Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

320. Minutes of the 14th Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board⁰

Washington, July 17, 1947, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
• Members Present
• Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
• Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, WDGS
• Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
• Maj. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff–2
• Also Present
• Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
• Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
• Colonel Riley F. Ennis, WDGS
• Capt. R. K. Davis, USN
• Lt. Colonel Edgar J. Treacy, WDGS
• Major W. C. Baird, AAF–2
• Secretariat
• Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

1. Employment of Reserve Officers as Agents (IAB 3¹ and IAB 3/1²)

The Director of Central Intelligence opened the meeting with the statement that he wished to add the following to the last sentence of paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to IAB 3/1³ “except those employed by CIG” since CIG was presently employing Army and Naval Reserve officers as agents in a full time capacity.

General McDonald stated he was inclined to believe that the provisions of IAB 3 were too restrictive. He said, for example, the Army Air Forces have contracts with institutions, some of whose employees are Reserve Officers, and pointed out that recently it was necessary for such an employee to go to Europe in a civilian and overt capacity in performance of duties assigned to him by his civilian employer. General McDonald further stated that he believed that instances of this nature were likely to occur many times.

Admiral Inglis stated that cases of the nature indicated by General McDonald brought out the fact that the Intelligence Advisory Board should have a coordinated policy on the employment of individuals as intelligence agents in an overt capacity since agreement had already been reached that CIG will have jurisdiction and cognizance over covert intelligence collection, and while he was not necessarily championing any particular ground rules he did think there should be a common understanding as to whether or not ground rules were necessary. He went on to state that if it were necessary for such an individual to go overseas as an agent of a department or an institution other than CIG and was not a part of CIG’s organized operations, he felt that such action should be coordinated or at least information given to CIG as to the identity of the individual.

Admiral Inglis further stated that this was based on the assumption that such an individual was acting in a covert capacity. If the work of this individual were in the overt field and he were a Naval Reserve officer, Navy regulations required that he notify the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department, prior to his departure, and further that he “check in” with the Naval Attach é or Senior Naval Officer in each country visited. Admiral Inglis noted that CIG’s position in this matter seemed to be quite logical and he accepted it without reservation.

General McDonald stated he did not believe that the Army had any like requirements as outlined by Admiral Inglis, but Army Reserve officers often volunteered to pick up any information they could in their travels abroad.

Admiral Inglis noted that some embarrassment might be caused if a Reserve officer were “caught,” since he could not divorce his identity with the services unless he had previously resigned his commission. However, it might conceivably be that the job he was performing was so important that he would resign his commission in order to take over a particular task.

General Chamberlin asked if the problem presented in IAB 3 was purely from a covert viewpoint.

Admiral Inglis replied that the problem was centered on the covert. Presumably when a Naval Reserve officer acted as an overt representative of the State Department, for example, the Navy was ordinarily kept informed.

General Chamberlin stated that he doubted the advisability of the conclusions of paragraph 5 a of IAB 3⁴ since he believed that this paragraph stifled liberty of action. He went on to say he thought in covert intelligence the Central Intelligence Group should be able to hire the best man suitable for the job whether he was military or Naval Reserve, and further that he did not think that the IAB should place any barriers that might be restrictive.

Admiral Inglis stated that he did not think that covert methods should as a general rule be used if the same objectives could be accomplished by using overt methods. He noted that targets given covert personnel were those that could not be gained by overt means, and further that they were not hired because they were Naval Reserve officers but rather on their ability to do the job.

General Chamberlin stated that in his opinion there should be very little, if any, restrictions imposed on operations in the covert field.

Admiral Inglis stated that he was not quite in agreement that covert operations should have no restrictions and reiterated that if a Reserve officer of the Army, Navy or Air Forces were caught it would surely cause unfavorable publicity and embarrassment to his service.

