860H.00/9–844
Memorandum by the United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Murphy), Temporarily in Washington, to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Cannon)
Dear Cavendish: During the course of Marshal Tito’s visit to Caserta he suggested several times that I visit him at Vis. After [Page 1404] his return there he again reminded me of it on four different occasions, through the OSS Mission. I thought, therefore, that it might be well before departure to go over to the Island and, accordingly, I flew over there on Thursday, August 31.
He was in excellent spirits, I found, and on the qui vive regarding the pending military operations in Yugoslavia. He had been asked by SAC48 to attempt to cut certain German lines of communication and to extend his sabotage activities. For that purpose he was being provided some additional means, although General Wilson said that he did not contemplate sending a large force to support him immediately.
I spent the entire afternoon with Marshal Tito, and had opportunity to ask him a few questions. Among those was whether in his opinion the Soviet Union would invade Serbia and attack the Mihailovic forces. He spoke with great assurance on this point, stating that he was convinced that the Russians would not enter Serbia, but would confine their activities along the Danube into Hungary, leaving Marshal Tito to deal with Serbian matters.
On the subject of territorial settlement after the war he said that the Allies would find Yugoslavia “stiff necked”. He said Yugoslavia is entitled to, and will insist on, Istria, and in his opinion should also have the Kossovar area and parts of Macedonia and Thrace. He felt that the Allies could afford to be liberal in their treatment of Yugoslavia, in view of the sacrifices the latter has made in the winning of the war.
Marshal Tito also expressed the opinion that, while the German settlement was a matter which he felt could well be left to the great powers, he did believe that any proposal to partition Germany should be approached with the greatest delicacy. He said that he personally believed that Germany should not be divided, but that its economy should be used as a unit for the benefit of the European community of nations. That economy has been built up over a long period of generations and represents an element of the greatest importance to the well-being of all of Germany’s neighbors. Punishment of German war criminals should not be confused with proper use of German economy.
He gave me the stock reply on the question of communism in Yugoslavia after the war, saying that Yugoslavia did not include a population whose traditions would tend toward communism, that he stood for a liberal and democratic form of regime, the form of which he was content to leave with the Yugoslav people. He made a long plea for economic support from the United States. There was no doubt in [Page 1405] my mind after meeting the members of the Russian Mission during a luncheon that the relationship between them and Marshal Tito could not be closer or more friendly.
- Supreme Allied Commander.↩