740.00112 European War 1939/10592: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:16 p.m.]
1352. Following is paraphrase of text of proposed note on Bothnian traffic referred to in Legation’s 290, April 17, 7 p.m. to London (Legation’s 1320, April 17, 7 p.m. to Department8):
United States and British Governments have considered Swedish aide-mémoire of January 59 referring to transport of large amounts of cement, coke and coal from Germany to Norway across Sweden through Bothnian ports. Allied Governments have noted that Swedish Government considers this transit as outside purview of the understandings arrived at last summer. This contention is inadmissible to American and British Governments.
Allied Governments have frequently stressed serious view they take of all kinds of transit through Sweden on behalf of Germany. Even though their principal concern has been movement of enemy troops and war materials across Sweden, they pointed out in course of discussions on transit traffic with what great concern they viewed transit [Page 511] of other commodities for enemy account. During these discussions last year and previously both Governments, although not informed about traffic via Bothnian ports, regarded negotiations as including all kinds of traffic across Sweden. The undertaking drawn up by negotiators in London last year contains following undertaking10 (article I):
“A limitation to 120,000 tons will be imposed by Swedish Government on annual traffic of all commodities not included in attached list of war materials which pass through Sweden from enemy areas to Finland and Norway.”
Allied Governments were within their rights in making the assumption as they did that since Swedish Government never expressed any opposition to this draft undertaking it agreed to its provisions. This assumption was supported by the fact that in August 1943 the Swedish Foreign Office confirmed to the British Minister the list of war materials envisaged by the undertaking, indicating thereby that the Swedish Government was operating along the lines of the London document. In addition Kumlin of the Foreign Office told the British Minister in August 1943 that the ceiling of 120,000 tons per annum for the traffic in non-war materials would be applied.
In their aide-mémoire the Swedish Government maintains that this undertaking to limit the traffic in non-war materials to 120,000 tons yearly relates only to traffic via ferries since discussions last year and previously were confined to ferry traffic. Allied Governments cannot agree with this conclusion, although they accept premise on which it is based. Allied Governments did not know of existence of Bothnian traffic which has sprung up since 1939 and is a means by which the Germans maintain their occupation of Norway.
Obviously, therefore, Allied Governments meant negotiations on traffic of non-war materials to limit all such transit, irrespective of route used. Certainly Swedish negotiators would have made a specific exception of traffic via the Gulf of Bothnia if their intentions had been different.
All Governments must conclude that on both sides it was intended to have unilateral declaration made in 1943 cover all enemy traffic through Sweden with no reservations. All three Governments understood negotiations in this manner and it was only later when Swedish Government became a sire [aware?] of traffic via Gulf of Bothnia that their position changed. Allied Governments are confident that this conclusion is well founded. On basis of this conclusion Swedish Government cannot expect that Allied Governments could [Page 512] agree with contention now made on Swedish side that only matter discussed was traffic via ferries.
It is impossible to disregard another side of question. United States and British Governments should undertake only with great hesitation to supply to a neutral country commodities badly required in their war effort. Steps taken by Sweden with regard to enemy transit were greatly responsible for their willingness to make this sacrifice. For this reason United States and British Governments clearly expect as of right that no modification in the understanding reached will now be made to their injury, particularly since the two Governments cannot conceivably be regarded as responsible for whatever error in understanding may have occurred.
Consequently, Allied Governments ask that Swedish Government give assurances promptly that transit of non-war materials from enemy territory to Finland and Norway by way of Gulf of Bothnia or other ports in Sweden will be brought within annual ceiling of 120,000 tons accepted in 1943 by Sweden.
My 300, April 19, 5 p.m. repeats this message to London.
- Not printed.↩
- See telegram 37, January 5, 7 p.m., from Stockholm, p. 458.↩
- See telegram 4093, June 21, 1943, 11 a.m., from London, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, p. 781.↩