After further discussion where it was brought out by the Director that CIG had exclusive organizational jurisdiction over operations in the clandestine field and that there could be no objection to the member IAB agencies employing casual agents,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Approved the conclusions in IAB 3 with the following exceptions:

• Paragraph 5 a to be omitted.
• Paragraph 5 b to be rewritten as follows:

  “Members in the Reserve of one military service shall ordinarily not be employed as agents by, and then only after informing, the other service.”

• Paragraphs c and d to remain as written.⁵

2. Action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on Matters Submitted to the National Intelligence Authority (CIG 24 and CIG 24/1)⁶

The Director stated the purpose of CIG 24 and CIG 24/1 was to formalize procedure on matters submitted to the National Intelligence Authority. He said he did not believe that the Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the National Intelligence Authority could correctly make the Intelligence Advisory Board, which was created solely for the purpose of advising the Director of Central Intelligence, privy to all matters presented to the National Intelligence Authority. He noted that in the last two months he had received calls from Admiral Leahy and Secretary Forrestal on matters that did not concern the coordination of intelligence. He further stated that up until the last N.I.A. meeting there had been no agenda published. However, prior to that meeting Secretary Forrestal requested that an agenda be published. An agenda was prepared and circulated to the member IAB agencies.

Mr. Eddy stated that the State Department was wholly in agreement with CIG 24/1 with the exception of two changes, one of which was substantive and the other one of clarification, the substantive change being that on matters involving the request for personnel or facilities by CIG to the member agencies that such requests should be submitted to the IAB in writing prior to submission to the N.I.A.

In this connection Mr. Eddy noted that the President’s letter of 22 January 1946 stated in part that full use shall be made by the Director of Central Intelligence of the staff and facilities of the member IAB agencies.

The Director read paragraphs 3 a, b and c of the above-mentioned letter.

Upon being asked by the Director Admiral Inglis replied that he went along with the change recommended by Mr. Eddy, and further that he had a number of other exceptions as to the whole philosophy of CIG’s position as set forth in the discussion of CIG 24/1. He said he took particular exception to the item in paragraph 1 of the recommendations in CIG 24/1, which stated: “The Director of Central Intelligence shall be the sole judge of the advisability of referring any proposed recommendation to a special studies group or for otherwise delaying the submission of the recommendation to the National Intelligence Authority.”

The Director stated that he believed that item was a result of the delays in receiving recommendations from ad hoc committees appointed by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

Admiral Inglis stated he also took exception to that part of CIG 24/1 which required the IAB to submit any desired statement of non-concurrence in one week.

The Director stated that he was often limited in time in the preparation of replies to other agencies and cited for an example the urgent request of the Atomic Energy Commission for comments of the National Intelligence Authority on the proposed intelligence organization within the Atomic Energy Commission.

Admiral Inglis noted that in reality any paper sent to the Intelligence Advisory Board for consideration could not be answered by “yes” or “no.”

General McDonald stated it was his opinion that by allowing a week and in some cases less for consideration of a paper, the work was being taken out of the hands of the intelligence staffs and was being performed by the members of the IAB.

The Director stated he agreed with General McDonald but he still felt there should be some time limitation set on papers circulated to the IAB for comment.

Admiral Inglis stated that in cases where urgency was of the essence, if a statement to that effect were indicated he would do all in his power to return his comments in the time allotted. Admiral Inglis went on to state that Secretary Forrestal had told him that he expected the IAB to thresh out and reconcile their differences on papers before they were submitted to the N.I.A., and further that Mr. Forrestal did not like the recent procedure of submitting recommendations to the N.I.A. without having such recommendations discussed by the intelligence chiefs of that Authority. Admiral Inglis said, however, he recognized that the Director of Central Intelligence had encountered from time to time inordinate delays in IAB handling of papers and he sympathized with the desire to reduce such delays.

Admiral Inglis also stated that it was his opinion that paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 did not restrict the matters which are referred to the IAB to matters related to coordination. Admiral Inglis said he was also not in agreement with paragraph 4 of the discussion in CIG 24/1, which read: “Recommendations requested of the Director of Central Intelligence by the National Intelligence Authority are not considered as falling into the pattern provided in N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 3, nor is it considered that it was the intent of the President or of the National Intelligence Authority that all reports, papers, and statements prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence for presentation to the National Intelligence Authority be first submitted to the Intelligence Advisory Board for advisory opinion” since a great deal depended upon the subject matter presented to the N.I.A.

