860H.01/8–3044: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Murphy), to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:50 p.m.]
243. Reference my 194, August 24.45 Following are principal points of informal conversations with Tito reported by Norden on his return from Vis.
Tito claims five Partisan corps have been formed in Serbia with two more in formation. He spoke of an impending offensive in Serbia in a manner that implied that it was directed at both Germans and Chetniks and expressed confidence that Mihailovic would shortly be in flight and cease to be a factor in Yugoslavia. He was unwilling to commit himself on possibility of a peaceful settlement with Chetnik Serbia. He claims principal Yugoslav cities will fall into his hands since he believes 75% of their population are with him and expects to be in Belgrade in about a month but admits there will be a struggle with Chetnik and Nedic elements. In strict confidence he estimated loss of lives by Partisans at some 200,000.
Plan for a single Yugoslav state authority (see my 175 August 12 [21]) he said was premature and would not be submitted to the National Committee for the present. He emphasized need for proceeding slowly and cited his difficulties with his supporters in the interior on occasion of his projected visit to Italy last July which visit he said would “more than likely” have been in accord with Moscow’s desires. He had recognized competence of the Subasic government only in respect to external affairs, he said.
With respect to post-war developments he expressed a desire to build a strong unified but federal state which would act as a bridge but not a buffer between East and West and expressed a strong wish for American economic and especially technical aid. At same time he said attitude hitherto shown toward his movement had been a great disappointment and warned that Western Powers should proceed carefully lest Yugoslav people turn against them which he said was already the case in respect to British, although he has a keen regard for Maclean personally. He anticipates a long period of instability in Europe following the war and sees the only hope of order in Anglo-United States-Russian collaboration, adding somewhat archly that he hopes he may be helpful to us in that respect. He wants to repatriate German minorities in Yugoslavia to Germany and hopes for our support.
[Page 1403]Of special interest was an emphatic and angry remark made apropos of opposition propaganda, that he would not permit the movement to be viewed in the sense of class struggle since far too heavy sacrifices had been made in its behalf.
A French but not an Italian mission would be welcome he indicated.
Tito who was resting from his recent trip was in an unusually relaxed mood. It was evident however that he considered himself future ruler of his country. Impression was of a man with a great gift for phrase, capable, energetic, with a singularly attractive personality which has an almost messianic hold upon his followers, a personal product of the Central European class struggle with a desire to outgrow his background and play a role upon a larger stage. However he seemed far more happy and at home in his role of romantic guerilla leader than in discussing peace time plans.
National Committee members Kardel, Zechevich and Ribnikar while determined and intelligent were more impressive as disciples than as personalities. By comparison, General Smetan Zujevic46 who is said to be close to Tito and is frequently sent on special missions to lift morale is an outstanding personality.
(Following personal for the Secretary.)
Maclean in discussing the Yugoslav problem indicated that British policy was dominated by a desire to give Russia no cause for uneasiness and no excuse for military intervention, whilst seeking to extend western influence and moderating extremism by a constructive and sympathetic approach. Tito, he feels, might well prefer to be a ruler of an independent Yugoslavia rather than [a mere] Soviet official especially if properly handled. He was of course selling a line intimately bound up with his activities of the past year but added that he kept in back of his mind possibility of disillusionment on an epic scale. A full report of conversation follows by despatch.47
Norden did not participate in Maclean’s démarche concerning Chetnik dissidents.