860H.01/7–2244: Telegram
The Chargé to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:30 p.m.]
Yugoslav Series 9. Subasic returned to London on July 18 accompanied by Tito’s nominees in the Cabinet, Vukosavlejvic and Marusic, and by General Velebit.34
He was somewhat weighed down by the course things had taken at Caserta.
He gave me some sidelights on Tito’s refusal to attend the Caserta meeting. Subasic said Tito took the position that if he was to discuss military matters at General Wilson’s headquarters he should do so alone, i.e., without the Yugoslav Prime Minister. He would be willing to discuss political matters with Subasic but on Yugoslav soil. Subasic remarked to me that if Tito could not come to Caserta he naturally could not go to Tito.
Pie added that Tito had also sent him a message explaining that certain leftist elements were opposed to any contact with the “Royal” Yugoslav Prime Minister; they objected to any relationship, however indirect, with the King. Secondly the anti-Fascist council had not given its approval to the Tito-Subasic agreement. To go to Caserta in the face of this lack of approval would be to act like a dictator.
Subasic thought Tito would be able to bring round the leftist elements but it would take time. To my question whether a meeting was planned for later Subasic said this was so but a time had not been fixed.
I suggested matters thus appeared to have made little progress. Subasic said that Vukosavlejvic and Marusic had been sworn in as Ministers and had taken the oath to the King. This was a step forward.
As for relations with Mihailovic, Subasic did not think King Peter would go ahead with his earlier idea of appealing to Mihailovic. He said the latter was an able officer but a revolutionary type and if such an appeal were made and he failed to heed it this would create a delicate situation.
It was still intended to send General Glisic into Serbia. He was a friend of Mihailovic and he might be able to work out something. But Subasic indulged no easy optimism on this score and frankly said he did not know whether Glisic would succeed.
[Page 1395]As for relations with the Serb leaders generally, he could report no improvement. He had received the resignations of quite a number of Serb diplomats including Hadzi Djordjevic, Minister at Cairo and Saponic, Undersecretary of State also at Cairo.
Subasic dwelt on his desire to bring about a united war effort and the avoidance of fratricidal war. He wished above all to have Yugoslavia follow a policy that coincided with that of its three great Allies so that when the war was over Yugoslavia would be in a position to receive the advantages of one of the United Nations, He hoped that if at any time he was not on the right track they would tell him.
- Maj. Gen. Vladimir L. Velebit, Chief of the Military Mission of the National Liberation Army in London.↩