The Director stated that he agreed with Admiral Inglis and suggested that the word “all” precede the word “recommendations” in the beginning of the above-quoted paragraph.

Admiral Inglis stated since the Director of Central Intelligence was a non-voting member of the National Intelligence Authority, it was his opinion that this fact gave a different implication to the statement contained in CIG 24/1 that “The Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the National Intelligence Authority can not correctly make the Intelligence Advisory Board, which was created solely for the purpose of advising him, privy to all matters before the National Intelligence Authority.” He went on to state that he certainly assumed from the reasoning behind the organization of the Intelligence Advisory Board that that Board should be privy to practically all matters going to the National Intelligence Authority.

The Director stated he agreed with the viewpoint of Admiral Inglis that practically all matters presented to the National Intelligence Authority should have had prior discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Board. He noted, however, that it would be difficult to define in advance those matters which should go to the National Intelligence Authority without previous IAB discussion.

Admiral Inglis stated with reference to the preparation and circulation of formalized agenda for NIA meetings that it was Mr. Forrestal’s desire that agenda should be prepared by the Secretary, N.I.A., and items thereon discussed by the IAB prior to their discussion by the N.I.A.

Mr. Eddy noted that even if formalized agenda for N.I.A. meetings were prepared that the Intelligence Advisory Board could not expect that the N.I.A. would not discuss other matters than those appearing on the agenda, if they so desired.

Admiral Inglis stated that it was not the intent that the National Intelligence Authority could not discuss any matter they saw fit. However, he was advocating that the Intelligence Advisory Board use the same procedure as used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, i.e., that all matters be thoroughly discussed and differences reconciled on the working level prior to submission to a higher authority.

General Chamberlin stated that he was in agreement with Admiral Inglis that there should be an agenda prepared for N.I.A. meetings, and further if the N.I.A. chooses to bring up items other than those appearing on the agenda that was, of course, their prerogative.

Admiral Inglis stated that it was his opinion that the provisions of the last three sentences under the discussion in CIG 24/1 were unsound, and further that neither the Director of Central Intelligence nor any other lone member of the Intelligence Advisory Board could nullify the desires of all other members in sending any paper to the National Intelligence Authority. He pointed out that he did not believe it was practicable to require the head of one of the intelligence agencies to go through his secretary in order to get a paper to the National Intelligence Authority, and further that such a practice was not fair to the members of the N.I.A. not to have the advice of the Intelligence Advisory Board. He also said it was his opinion that the logical and practical way to submit papers to the N.I.A. was through the IAB with the recommendations, if any, of the members of the IAB appended to such papers in the event agreement could not be reached. Admiral Inglis went on to say that this procedure was followed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and any other way seemed irregular to him.

Mr. Edgar stated that the N.I.A. and the IAB were not comparable to the JCS and JIC. The JCS has a committee where the N.I.A. has a Director of Central Intelligence who is an individual responsible for certain activities and the IAB is merely advisory to him.

Admiral Inglis stated that he did not agree that the IAB was merely advisory to the Director of Central Intelligence and further it was not intended in the philosophy that established the IAB.

Mr. Edgar said that the title of the IAB indicated that it was in fact an advisory body.

Admiral Inglis stated that he did not believe this was the concept. He said the IAB, in addition to being an advisory body, is also an implementing body, and further the IAB is a liaison channel between the Director of Central Intelligence and the member agencies. It also permits the heads of the intelligence services themselves to implement and take special personal interest in the work of the CIG. He pointed out that the IAB was intended to make the heads of intelligence services share the responsibility of the success of CIG and in sharing this responsibility the members of the IAB must have a certain amount of authority.

