

Washington, February 8, 1949.

SUBJECT

• “Coordination of Intelligence”

1. With reference to the recurring statements throughout the Dulles Report that the IAC Agencies should more actively participate in CIA’s production of intelligence estimates, we think that complaints by State are justified that it is not being consulted in the production of Intelligence Memoranda, when the subject is obviously within the field of State’s dominant interest. Furthermore, the Air Force received no prior notification on two recent papers¹ produced in ORE—“Reinforcing the Israeli Air Force,” and “Uncontrolled International Air Traffic”. Obviously these were both within the field of dominant interest of the Air Force.

2. NSCID No. 3 paragraph 1c (5) states that CIA and the Agencies shall for purposes of coordination, exchange information on projects and plans for the production of staff intelligence, and paragraph 1e (4) states that the DCI shall request and receive such special estimates, etc., etc. prepared by the individual departments in their fields of dominant interest, etc., etc.

3. In October we discussed this with Messrs. Babbitt and Borel when State first brought up the subject of not participating, and of not being consulted orally when the subject of the IM was obviously within their field of dominant interest. (See October memoranda.)² Again State brought up this complaint at the end of December, so we again, in a memo of January 72 referred this matter to Mr. Babbitt. All State wants is to be consulted orally or advised of the subject under consideration. We think it would be no hardship, and not at all difficult for ORE to advise State, or Air, or any IAC member of the subject under consideration, even if it is so urgent that there is not time for actual participation by the IAC Agency. DCI 3/1 covers the way this should be done under normal procedures, under urgent procedures, and under exceptional circumstances. We think ORE should follow these instructions.

4. State says that it very recently began to receive mimeographed slips about the subject that is to be considered, but that these slips usually reach it after the dead-line specified therein. It would be better pleased if it could be given prompt oral information on the subject to avoid future confusion like the recent case of Manganese (?).³

5. ORE claims that State never meets its dead-lines, but we think that should not be used as an excuse for CIA not doing its part in accordance with the established regulations. Furthermore, we wonder if 100% of the IM’s are so urgent that the subject matter cannot be at least orally given to State before production is completed.

6. We also think that the “Review of the World Situation” which is now published regularly for the National Security Council would carry a lot more weight and be more in accordance with the laws and regulations if it were coordinated at least orally in advance of publication. Formerly, there was an irregular dead-line making such a procedure too difficult, but now that it has a fixed date of publication each month, we should think that the IAC members could participate in this publication also.

7. The feeling that CIA has a free hand in current and staff intelligence, we think has gone too far, because the basic law and regulation under which we function give to CIA the responsibility for only national intelligence, and the method for setting up national intelligence is participation by the various established intelligence agencies in the National Military Establishment and State. We think that CIA should stick to the rules of the game and not by-pass them. Then after we have no mote in our own eye, we can with justification get after the beam in the other fellow’s.

Prescott Childs ⁴

Comments:⁵

If there actually is the fullest flow to CIA from the IAC, CIA’s files would be complete for hurry-up preparation of an Estimate requested by Ad. Leahy or Mr. Forrestal. They at least look upon CIA as the central agency for “intelligence.”

Should be more oral coordination, at any rate, in almost everything and DCI will give instructions to this effect.

0. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 62 D 42, Box 7385, Dulles, Correa, Jackson Report and NSC 50. Confidential. The words “but Eyes Only!” have been added by hand after the classification.
1. Neither found.
2. Not further identified.
3. The reference is not clear but it may be two Central Intelligence Agency memoranda of December 1948 suggesting that the USSR would reduce manganese exports to the United States, leading to a serious shortfall in U.S. supplies (memorandum from Hillenkoetter to the President, December 10, 1948; Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files) and Intelligence Memorandum No. 99, dated December 22, 1948. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Files)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
5. The following “Comments” are a handwritten addendum, possibly in Childs’ hand.