740.00119 EW/10–1444
Memorandum by Mr. John Coert Campbell of the Division of Southern European Affairs65
The attached report from Merrill66 throws some light on the confused situation with respect to the various approaches made by the Hungarian Government to the Allies in September and October. Merrill was informed by Lt. Colonel Howie that Horthy in early September made the decision to get in touch with the Anglo-Americans. Note that this was not a decision to surrender simultaneously to the three principal Allies.
Horthy is reported to have drafted, with the aid of Count Bethlen and General Voros, a message for delivery to the British and the Americans. He attempted to get this message out both by radio and by diplomatic courier to Switzerland and to Sweden. On September 18 [20?] we received from our Legation in Bern67 a message purportedly from the Hungarian Government containing the proposal that “Anglo-Saxon troops” occupy key positions in Hungary, that the Russians and Rumanians be made to halt their advance, in order that Hungary might turn against the Germans. Apparently no message got through to Stockholm until October 7, when Minister Johnson was given a message purportedly from the Hungarian Government which stated that Hungary wanted the assurance that, upon its surrender at least part of the country would be occupied by “Anglo-Saxon troops”, and that without such assurance it would continue to fight as Germany’s ally.68
Meanwhile General Naday and Lt. Colonel Howie arrived in Italy on September 22.69 The message which they delivered orally on behalf of Horthy was substantially the same as that which we had already received through Bern and that which we were later to receive through Stockholm, namely, that Hungary wanted to surrender but would not do so if it was to be placed entirely under Soviet occupation and control.
Looking back on the whole affair it seems to me that the Naday mission, like the approaches through Bern and Stockholm, was an attempt to bargain with Great Britain and the United States and not a sincere offer to surrender simultaneously to all three Allies, and that the Russians therefore had some justification in refusing to deal with Naday and in waiting for a direct offer of surrender made to them.
- Addressed to the Chief of the Division, Cavendish. Cannon, and to Cloyce K. Huston of the same Division.↩
- Report not printed; Frederick T. Merrill was Special Assistant at Istanbul.↩
- Telegram 6246, September 20, midnight, from Bern, not printed.↩
- Telegram 4075, October 7, 2 p.m., from Stockholm, not printed.↩
- See telegram 2278, September 24, 9 p.m., to Moscow, p. 889.↩