Mr. Eddy stated it appeared to him that to send a paper to the N.I.A. without the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the majority of the members of the IAB would be expecting a lot of the N.I.A.

Admiral Inglis thought that any member of the IAB who filed a paper should get the concurrence of not less than one other member. However, if it was desired to adjust this to a majority, that was a compromise, and that he did not feel too strongly one way or the other.

General Chamberlin stated that he thought the IAB might approach the overall question better if CIG 24 and CIG 24/1 were withdrawn and a complete new paper prepared. He went on to state that he objected to CIG 24/1 somewhat along the lines of Admiral Inglis. He said he agreed perfectly with Admiral Inglis that the IAB was a little more than an advisory body and further that the idea that the IAB had authority to commit their own departments to action could be justified. He went on to state that the success of intelligence in the government is dependent entirely on cooperation. He said that the above was a general summary of his feeling. However, he had other objections in detail and believed that time could be saved by appointing an ad hoc committee to redraft a new paper.

Mr. Eddy stated that he would agree to the appointment of an ad hoc committee to redraft a new paper. However, he believed that a close examination of the recommendations contained in CIG 24/1 left nothing to be desired, and further that he hoped that the ad hoc committee, if appointed, could start with these recommendations and see how they could be amended. He went on to say he did not find much in the recommendations which would not be acceptable to him.

General McDonald, upon being asked by the Director, agreed to the appointment of the ad hoc committee mentioned above.

Admiral Inglis asked Mr. Eddy whether the ad hoc committee in drawing up a new paper should restrict itself to the recommendations contained in CIG 24/1.

Mr. Eddy replied that he hoped that they would consider the recommendations and that in the main these recommendations could form a basis for the new paper.

After some discussion where it was noted by Admiral Inglis that he felt that the IAB should have a staff as did the JIC,

The Intelligence Advisory Board

Agreed to appoint an ad hoc committee to submit a new paper on the subject of action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on matters submitted to the National Intelligence Authority, the committee to consist of Mr. Edgar, Mr. Armstrong, Lt. Col. Treacy, Capt. Davis and Col. Mussett.

3. Amendment of the Definition of Strategic and National Policy Intelligence (IAB 2)⁷

The Director stated that the phrase “strategic and national policy intelligence” had its origin in a memorandum from General Donovan to the President dated 18 November 1944.⁸ Therein General Donovan distinguished between intelligence pertaining primarily to departmental action and intelligence material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out the national policy and strategy. General Donovan went on to say in this memorandum that while recognizing that production of the former must remain decentralized, he contended for centralization with respect to the latter. He proposed as one of the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency the “final evaluation, synthesis, and dissemination within the government of intelligence required to enable the government to determine policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and war and the advancement of broad national policy.” The Director went on to say that in a counter proposal prepared by the JIS the above passage was revised and stated that

“Accomplish the synthesis of departmental intelligence relating to the national security and the appropriate strategic and national policy intelligence.”

This counter proposal was in turn carried over into the President’s letter of 22 January 1946 with the substitution of “correlation and evaluation” for “synthesis” and the deletion of “departmental.” The Director said that Admiral Souers attributed the first change to the mere preference of Latin to Greek. The second was intended to deemphasize the idea of dependence on departmental agencies. A new sentence was added to require their full (but not exclusive) use. The Director said the JIS draft, which served eventually as the basis of the President’s letter, was based on the following concepts:

a. That each department would continue to produce the intelligence required to meet its own operating needs (i.e. pertaining primarily to departmental action).

b. That such intelligence was inadequate as a basis for national strategy and policy (i.e. for decisions transcending the responsibilities of any particular department).

c. That a central agency free of departmental bias was required to provide, through evaluation and synthesis, the intelligence required as a basis for such decisions.

The Director said that from the beginning strategic and national policy intelligence was conceived to be one thing, not two. Strategic was used in view of the emphasis upon relation to national security and because it was anticipated that the central organization would supersede the JIC in the realm of overall national strategy. National policy was used to broaden the implications of strategic to exclude, on the one hand, such matters of operational strategy as purely military plans for the seizure of Okinawa, and to include on the other considerations of a policy nature. The phrase, as a whole, was intended to describe that politico-military area of concern to the State, War and Navy Departments transcending the exclusive competence of any of them.

