Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

317. Central Intelligence Group Paper No. 24/1⁰

Washington, undated.

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD PROCEDURES

The Problem

To establish procedure for the Intelligence Advisory Board.

Facts

Although certain basic policies are established by the President’s letter of 22 January 1946 and by subsequent N.I.A. Directives, no procedure has been formally agreed upon for the accomplishment of the mission of the I.A.B.

Discussion

In accordance with N.I.A. Directive No. 1,¹ paragraph 3, all recommendations to the N.I.A., initiated by the Director of Central Intelligence and related to the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the departments as related to the national security, are referred to the I.A.B. for concurrence or comment before submission to the N.I.A.

At its 9th meeting, the N.I.A. established the procedure it desired for the implementation of N.I.A. Directive No. 5, paragraph 3.²

The I.A.B. has itself agreed upon an acceptable procedure for implementation of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 6, which relates to intelligence reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Group.

Recommendations requested of the Director of Central Intelligence by the N.I.A. are not considered as falling into the pattern provided in N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 3. Nor is it considered that it was the intent of the President or of the N.I.A. that all reports, papers, and statements prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence for presentation to the N.I.A. be first submitted to the I.A.B. for advisory opinion. The Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the N.I.A. can not correctly make the I.A.B., which was created solely for the purpose of advising him, privy to all matters before the N.I.A. Similarly as the agent of the N.I.A. he can not make the I.A.B. privy to all of his relations with the N.I.A.

Since it is not the current practice of the N.I.A. to formalize agenda in advance of its meetings, it is impossible for the Secretary, N.I.A., to undertake to supply N.I.A. agenda to the I.A.B. At such time as the N.I.A. may formalize such agenda, distribution thereof will necessarily be determined by the N.I.A. and not by the Director of Central Intelligence or the I.A.B.

After careful consideration, it is believed that no procedure should be established which requires the I.A.B.–D.C.I.–N.I.A. channel for the presentation of opinions by an Intelligence Chief to his respective departmental head. No such procedure appears contemplated by the President’s letter nor subsequent N.I.A. Directives. This opinion is further borne out by the absence of any provision requiring the submission to the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence of any recommendation, paper, etc. originated elsewhere than with him. Thus it would appear that any recommendation originated by a member of the I.A.B., even though it may receive concurrence of all other I.A.B. members, can not properly be submitted to the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence unless it is accepted by him as a recommendation from him. Any such recommendation would apparently have to be submitted individually by each I.A.B. member to his respective N.I.A. member.

Conclusion

It is concluded that a formalization of I.A.B. procedures is appropriate.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board adopt the following procedures for its consideration of recommendations properly coming before it for advisory opinion:

1. All recommendations envisaged by paragraph 3b of the President’s letter of 22 January 1946 will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the I.A.B. in writing, accompanied by copies of such papers or statement with which the Director of Central Intelligence may contemplate accompanying the recommendations upon presentation to the N.I.A. These recommendations will have attached a voting slip providing opportunity for (a) concurrence; (b) comment; (c) request for an I.A.B. meeting to express oral advisory opinion. Voting slips will be returned to the Secretary, N.I.A., within one calendar week after receipt. If any I.A.B. member so requests, an I.A.B. meeting shall be promptly called by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be the sole judge of the advisability of referring any proposed recommendation to a special study group or for otherwise delaying the submission of the recommendation to the N.I.A. If he considers such reference or other delay inadvisable, he shall give I.A.B. members one calendar week for the submission of any desired statement of non-concurrence, the basis of which will accompany the recommendation to the N.I.A.

2. All implementations envisaged by N.I.A. Directive No. 5, paragraph 3, will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the I.A.B. in writing, accompanied by a voting slip providing opportunity for (a) comment, and (b) calling of a meeting. Written comment by any I.A.B. member, after consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence, will be filed by the Secretary, N.I.A., with the file copy of the related implementation. Oral comment will be fully spread on the minutes of the I.A.B. meeting, if held. Any implementation modified by the Director of Central Intelligence as the result of I.A.B. advisory opinions will be distributed by the Secretary, N.I.A., to the I.A.B. The decision to hold subsequent I.A.B. meetings or otherwise to delay the issuance of any proposed implementation rests with the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The Secretary, N.I.A. shall circulate to I.A.B. members all proper recommendations, proposed directives, papers, etc., which any I.A.B. member may originate for consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence and the I.A.B. Each shall be accompanied by a voting slip providing opportunity for (a) concurrence; (b) comment; (c) request for meeting.

4. Unless otherwise directed by the N.I.A., the Secretary, N.I.A., shall circulate to the I.A.B. copies of all minutes, decisions, and directives approved by or issued by or in the name of the N.I.A.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276. Confidential. Attached to a May 13 memorandum from Earman to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, which noted that it was circulated at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence as an alternative to CIG 24 (Document 189).
1. Document 141.
2. Document 160. Paragraph 3 reads “the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed to act for this Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed.” The reference to the procedure established at the NIA’s 9th meeting is to the NIA’s approval of Vandenberg’s recommendation that the Director of Central Intelligence should “operate within his jurisdiction as an agent of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy.”