832.30/543

The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

No. 14722

Sir: Referring to my despatch No. 14708 of February 24, 194465 concerning the new Brazilian naval program proposed by the Minister of the Navy,66 I have the honor to transmit herewith some comments thereon prepared by Captain W. S. Macaulay, Chief of the United States Naval Mission:

  • “1.…67
  • “2. These comments are based on the following assumptions:
    (a)
    That the Natal statement of Presidents Roosevelt and Vargas68 that they had ‘reached complete agreement that it must be permanently and definitely assured that the coasts of West Africa and Dakar never again under any circumstances be allowed to become a blockade or an invasion threat against the two Americas’ will be implemented.
    (b)
    That Brazil and the United States will conclude a new or continue the existing Political-Military agreement for their mutual and joint defense and for the defense of the Western [Page 572] Hemisphere, i.e., the United States and Brazil are assuming mutual responsibility.
    (c)
    That after the war the United States will have more naval tonnage available than will be desirable for us to keep in commission.
    (d)
    That a ‘quid pro quo’ will be agreed upon for the transfer of naval vessels to Brazil.
    (e)
    That the U.S. Naval Mission will be continued after the war and will be able to exert influence on the disposition, employment and operation of these vessels after their transfer to Brazil.
    (f)
    That transfer of vessels will be made with the proviso that such transfer will be effected when the U.S. Navy considers Brazilian crews are sufficiently trained to operate the vessels concerned.
  • [Here follows an analysis of certain military and naval factors in the situation.]
  • “11. From a purely military viewpoint, i.e., without considering the political aspects involved, if the Brazilian Navy did not maintain a force capable of carrying out the above tasks the United States should. A logical U. S. task force for this area would consist of one division of cruisers (4), two carriers, and two destroyer squadrons (sixteen destroyers and two destroyer leaders) with necessary tenders and base defense vessels. This corresponds very closely to the Brazilian Naval program.
  • “12. It therefore appears that provided the assumptions stated in paragraph 2 are correct the principle of transferring excess naval tonnage to Brazil is sound from the U.S. point of view and that the naval program proposed by the Minister of Marine is a reasonable, practical and well balanced program in the existing international situation.”

Respectfully yours,

Jefferson Caffery
  1. Not printed.
  2. Adm. Henrique Aristides Guilhem.
  3. Omission indicated in the original despatch.
  4. For correspondence on the meeting of the Presidents at Natal, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. v, pp. 653 ff.