Mr. Eddy stated that he preferred the original definition as approved by the N.I.A.

General McDonald stated that he believed that the counter proposal submitted by the Navy on the definition in question was on the right track and that he had a proposal to go along with it. General McDonald said he thought the last sentence of the Navy definition might be modified to read as follows:

“It is political-economic-military in scope including such strategic data, as is necessary, of common concern at least to one military and one non-military agency.”

Admiral Inglis stated that he thought operational intelligence had to be reserved to the military, if it was military, and if diplomatic to the State Department. Mr. Edgar stated that he thought the definition of staff intelligence clearly indicated that anything that would be called operational would come under staff intelligence rather than under national intelligence.

Captain Davis said he questioned Mr. Edgar’s remark. He said it had been mentioned a number of times in discussions at other IAB meetings that CIG had no jurisdiction over operational intelligence. He went on to say that CIG no doubt did some operational intelligence but it was necessary for the military to keep control over their own operational intelligence. He said that nowhere did he find in writing or in the laws drafted in relation to CIG that exception, and it seemed to him that such should be put in writing.

Admiral Inglis stated if it could be worked in somewhere “that intelligence which is necessary for their operations” and if there could be an understanding that strategic and national policy intelligence “must transcend the exclusive competence of both War and Navy Departments or any other Department thereafter that may arise from unification,” then he was agreeable to the definition of strategic and national policy intelligence as written. Admiral Inglis went on to say that he thought this matter could be settled by writing into the minutes or having a memorandum prepared that the meaning of the definition was justified by implication since it included the words “political-economic-military,” and further that it must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department or of the Army and Navy Departments together.

Mr. Eddy asked whether the IAB could be sure that the JCS were not going to call on CIG for basic intelligence related to military and naval problems. He noted that the JIC already goes out of the chain of command for required intelligence information.

Admiral Inglis replied that it would be hard to give a “yes” or “no” answer.

Mr. Eddy stated that although the IAB did not know the final form of the JIC, he had no objections to the above proposal of Admiral Inglis.

Mr. Edgar suggested that the IAB accept Admiral Inglis’ proposal until such time as the JIC’s future was determined and then, if necessary, again raise the question of the definition of strategic and national policy intelligence from the Army and Navy angle.

After some discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to Mr. Edgar’s proposal.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–281. Secret. The meeting was held in the North Interior Building.
1. On June 30 the NIA’s secretary, at the request of the Acting Chief of Naval Intelligence, circulated IAB 3, “Employment of Reserve Officers as Agents,” recommending that reserve military or naval personnel not be used as agents unless “the information is most important and can not otherwise be obtained.” (Ibid., HS/HC–280) See the Supplement.
2. IAB 3/1, July 15, summarizing an ICAPS study, suggested that employment of agents, military or civilian, for espionage or counter-espionage by agencies other than CIG ran counter to the intent of NIA Directive No. 5. Reservists acting in a civilian capacity as observers and reporters for their parent agencies did not fall within the definition of espionage or counter-espionage agents, but their activities should be coordinated in accordance with NIA Directive No. 7. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–280) See the Supplement.
3. The sentence reads: “Consequently, this practice [use of reservists as observers and reporters for parent agencies] must be considered a purely departmental undertaking unrelated to the special operations of CIG [,] but all reserve personnel of the Armed Services residing abroad in civilian capacity should be used as observers and reporters of intelligence only by their respective departments.”
4. Paragraph 5 a of IAB 3 recommended that reserve officers not normally be used as agents abroad.
5. The “conclusions” section of IAB 3 as amended became NIA Directive No. 10, Document 322.
6. Documents 189 and 317.
7. Dated May 9, 1947. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–280) See the Supplement.
8. See Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 445–447.